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Abstract
Does politician identity matter to policy outcomes? Political scientists tend to be skeptical
of the idea because of the strong role of electoral incentives. Yet the argument for greater diversity in
public office often relies upon exactly this claim. To make progress on this question, my dissertation
examines the political impact of gender quota laws, which require all parties to include a percentage
of women in their candidate lists.
I argue that quotas help overcome a political market failure, whereby group interests are
unlikely to be represented in politics if the group faces high barriers to entry and their interests lie
off the main left-right (class-based) dimension in politics. Using survey data, I show that the largest
gender gap in advanced democracies exists on maternal employment, and it cuts across partisan ties.
I evaluate the argument using a mixed methods approach, combining statistical analysis of time
series data with qualitative evidence from two matched pair case studies – Belgium and Austria, and
Portugal and Italy. After showing that quota laws are one of the most important determinants of
women’s descriptive representation, I demonstrate that they also increase both party- and national-
level attention to women’s preferences. Implementing a quota law increases coverage of women’s
social policy concerns in manifestos, and raises public spending on child care, which encourages
maternal employment. Evidence from case studies suggests that increased numbers of women and
rising issue salience after a quota are both important mechanisms linking quotas to policy change.
Overall, the findings provide new insights about when and how politician identity is relevant
to policies. Results point towards the importance of descriptive representation particularly when
group demands are orthogonal to the left-right dimension. They highlight several ways that quotas,
and increased numbers of women, can shift policies even in the context of strong parties.
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1 | Introduction
A controversy that runs deep in the study of political representation, with roots as far back as
the earliest philosophers of democracy, is whether the identity of those who represent us matters
for policies. Political scientists tend to be skeptical of the idea that a group’s physical presence in
office – descriptive representation – is necessary for the substantive representation of their interests.
Perhaps the most influential theorist of representation, Hanna Pitkin, rejects the notion that there
is a link between representatives’ identity and actions (Pitkin 1967). Empirical political scientists
often assume that politicians or parties will have incentives to incorporate any electorally salient
issues into their platforms. In this view, the identity of individual representatives is irrelevant.
Yet the argument for diversity often relies upon ‘the politics of presence’ (Phillips 1995),
the notion that a group’s physical presence in office will lead to better outcomes for that group. In
the case of women, the idea is not that gender is prescriptive, but that women will be more likely
to represent women’s interests than men. Those who believe identity matters reject the notion that
politicians are simply responding to incentives; they believe that lived experiences affect how you
behave, and this is true of politicians as well. Identity conditions what you see as important, and
how you understand what your incentives are in the first place. One of the difficulties of adjudicating
in this debate is that changes in policy outcomes may arise not from more women in office, but from
something else that may cause both women’s representation and female-friendly policy change, such
as cultural shifts.
This book uses the rise of gender quota laws in advanced democracies to study the political
impact of representatives’ identity. Gender quota laws require all political parties to include a certain
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percentage of women in their party lists, and they now exist in over fifty countries. They cause
major transformations of the composition of those elected unmatched by changes in the electorate.
Changes in public preferences are glacial, but, as I will show in Chapter 4, the effect of quotas
on representation has been abrupt. Measuring policy change after a semi-exogenous quota ‘shock’
provides useful leverage for making causal inferences.
Quotas laws are controversial. The term ‘quota’ itself has a negative connotation in many
societies, leading many advocates to use terms like ‘parity’ instead. Some proponents build the case
for quotas on pure justice reasons – women make up half the population, so they should be equally
represented in parliaments. Some claim that quotas are necessary for symbolic reasons, that the
historical absence of women in political institutions may be associated with perceptions of women’s
second-class citizenship and the notion that politics is a ‘male domain’. These approaches make no
assertions about women having a different set of policy preferences or acting differently than men.
Yet, in debates about quotas around the world, assumptions are often made about their impact on
a set of ‘women’s issues’. Many believe that increased numbers of women will change politics for
the better by addressing women’s specific policy interests. Some recent debates are illustrative.
In France, a quota law was adopted in 2000 requiring 50% of candidates to be women.
The quota was controversial, only passing after many years of sustained advocacy from the Socialist
Party and others (Murray 2012b). In the long debate about its merits many supporters connected
the proposed quota law to the substantive representation of women’s interests. For instance, an
op-ed in La Croix claims that, “It [the quota law] also will help to put on the political agenda some
different issues. On unemployment, for example, we get measures to help men who are unemployed.
If there were more women in the Assembly, they would remind them that the unemployment rate is
higher for women than for men. For many problems, issues concerning women would thus be taken
into account more easily.”1 Former UDF (center-right) party secretary Anne-Marie Idrac supported
the quota because, “some of the most important concerns of women have not seen access to the
political world. Women care much more about their jobs, their children and everyday safety, the
1“Pourquoi fallait-il inscrire la parité dans la Constitution?,” La Croix, 29 June 1999, translation by Google
Translate.
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environment, the reconciliation of working time and the family, solidarity between generations.”2
In Poland, a quota law was passed in 2011, requiring 35% of candidates on party lists to
be women. The original idea for the law came from the Congress of Women, a meeting of more than
four thousand women from across Poland that took place in June 2009, and turned into a social
movement. The group spearheaded a petition for gender parity in political representation, which
was eventually signed by over 150,000 Poles (Kroliczek 2012). One of the primary advocates for
the quota law was the former Head of the Social Policy Ministry from the Labour Union, Izabela
Jaruga Nowacka. Jaruga Nowacka claimed, “if there will be no women in politics, women’s interests
will never be taken into consideration” (TVN24 2009, as quoted in Kroliczek 2012, p. 24). Another
quota supporter, Professor Magdaleny Srody, took this line of reasoning further, connecting the
quota law to specific social policies for women: ‘the Sejm is such a black hole... it seems common
sense that certain laws such as the nurseries and kindergartens should move at lightning speed, and
here it turns out that they do not. For example a gambling law shall be passed at express rate but
for nurseries and kindergartens it takes years.”3
Ireland passed a quota law in 2012, requiring parties to include women as 30% of candi-
dates or face major funding cuts. The law was informed by a report on women’s participation in
politics published by the Justice Committee in 2009, which argues that, “women bring different life
experiences, priorities, knowledge and a different style of decision-making” to politics.4 In an op-ed,
first-time Fianna Fáil (centrist) candidate Laura Reid writes that she supports quotas and was
motivated to run because, “It will only be when a large enough proportion of elected representatives
are female that challenges, interests and life experiences applicable to women will properly gain a
voice and be represented.”5
2“ ‘Pour réparer l’injustice faite aux femmes, il faut modifier la Constitution’ même s’il est triste d’en passer par
là,” Liberation, 14 December 1998, translation by Google Translate.
3“MPs returned to Parliament, comes a struggle for parity,” Gazeta, 22 September 2010, translation by Google
Translate.
4Oireachtas Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights. 2009. “Women’s Participation in
Politics.” Available from: http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/committees30thdail/j-justiceedwr/reports_
2008/20091105.pdf.
5“More female voices are needed in Irish politics to tackle societal imbalances,” TheJournal.ie, 26 April 2013.
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Italy has debated a quota law in parliament twice in recent years, in 2005-06 and 2014-
15. In both cases women MPs campaigned to include a gender quota in changes to the electoral
law. The 2005 proposal was not successful, but the more recent electoral reform includes a 50%
quota for women. In the debate about the quota in parliament, several female representatives made
the connection between the historical lack of women in politics and inequality in Italian society.
Annalisa Pannarale, a representative from the left-wing SEL party, argued that the idea quotas
discriminate unfairly is a fallacy:
It is not true that women in this country can show what is their value and what is their
quality, because there are no tools to do so. This is a country that must constantly
address the gender pay gap, which sees the salaries of women drop lower and lower, this
is a country that sees women in increasingly precarious contracts, where half of women
do not work... where you must choose between a reproductive path or the possibility of
a career.6
In the same debate, Paola Binetti, a representative from the Christian Democratic UDC
party, suggested that persistent gender inequality is exactly why it’s so important to have women
in positions of political power. She states:
The difficulty that women have balancing professional, or in this case political, engage-
ment with family needs has been cited by many. But it is precisely for this reason that
we want female presence at the highest decision-making levels; it is precisely for this
reason that we hope that those policies for the family which have never been, come to
be... there is a culture of thought and of difference that should be a positive enrichment
for this parliament.7
Finally, Venezuela’s National Electoral Council (CNE) required a 40% gender quota for
party lists in the 2015 national election. During the presentation of the new rules, the President
of the CNE Tibisay Lucena explained that the quota was necessary because political parties were
too often closed to women, and the major issues facing women stand above political differences.
She said, “The political participation of women is what brings us together, but also the issues of
sexual and reproductive rights, the right to life free from violence, domestic violence, sexual abuse,
6Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea, Seduta 186 di lunedi 10 marzo 2014, author’s translation.
7Resoconto stenografico dell’Assemblea, Seduta 186 di lunedi 10 marzo 2014, author’s translation.
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harassment, use of women as a commodity to sell products, these are all issues that cut across social,
educational, economic and political strata.”8
These views are shared by the UN Committee established under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which states: “the concept
of democracy will have real and dynamic meaning and lasting effect only when political decision-
making is shared by women and men and takes equal account of the interests of both.”9 In summary,
quotas are often viewed as a way to promote not only women’s inclusion but their political interests
as well. Yet, we know very little about whether quotas lead to meaningful policy change for women.
Along with the deeper theoretical question of whether identity matters, this book addresses a
very practical policy question. Do increasingly popular quota laws facilitate women’s substantive
representation, or are they just ‘window dressing’?
1.1 The Argument in Brief
This book is the first to examine the relationship between quota laws and policy outcomes across
countries. In addition, I seek to identify the unique effects of identity by tracing the influence of
quotas on politics. There is very little work of this nature, particularly in advanced democracies.
A notable benchmark is Chattopadhyay & Duflo (2004), who use a unique institutional setup in
India whereby certain seats are required to be randomly reserved for a woman. They find that
quotas have altered policymaking in favor of women’s interests – specifically, more spending on
water and roads. Findings have yet to be replicated in advanced democracies, where women have a
different set of policy preferences and parties and their governments wield significant power. In this
setting the conventional wisdom is that party preferences are unitary and decision-making highly
institutionalized, casting doubt on the notion that individual politicians have sufficient agency to
influence policy outcomes.
8“Chavistas y opositoras coinciden en apoyo a paridad de gÃľnero aprobada por el CNE,” Correo de Orinoco, 5
July 2015, translation by Google Translate.
9CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation no. 23 (1997), at para 14.
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In Chapter 2, I provide a broad theoretical framework for thinking about identity and policy
change. The theory focuses on understanding when and how politician identity is relevant to policy
outcomes. I argue that quotas help overcome a political market failure, whereby disadvantaged
group interests are not represented in politics if they lie off the main left-right (class) dimension in
politics. Disadvantaged groups like women face high barriers to entry in politics, and their interests
are especially likely to be ignored if they lie off the main left-right dimension. This is because
parties have little incentive to represent issues that detract from known positions or cross-cut their
constituencies.
Work-family policies fit this criteria. Survey data show that perhaps the largest gender
gap in preferences exists over the issue of maternal employment, and this gap cuts across party lines.
The issue is also not clearly partisan; left parties have been criticized for their lack of attention to
work-family policies, and right parties have been behind significant reforms in recent years. Parties
often frame the issue differently – right parties might emphasize fertility or productivity while the
left highlights gender equality – blurring the lines of issue ownership (when it is addressed at all).
Quotas, and increased numbers of women in office, are one way of correcting this market failure and
increasing the likelihood that the preferences of disadvantaged groups will be represented.
Additionally, Chapter 2 outlines a causal path linking quotas to policy outcomes that
I further develop in subsequent empirical chapters addressing specific stages of the policymaking
process. Building on insights from economic models of representation, recent empirical work in the
field of identity and politics, and anecdotal evidence from contemporary political actors, I advance a
causal story in which both electoral incentives and politician identity can matter to policy outcomes.
Once the quota law is in place, I suggest that quota laws influence policymaking in two main ways: by
increasing the number of political actors likely to care about and advocate for these issues (women),
and by increasing the salience of women’s interests. First, quotas lead to increases in the numbers of
women in office. After a quota law, an influx of women (especially a ‘critical mass’) could push the
party towards their collective preferences on certain policies. Second, quotas increase the salience
of gender-related issues, making it more likely that women’s interests will be prioritized in office.
In other words, parties might have already shifted their positions to cater to women voters even
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without a quota law in place. However, party position-taking is very different from governments
actually putting the issue on the agenda. The institution of quotas could improve the substantive
representation of women regardless of the number of women elected.
1.2 Methodology
Demonstrating that politician identity influences policy outcomes requires an empirical approach
that can pull apart politician identity, cultural shifts, and structural and institutional factors such
as women’s labor force participation and electoral rules. Moreover, any convincing explanation
of policy change must be rooted in a solid understanding of the role of identity and processes of
political decision-making at the internal party and national government levels. No single technique
would be able to accomplish all of these objectives effectively. Therefore, this book takes a mixed
methods approach, using both statistical tests and qualitative case studies. This two-pronged
approach offers the advantage of incorporating both the rigor and generality of statistical work
and the causal narrative of case-based analysis. Cross-national statistical analyses establish key
correlations, and careful robustness checks provide leverage for the causal interpretation of results.
Case studies assess the plausibility of observed statistical relationships between variables, and shed
light on mechanisms.
This book uses a variety of statistical techniques to test theories about the influence of
quotas on womens’s descriptive representation and policy outcomes. The statistical analysis aims
for breadth of coverage both in terms of time periods and the number of states included in analysis.
The analysis includes over 30 years and 20 countries, with coverage varying by chapter according
to data availability for the dependent variable and key covariates. Extending the range of relevant
dependent and explanatory variables as much as possible increases confidence in model estimates
and their potential generalizability. Large-N studies also have practical advantages, such as the
ability to apply fixed effects and other advanced techniques. I should briefly mention here why
I restrict the sample to advanced democracies. The main reason is that my theory is based on
gender gaps in social policy preferences, which are well-established in advanced democracies but
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not elsewhere. It is thus not clear that we should expect quotas, and politician identity, to influence
similar policies (or, perhaps, any policies) in developing countries. This choice is explained in further
detail in Chapter 2.
Statistical analysis establishes key associations between quotas and outcomes, but it cannot
tell us much about the theorized causal chain linking the variables. This is particularly tricky
because women’s political representation is both a key confounder, which ought to be included in
models in order to account for general favorable trends towards women in politics, and a mechanism.
Including both variables contemporaneously raises concerns about post-treatment bias. Therefore
in statistical analysis of policy outcomes I include the lagged share of women in parliament as a
covariate (just as I lag other covariates). Chapter 6 provides an initial statistical mediation test
to explore the indirect effect of quotas through women’s representation. However, for the most
part this book takes the approach of using case studies as the best way to disentangle the causal
mechanisms at work.
Matched pair case studies compare countries, and parties within countries, in detail, check-
ing the credibility of statistical results and examining how processes leading to policy change com-
pare to the mechanisms laid out in the theory. Matched pair case selection accomplishes three key
goals. First, ‘most similar’ cases can serve as mutual counterfactuals. They provide a framework
for thinking about what would have happened, all else equal, if a key treatment variable had not
occurred (Tarrow 2010). Second, matched pairs also unpack the process by which outcomes came
about in each case (George & Bennett 2005; Tarrow 2010). This parallel process tracing provides
important leverage for exploring causal mechanisms, which are often complex. For example, in
Chapter 5 I separate the causal mechanism of women’s representation into the constituent parts
of a ‘critical mass’ of women, women’s sections in the party, and women in leadership positions.
For quantitative analysis, each of these proposed links would require operationalization (which is
difficult conceptually – is there a hard threshold for a critical mass? – and for reasons of data
availability) and estimates at each step of the chain.
Finally, statistical matching as a case selection method offers a transparent and principled
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way to select cases when there are many relevant variables (Nielsen 2014). Many methodologists
advocate matching as a viable way of selecting paired cases (Gerring 2006; Seawright & Gerring
2008; Nielsen 2014; Tarrow 2010), and although it is a relatively new technique a growing number
of studies employ it (Madrigal, Alpízar & Schlüter 2011; Genovese, Wassmann & Schneider 2014;
Glynn & Ichino 2014; Lyall 2014). Case selection involved two stages. First, I selected the ‘quota
countries’ of Belgium and Portugal because these countries are of particular interest: in both a quota
law led to increases in the percentage of women in office, but in very different contexts and time
periods. I carried out fieldwork in these countries from September to December 2013, interviewing
over forty legislators, party members, and political activists. The goal was to gain knowledge about
(1) why quotas are adopted and (2) determinants of policy outcomes in key areas of interest to
women, especially work-family policies, including the role of quotas. I then used the information
gleaned about (1) to inform the book’s discussion of the causes of quota adoption (in Chapter 3),
a vital first step in order to address endogeneity concerns regarding the effect of quotas.
Having established the key potential confounders, the second stage of case selection was
to use this information in statistical matching to select pairs for Belgium and Portugal (detailed in
Chapter 3). These pairs are similar in most respects, especially with regards to the determinants
of adopting a quota law, except no quota law was adopted. The matched pairs are Belgium and
Austria, and Portugal and Italy. I conducted fieldwork in the ‘non-quota’ countries of Italy and
Austria from February to May 2014, interviewing over thirty key political actors. These interviews
focused on (2), exploring the determinants of policy changes in key areas for women, including the
role of women politicians. However I also explored questions of why quota proposals had not been
successful in these countries (the counterpart to (1), in non-quota countries). I used a non-random
strategy to select interviewees, deliberately choosing subjects who could offer the best evidence about
quota adoption and policymaking. This includes party leaders, cabinet members, and politicians
and activists with a track record of work on work-family policies.
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1.3 Plan of the Book
The rest of this book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of the book’s
theory of politician identity and policy change. While the discussion focuses on gender identity, the
theory is developed to be broad enough to apply to any historically disadvantaged group. The key
contribution is a new theoretical framework explaining how emerging policy demands interact with
traditional (left-right) party competition and entrenched political institutions to result in varying
levels of policy representation. Unlike previous work, which focuses on changing voter demands, it
emphasizes the additional role of politician identity in policy change. I claim that quotas can be
an important mechanism for political change in certain contexts, identified by interactions of group
status and left-right party competition in the theoretical model. I provide initial evidence that
supports my expectations about women’s policy demands and their relation to the standard left-right
dimension in politics using survey data. The chapter then proposes two key mechanisms through
which quotas specifically are linked to policy change for women – women’s representation and issue
salience – to be further developed in subsequent chapters. To close, I clarify key assumptions, the
scope of the project and expected external validity, and the main theoretical contributions to the
literature.
Chapter 3 takes a step back and considers why some countries adopt quota laws and
others do not. This is a critical step aimed at addressing endogeneity concerns before moving to the
empirical analysis of quotas’ effects. The chapter gives a brief history of quota laws, their evolution
and how they relate to other types of political gender quotas, before moving to a discussion of
the causes of quota adoption. I focus on identifying potential confounding variables, building on
secondary literature and evidence from fieldwork in two quota countries, Belgium and Portugal.
The last section of the chapter employs these confounders as matching variables to select ‘most
similar’ pairs for my case studies in a small-N statistical matching procedure. This sets the stage
for subsequent empirical chapters that consider the effects of quotas on women’s descriptive (Chapter
4) and substantive representation (Chapters 5 and 6).
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Chapter 4 confirms the assumption that quotas lead to more women in office, and it
demonstrates that quota laws are more effective at increasing women’s descriptive representation
than voluntary party quotas, which are also popular in advanced democracies. It also advances a
new explanation for how quota laws work. The main argument is that quota laws have both ‘vertical’
and ‘horizontal’ effects – helping party leaders overcome local-level opposition and forcing skeptical
parties to comply, respectively. They also tend to generate significant public support, creating
a powerful ‘policy feedback effect’ not present with party quotas alone. Time series analysis of
women’s descriptive representation is supplemented by synthetic control methods to establish the
link between quotas and additional numbers of women across and within countries. Case studies of
quota implementation in Belgium and Portugal help unpack the ‘black box’ of how different quota
policies work in practice and provide initial support for each of the three mechanisms proposed.
Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the key question of this book: do quotas, and identity, matter
to policy outcomes? These chapters provide the first cross-country evidence that quotas affect
outcomes – both within parties (Chapter 5) and to actual spending decisions (Chapter 6). Chapter
5 explores the relationship between quotas and political party positions, using manifesto data.
In this chapter I develop the theoretical mechanisms linking quotas to ‘policy change’ broadly
considered (Chapter 2) for the specific context of intra-party decisionmaking. I suggest several
ways these mechanisms are likely to operate in the context of party position taking, including:
increased negotiating power for women within the party; greater numbers of women in leadership
positions; increased strength of women’s sections; and policy feedback. Because party manifestos
are not coded for specific policy issues such as work-family concerns, I examine party positions
on welfare state expansion, an issue characterized by a significant gender gap in policy preferences
(women preferring more spending compared to men), and environmental protection, an issue with
no gender gap. In line with hypotheses I find that that passing a quota law coincides with increases
in party attention to welfare state expansion, but not to environmental protection. Qualitative
evidence of the evolution of party positions in far right parties in the matched pair of Belgium and
Austria suggests that quotas led to a shift in the direction of work-family positions in particular,
and women in leadership positions played key roles.
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Chapter 6 tackles the question of whether quotas lead to real policy shifts. While the
evidence from Chapter 5 is compelling, and the party position-taking stage an important part of the
policymaking process, ultimately most people judge political representation by actual policy outputs.
Could quotas be mere ‘window dressing’? The chapter continues the theoretical discussion about
mechanisms from Chapter 5, proposing that women in leadership and issue salience will be especially
important in the context of government actions. In a time series analysis of public spending data on
work-family policies, it shows that quota laws lead to greater spending on child care, a policy that
encourages maternal employment, and less spending on family allowances, which tend to discourage
women from returning to paid work. Effects are larger in size in the context of countries with larger
average gender gaps in policy preferences (e.g., France as opposed to Portugal). A matched pair
case study of work-family policy evolution in Portugal and Italy sheds light on the mechanisms at
work, indicating that the distinction between added numbers of women and issue salience might
not be as sharp as theory suggests. Instead these mechanisms can overlap and interact, together
shifting dynamics within the party and pushing party leaders to prioritize women’s concerns.
Chapter 7 concludes by summarizing the argument and key findings of the book. I review
the book’s main contributions to the literature, which include useful theoretical and practical policy
implications. By providing new insights into when and how identity matters, the book demonstrates
that descriptive representation may be more consequential than is often assumed, even in the context
of strong parties and parliamentary democracies. The adoption of quota laws has practical policy
implications for work-family and related issues – policies that affect all of us, not just women.
Lastly, the theoretical framework proposed is broad enough to apply to other identity groups. It
can help explain why certain policy demands are likely to be under-represented, and determine
whether mechanisms to increase group representation in office might help. In closing, I speculate
about several promising lines of future inquirty that will advance knowledge in the field.
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2 | A Theory of Identity and Policy
Change
This chapter presents an in-depth discussion of the book’s theory of politician identity and policy
change. For the sake of this chapter I define ‘policy change’ broadly as the process of political
decision-making leading to public policy outputs. In advanced democracies, this process involves
an intricate chain of relevant ideas, institutions, and actors, from voters to representatives, parties,
and governments (Sabatier & Weible 2014). In subsequent empirical chapters I apply the theory to
two crucial stages of the process, party position taking and government action, further developing
the link between quotas, identity, and policy change separately for each stage.
I begin by providing an overview of the causes and consequences of the political under-
representation of disadvantaged groups, focusing on women. I claim that under-representation
matters to policy outcomes because politicians are biased towards their own interests. I next
address the question of why some group preferences remain largely off the political agenda, paying
particular attention to how policy demands fit within traditional lines of party competition. I
propose a broad theory of identity and policy representation which suggests that when new policy
demands are orthogonal to the main left-right policy dimension, and the group demanding change
faces high barriers to entry in politics, the result is a political market failure whereby interests are
not represented. In this scenario, when parties have little incentive to represent group demands and
groups lack the resources to form a new party, quotas can be a particularly important mechanism
for the political expression of policy interests.
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Having established the main argument, I provide initial evidence that supports my expec-
tations about the distinct and orthogonal preferences of women. Using survey data, I show that
women prefer more spending on a range of social policy issues compared to men, and women have
particularly strong preferences for maternal employment. The gender gap for maternal employment
cuts across parties – it persists among those who vote left and right – and gender is a larger deter-
minant of preferences than partisanship for these issues. I then spell out the causal logic underlying
the central argument, proposing two main mechanisms through which quotas lead to policy change
in advanced democracies. These are: 1) added numbers give women within the party more leverage
to push party leaders for change; and 2) quotas increase the salience of gender-related issues, making
it more likely that they will be prioritized. In the final section I state the assumptions on which
the book’s theory rests and discuss how the theory contributes to the existing literature on identity
and politics, political parties, and public policy.
2.1 The Under-representation of Disadvantaged Groups
A wealth of empirical research has shown that certain disadvantaged groups face high barriers to
running for office and winning (Rule 1987; Rule & Zimmerman 1994; Verba, Schlozman & Brady
1995; Banducci, Donovan & Karp 2004; Bird 2005; Besley, Pande & Rao 2005b). The labor market
for politicians is mostly majority ethnic group, educated, wealthy men (Norris 1997). I focus on
the case of women here, but many of the arguments that follow apply to other forms of identity,
like race and social status. Women, and other disadvantaged groups, face bias in the candidate
selection process which can prevent them from participating. This can be higher costs in running
for office (such as comparative lack of time and financial resources) and/or discrimination in being
selected (Lovenduski & Norris 1993; Fox & Lawless 2004; Lawless & Fox 2005; Anzia & Berry
2011). Discrimination need not be overt; party selectorates could avoid choosing women because
they are, statistically speaking, less likely to invest in long, uninterrupted careers (what Iversen and
Rosenbluth (2010) call ‘statistical discrimination’). Male party leaders also tend to prefer candidates
like themselves (Niven 1998), and / or have few women in their professional networks (Kanter 1977;
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Sanbonmatsu 2006; Fox & Lawless 2010; Crowder-Meyer 2013). Women are encouraged to run less
often than men, which affects their political ambition (Fox & Lawless 2010). Research shows that
women are just as likely to respond favorably to recruitment, but they are less likely to be recruited
(Fulton et al. 2006; Fox & Lawless 2010).
As a result, in most democracies the share of women elected is much less than the share
of women in the population. In 2015, women make up 23% of parliaments worldwide.1 However,
in some countries the share of women in parliament nears parity – for example Sweden (44%)
and Belgium (39%). A large body of comparative research suggests that the variation in women’s
representation can be attributed to structural and institutional factors which can lower barriers
to entry, especially women’s labor force participation and electoral rules (Norris 1985; Rule 1987;
McAllister & Studlar 2002; Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008). These
factors create incentives that lower the likelihood of discrimination and increase the supply of
female candidates. According to Inglehart and Norris (2000), economic development and associated
increases in women’s employment go hand in hand with the transformation of sex roles and attitudes
towards women, and the break-up of traditional family units. As the service sector grows in more
developed economies, and education for women improves, women are better able to compete with
men for jobs. And as women gain entry into previously male-dominated labor markets (the ‘political
pipeline’), they gain the experience and networks necessary to run for political office.
Electoral rules also affect the constraints and opportunities facing female candidates. In
countries where electoral rules create incentives for programmatic parties, women fare better than
they do in countries where the rules lead parties to focus on individual candidates. In personalistic,
single-member district systems, seniority and long tenure are important candidate traits because of
the focus on constituency service. Women are less likely to be able to credibly commit to these type
of long-term, uninterrupted careers, making them less likely to put themselves forward and also to
face discrimination in the selection process. In proportional systems with large districts or pooling
across districts, it makes little sense to focus on narrow constituencies, and women are less likely to
1IPU Women in National Parliaments Database, www.ipu.org, accessed 20 December 2015.
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be at a disadvantage (Carey & Shugart 1995; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010).
The recent growth of gender quota provisions is another important determinant, particu-
larly because quotas can help countries increase numbers of women despite ‘sticky’ structural and
institutional constraints. They can be implemented even in majoritarian systems, and in contexts
where women’s labor force participation lags. Previous literature suggests that quotas increase
women’s representation (McAllister & Studlar 2002; Tripp & Kang 2008; Paxton, Hughes & Painter
2010; Hughes 2011), but it is unclear which type of quota (party- or national-level) is more effective,
or how quotas compare to other determinants. I return to these questions in Chapter 3, which also
includes an extended discussion of explanations for women’s (lack of) descriptive representation.
In summary, existing literature suggests that the under-representation of women is due to
supply-side problems that make women less likely to put themselves forward and be selected rather
than a lack of voter demand. Voters typically do not have the opportunity to select a proportionate
share of women, even though in advanced democracies the evidence shows that voters are not biased
against women (Norris, Vallance & Lovenduski 1992; Matland & King 2002; Black & Erickson 2003;
Lawless & Pearson 2008; Wauters, Weekers & Maddens 2010; Murray, Krook & Opello 2012). As
Lawless states, “When women run, they win” (Lawless 2015, p. 353). In fact, some research shows
that female voters have a baseline preference to vote for female candidates (Dolan 1998; Banducci &
Karp 2000; Sanbonmatsu 2002), and that gender can even trump partisan identity in some instances
(Brians 2005).2 In short, the demand for women candidates is present but there is a blockage in
the supply.
2.2 Identity and Theories of Representation
The blockage in the supply of female candidates matters because growing evidence suggests that
politicians are biased towards their own interests in policymaking. This runs counter to the conven-
tional wisdom in political science. The spatial theory of party and voter behavior – originally made
2Men have a similar (slightly lower) baseline preference to vote for men (Sanbonmatsu 2002); however, women
are more likely than men to vote in advanced democracies (Pintor & Gratschew 2004).
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famous by Downs (1957), but also at the heart of more recent work on parties (Enelow & Hinich
1984; Adams & Grofman 2005; Persson & Tabellini 2005; Meguid 2005) – says that rational parties
choose policy positions to minimize the distance between themselves and voters. Existing theory
would suggest that if women as a group have significant preferences that are not being represented,
politicians or parties ought to move to capture that space in order to maximize their vote share,
or a new candidate or party ought to spring up. The selection of candidates plays no role at all;
men and women should be equally good at representing the interests of women voters. Thus, the
identity of politicians ought to be irrelevant.
At the same time, mounting evidence casts doubt on the model of politics as a marketplace
in which parties deliver policies in exchange for voters’ political support (Romer & Rosenthal 1979;
Ansolabehere, Snyder Jr & Stewart III 2001; Gilens 2012). There seems to be significant ‘slippage’
in the principal-agent contract. For example, Gilens (2012) shows that policies in the United States
are much more responsive to the preferences of the very wealthy than to middle- or low-income
individuals (for a similar argument, see Hacker & Pierson 2011). Explanations for why this might
be the case have led to new models of representation, including some that acknowledge the role
of candidates’ personal preferences. In the citizen-candidate model voters vote for the candidates
closest to their policy views. Individuals choose to run for office if the expected payoff is greater
than the cost of running. Once elected, the candidate implements the policies of their own choosing,
rather than responding to changing voter preferences (Osborne & Slivinski 1996; Besley & Coate
1997). This theory is supported by an emerging empirical literature which suggests that politician
identity – from race (Canon 1999; Whitby 2000) and social class (Carnes 2012) down to learned
behaviors like smoking – is relevant to policymaking at the highest level. For example, Burden
(2007) shows that smokers are more likely to speak and vote against tobacco control measures. In
the citizen-candidate model, if certain issues are important for women in particular, women ought
to run for office in order to represent them.
The citizen-candidate model is valuable in that it dispenses with notion that motives of
voters and candidates are distinct. It predicts that increases in women’s political representation
will matter to policies if women have different preferences than men. However, the model leaves
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significant room for doubt about its applicability to the context of policymaking in parliamentary
settings. First, both versions of the model assume that anyone can run for office, and that an
individual’s decision to run depends on the trade-off between a fixed cost of running for office and
the benefits of doing so (the benefits of running vary between the two models). The possibility of
certain individuals being systematically disadvantaged – that the cost is higher for some groups than
others – is not discussed. Thus both of the dominant economic paradigms of representation, the
traditional principal-agent model and the more recent citizen-candidate model, do not acknowledge
the high barriers to entry that prevent many women, and other disadvantaged groups, from running
for office and being selected as candidates. Because the labor market for politicians is inefficient
in this sense, these models are not able to account for how demographic discrepancies between
electorates and legislatures affect the substantive representation of different groups.
Second, the citizen-candidate model was developed for a framework in which “a single
elected official makes policy choices in an atemporal world without political parties or interest
groups” (Besley & Coate 1997, p. 106). It assumes that the policymaking process occurs mainly
at the voting stage, neglecting to account for how identity may affect the multi-stage and com-
plex agenda-setting process. Literature that employs the citizen-candidate model in the context of
parliaments does so by assuming that parties can be thought of as citizen-candidates; i.e. party
preferences are unitary (e.g., Iversen & Soskice 2006). Even when this assumption is relaxed, we are
left without a description of how quotas and identity could affect important decisions throughout
the policymaking process. In her work on political reservations for caste members in India, Pande
assumes that parties have policy preferences but claims that identity can matter because, “parties
cannot fully control candidate behavior after elections (for if they could, candidate identity would
be irrelevant to the policy process)” (Pande 2003, p. 1133). Even if parties fully control candidate
behavior (i.e. party discipline is very strict, as in many European parliamentary democracies), there
is still the question of how party priorities are formed. As Bachrach and Baratz famously argued,
values and biases shape the issues which enter the political arena in the first place (Bachrach &
Baratz, 1962).
The third issue with regards to a straightforward application of the citizen-candidate model
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is that it assumes politicians act only in their own interests. E.g., in Besley and Coate’s version:
“The citizen who wins the election implements his preferred policy – promising anything else is not
credible” (p. 88). This runs counter to the traditional notion of ‘representing’, and a wealth of
empirical evidence suggests that politicians do feel responsibility to act for members of their social
groups. For example, women representatives claim to think of themselves as representatives of
women and to consider women as a constituency group with particular political concerns (Reingold,
1992; Childs, 2004a; Dodson, 2006). Broockman’s (2013) work on race and representation in the
United States demonstrates that group representation can be altruistic (or at least not electorally
motivated); black politicians are more responsive to black citizens even if they reside outside their
constituency.
Anecdotal evidence supports the idea that women politicians feel a particular obligation
to act for women as a group. In my interviews in Western Europe women MPs frequently claimed
to think about how policies would impact women as a group, even in settings with strict party
discipline. In Portugal, the conservative (PSD) MP Monica Ferro explained that she believes she
brings a different perspective to her work on male-dominated committees,
I always think it’s relevant [gender]. I was filling in a question on European policy, and
it was very interesting because at the end you had to identify yourself and you could
choose if you were European, a woman, a Catholic, whatever. And I chose I’m a woman,
I’m European, I’m Portuguese, and then at the end you had my age. So for me it’s very
important. . . it’s because of the background experience that we have in building a
family, in trying to conciliate work with family.3
The social democratic (Pd) Italian Senator Cecilia Guerra said that she and other women in par-
liament consult with women’s groups when planning policy reforms on certain issues:
Women in the parliament have many connections – not all of them, but there are
many women in parliament who have connections with associations, civil society groups,
women’s movements outside of parliament. So, we also gave these groups a kind of rep-
resentation. In the debate about violence against women this came out strongly.4
3Monica Ferro, personal interview, 5 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
4Cecilia Guerra, personal interview, 9 April 2014, Rome, Italy.
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Another example comes from my discussion with Austrian conservative (ÖVP) MP Claudia Durch-
schlag about how she got her start in politics:
If you see politics from outside, you will have a picture in your mind of many men and
few women. And I started in the 1990s, and then it was a very strong picture I had in
my mind. Therefore I thought I should do something for women too.5
In summary, the dominant economic models of representation make assumptions about the
incentives of politicians and about the policymaking process that don’t seem to reflect the reality
of representation in parliamentary democracies. As Williams (2012) states, “For empirical political
science, if the evidence from ground-level actors contradicts key assumptions of our theoretical
models, we must either provide a structural or system-level explanation of the gap, or we must
revise our theories” (p. 798). The section below proposes a theory in which both electoral incentives
and politician identity can matter to policy outcomes, in line with recent normative arguments. For
example, Mansbridge argues that multiple models of representation exist at the same time; the
desire to make good policy and to be re-elected are almost always mixed. Election must always be
a proximate goal for policy-seeking candidates, and “It is hard to imagine a representative with no
intrinsic motivation to work for the policies he or she thinks good for the polity and hard to imagine
any constituent voting for a representative whose preferences the constituent thought were always
induced” (Mansbridge 2009, 370). The theory below focuses on when and how identity can matter
in parliamentary settings with strong parties.
2.3 Identity and Policy Change
The main focus of this book is the study of how quotas, and additional numbers of women in
office, affect policymaking. Women’s concerns can be considered one of a set of new policy demands
that have risen out of the transition to a service economy and changing values in post-industrial
democracies. Some of these new demands have been incorporated into the political agenda – for
example, ‘new left’ and ecological parties have gained power in many countries – but others have
5Claudia Durchschlag, personal interview, 5 May 2014, Vienna, Austria.
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not. Several authors note that there is a substantial (gendered) public demand for work-family
policies that has not been met (Morgan 2013; Gingrich & Ansell 2015). This presents a puzzle: why
are some new policy demands represented while others are not?
The Representation of Emerging Issues
The conventional starting point for thinking about policy representation is a one-dimensional spa-
tial model in which the policy space is defined by the labor-capital conflict on economic issues.
Traditional partisan politics theory holds that parties are representatives of social constituencies,
broadly defined in terms of industrial classes. In Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) classic theory, eco-
nomic cleavages between the working class and upper class / business provided a basic framework
for party competition at the formation of many mass party systems.6 These cleavages became in-
stitutionalized (‘frozen’), with class remaining the most salient source of electoral competition until
very recently. Importantly for women, when these cleavages were defined they were based on a
full-time male ‘breadwinner’ model in which women stayed at home to look after the family. Thus,
policies to support families were often tied to upholding the income of the male earner – for example,
employment-based entitlement systems rather than individualized benefit systems and public care
services (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2002).7
However, since the 1970s advanced democracies have transitioned into post-industrial so-
cieties. The growth of the service sector and entry of women into the labor force coincided with
important cultural value changes emphasizing equality and individualization over materialist and
security concerns (Inglehart 2008). Recently the notion that new issues are emerging and chal-
lenging traditional one-dimensional models of party competition has become an important topic in
the literature on comparative welfare states (Kriesi 1998; Kitschelt 1994; Häusermann 2006, 2010;
Beramendi et al. 2015). Class is still important (Allan & Scruggs 2004; Bartolini & Mair 2007;
6Other salient divisions in society, such as religion or urban / rural, led non-economic cleavages to be more
pronounced in some countries.
7Note that a ‘pure’ breadwinner model never existed; working class women often could not afford to stay out of
the paid labor force (Pfau-Effinger 2004). However it described the reality for middle and upper working classes in
many Western countries, and it was also aspirational (Lewis 1992).
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Benoit, Laver et al. 2006), but economic interests have transformed and other issues gained promi-
nence. Electoral constituencies and voter interests have changed over recent decades, with more
high-skilled middle class voters voting left, and more working class voters voting for right-wing,
anti-immigration parties.
So far, the literature has demonstrated the relevance of several cleavages other than (indus-
trial) class alone, such as: environmentalism (Kitschelt 1988); anti-immigration (Bornschier 2010);
labor market insiders and outsiders (Rueda 2005); and social and cultural professionals (Kriesi
1998). Crucially, gender has also become a relevant cleavage as the male breadwinner model be-
came increasingly out of touch with new social structures and values – notably the rise of women’s
employment, decline in marriage, and changing attitudes towards gender roles in society (Esping-
Andersen 1999; Edlund & Pande 2002; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2010).
How have parties responded to these emerging issues, particularly with regards to gender-
related policies? Kitschelt’s (1994) model of intraparty politics is useful here because it provides a
general framework explaining how parties form preferences. In this model, the substantive priorities
of the party are influenced by the distribution of sentiments among political activists, which are in
turn shaped by the broader political context (e.g., the party’s competitive position and institutional
rules). The party’s own organizational rules also matter, because they influence the socialization
and types of activists likely to join (‘selective recruitment’).8 They also determine how effectively
activists can push for their policy concerns – i.e., bureaucratic mass parties are likely to strive to
minimize party disunity, and parties with high leadership autonomy can rapidly adjust strategies.
Much of the literature on emerging issues in the policy space fits with this model, demon-
strating that the institutional and partisan environment matters to how well parties and states are
able to modernize to meet the challenges of post-industrial society. For example, electoral con-
stituency shifts mean that programmatic parties have had to re-conceptualize their core voters, and
party systems that have shifted away from the ‘class-mass’ model have been more successful and piv-
8Kitschelt does not define ‘activists’, but since they are individuals involved with strategic choices in the party I
assume that backbenchers are part of this group, along with rank-and-file militants and ‘middle level’ regional party
leaders.
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oting to do this (Kitschelt 2000b). Multi-party systems are more compatible with the development
of secondary cleavages, such as Christian democratic parties in Continental Europe (Van Kersbergen
2003), agrarian parties in Nordic countries (Manow 2009), and left-libertarian parties in e.g., the
Netherlands and Austria (Kitschelt 1988). Another strand of literature shows that the emergence
of new needs and values in society can lead to cross-class alliances, bringing together groups who
support reforms for different reasons (Rueda 2005; Häusermann 2006). These coalitions are more
easily forged in consensual democracies, as Häusermann (2010) demonstrates in the case of pension
reform.
Regarding gender-related concerns, the major issue facing women in post-industrial soci-
eties is the question of how to reconcile increased labor force participation with continuing to do the
bulk of care work within the family (Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993). While some countries have initiated
major reforms to address work-family issues, such as child care resources and parental leave, schol-
ars also note that the pace of change has been very slow (Morgan 2013; Gingrich & Ansell 2015).
The literature from political economy emphasizes internal shifts in party organizations (altering
party platforms to appeal to dealigned female voters), as well as the institutional framework which
helps or hinders new alliances (Häusermann 2006; Gingrich & Ansell 2015). Yet these arguments
are somewhat unsatisfying, because they cannot explain why reforms in the work-family area have
been relatively anemic compared to other policy areas, especially outside of Scandinavia. It is no-
table that explanations of Nordic generosity from the gender and politics literature stress the role
of women’s political agency (Skeije 1993; Lambert 2008), as well as institutional factors. Morgan’s
(2006; 2013) work on family policies in continental Europe, where women’s political representation
has been much lower than the Nordic states, also suggests that politician identity has played an
important role.
In summary, the literature from political economy and gender and politics both offer
important insights for policy representation, but we would benefit from a theory that incorporates
both structure and (gendered, raced, classed, etc.) agency. Overall the literature on emerging social
needs remains inconclusive, because different studies focus on different policy areas separately, and
most ignore the role of politician identity. This leaves an unresolved puzzle. If new needs and
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values in society are emerging, which of these cleavages will become politically salient in a given
context? Are structural and contextual explanations equally powerful across policy fields – and
when might identity matter? The theory outlined below uses politician identity to make progress
on these questions.
Party Competition and Barriers to Entry
The main argument goes as follows: the translation of policy demands into outcomes depends on how
demands map onto traditional (class-based) political cleavages, and on whether the policy demand
comes from groups that face high barriers to entry in politics. I take Kriesi’s (1998) work on the
transformation of cleavage politics as a starting point, because it is one of the few to acknowledge the
role of politicians. Kriesi claims that social divisions must be expressed in concrete, organizational
terms in order for them to become a salient issue cleavage in politics (rather than just values and
experiences among members of a social group). There has to be political articulation of new beliefs,
and political actors are crucial in this process. He says:
...preferences in general, and values in particular, are not just the reflection of underlying
structural patterns, but they are shaped by collective political actors, who selectively
reinforce some preferences and ignore others in the process of the translation of social
division into politics. (1998: p. 177)
This sentiment fits well with the emerging literature demonstrating that politicians are biased
towards their own interests, discussed earlier. It is also implicit in Kitschelt’s (1994) model of
intraparty politics, although he does not discuss identity specifically. In his model, the substance
of party preferences is determined by the distribution of party activists (pragmatists, lobbyists, or
ideologues), which is in turn affected by electoral laws, entry costs, and party recruitment practices
(pp. 210 – 211). These variables are all likely to influence the proportion of women, and other
historically disadvantaged groups, active in the party as well. They key point is that group identity
could be another important determinant of party strategy and outcomes, along with the factors
discussed above – context and institutions.
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I understand political parties to have electoral incentives as well as commitments to ide-
ology, and preferences that are not necessarily unitary or stable. Parties must also respond to the
evolving preferences of activists within the party, and these preferences are influenced by identity.
The theory proposed in this chapter integrates gendered – and raced, classed, etc. – political agency
into existing arguments about the substance and flexibility of policies. I focus on the transforma-
tion in party strategies that results from shifts in the demographics of representatives. In line with
previous work, in subsequent empirical chapters I control for different structural and institutional
factors that may mediate this relationship.
The first fundamental question in the theory of policy representation is whether the group
with new policy demands faces systemic barriers to entry in politics. Groups that do not face
high barriers to entry have access to resources and opportunities that allow them to participate in
politics, mobilize, and even form new political parties should existing parties not represent their
views sufficiently. Groups that face high barriers to entry do not have the same means to put new
issues on the political agenda. For example, forming new political parties requires even more effort
and resources than participating in existing political parties and interest groups (Kitschelt 1988).
When historically disadvantaged groups become more equally represented in politics, we
should expect to see policy change on the issues that these groups prioritize. The preferences
of historically disadvantaged and dominant groups may not diverge on many issues; in this case,
no policy change is expected. But when there are significant gaps in policy preferences, policy
ought to shift in the direction of disadvantaged group interests after their numbers increase. For
example, lower levels of income and education are associated with more support for redistribution
(Svallfors 1997; Finseraas 2009; Rueda & Pontusson 2010; Lloren, Rosset &Wüest 2015). Immigrant
groups prefer less-restrictionist immigration policies (Mughan & Paxton 2006; Scheve & Slaughter
2001). Women favor more spending on a range of social policies compared to men across advanced
democracies, even controlling for class and party (Svallfors 1997; Edlund & Pande 2002; Huber
& Stephens 2000; Lott & Kenny 1999; Iversen & Soskice 2001). As this chapter later illustrates,
women are also far more supportive of maternal employment than men.
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I expect the representation of disadvantaged groups to be especially likely to lead to policy
change for issues that are orthogonal to the main left-right (economic) party dimension. This is
because when issue demands coincide with existing party preferences, disadvantaged groups are more
likely to find allies within the established political system to represent their interests. For these
issues, political parties can be effective vehicles for the representation of new demands. However
when new demands cut across political parties and split their constituencies, parties have little
incentive to represent them. In this case, prioritizing new issues would likely cause further divisions
within the party and electoral prospects may suffer (Ferrara & Weishaupt 2004; Parsons & Weber
2011). Additionally, parties cannot compete on all issues in every election. They are likely to
accentuate those issues on which they have an advantage (‘issue ownership’), and ignore those
which are perceived to be difficult or unimportant (Budge, Robertson & Hearl 1987).
Figure 2.1 cross-tabulates policy issues by the issue type (on main left-right dimension or
not) and the status of the group demanding change (faces high barriers to entry or not). It yields
four ideal-type policy representation alternatives, and highlights an example of each. The top-left
cell represents the traditional one-dimensional model of the policy space, where the working class
and wealthy diverge on economic interests. Mainstream parties have clear incentives to represent
this issue, which has traditionally defined their ideological profiles. High-income individuals face
particularly low barriers to entry in politics; increasingly elected officials tend to be drawn from
white-collar professions and the business community (Pontusson 2015). Thus, high-income interests
in keeping taxation and spending low are likely to be well-represented in politics.
The bottom-left cell represents emerging policy demands that coincide with the main left-
right dimension in politics, but are supported by groups that face high barriers to entry in politics.
An example is labor market ‘outsiders’ who demand low job security. Labor market outsiders are
defined as those without secure employment – they are either unemployed or in precarious jobs –
while ‘insiders’ benefit from highly protected jobs (Lindbeck & Snower 2001; Rueda 2005). The
emergence of the insider-outsider distinction stems from labor market changes in post-industrial
democracies, including widespread unemployment since the 1970s. Outsiders tend to be less po-
litically active than insiders; arguments about the lack of resources and networks seem especially
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Left-Right Dimension
Issues well- New parties
represented On Off emerge
Barriers to
Low
Entry
Low redistribution Environment
(High income) (Environmentalists)
High
Low job security Work-family
(‘Outsiders’) conciliation
(Women)
Dealignment / Political market
realignment failure
Figure 2.1: The Representation of Policy Demands
Notes: Cells show policy demands followed by the group demanding policy change in parentheses. The figure
shows four ideal-type policy representation alternatives, and highlights an example of each.
relevant. However, their preference for low job security is likely to be represented in politics (on
the political agenda, even if reforms are not guaranteed) because it aligns with the interests of
the upper class (Rueda 2006). Another example that fits this cell is women’s preferences for more
redistribution, which align with the interests of the working class. In this scenario we might see
dealignment in post-industrial democracies, followed by parties competing to attract these voters
– e.g., the right appealing to outsiders and the left to women. One party strategy to attract new
voters is to nominate more candidates like them (i.e., to compete for women voters, promote more
women candidates) (Matland & Studlar 1996). This gives disadvantaged groups opportunities to
work within the party to prioritize the issues they care about.
The top-right cell represents the opposite scenario: emerging policy demands that do not
coincide with the main left-right dimension in politics, but are supported by groups that face low
barriers to entry in politics. An example is environmental concerns, one of the issues associated
with rising post-materialist values in recent decades. Traditional parties have little incentive to
represent issues that distract from class-based concerns, making it difficult for environmentalists to
work within mainstream parties to push for their interests. As a result green parties emerged in
the 1970s to represent these interests instead, using the mantra: ‘We are neither Left nor Right, we
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are out in front’ (Dalton 2009). Importantly, environmentalists – mostly well-educated middle class
– had the resources and opportunities necesary to form these new parties (Kitschelt 1988). Many
mainstream parties only began to incorporate environmental concerns into their agendas after green
parties became a significant threat – a trend that seems consistent with how parties are responding
to the rise of anti-immigration parties as well (Meguid 2005; Norris 2005; Harmel & Svåsand 1997).
Over time, even if the niche party disappears, the new policy demand is likely to remain on the
political agenda.
Finally, the bottom-right cell represents political market failure. By this I mean a salient
political interest that is unlikely to be represented in the mainstream policy space, due to the
principal-agent ‘slippage’ that occurs when disadvantaged groups are under-represented. In this
scenario groups that face high barriers to entry in politics have policy concerns that lie off the main
left-right dimension. The example of this is women’s interests in work-family conciliation policies like
child care provision. As I will demonstrate later in this chapter, women are much more supportive
of maternal employment than men. Like environmental issues, work-family policies might detract
from traditional class-based concerns, so mainstream parties have little incentive to represent them.
Moreover as I will show, the gender gap in preferences on maternal employment cuts across partisan
identities, and so parties are even more likely to downplay the issue because it could exacerbate
internal divisions.
We might think that left parties are associated with these issues, but in fact work-family
policies are not clearly identifiable with either left or right wing parties. Ideologically the issue
seems to be a fear that gender will compete with traditional class concerns, and left parties have
been criticized for their indifference to problems facing working mothers (Perrigo 1996; Von Wahl
2006). The right is also not clearly opposed to spending on these policies; in fact, right parties have
been influential in changing work-family policies in several cases, such as Germany and Austria’s
recent reforms. In the United States, Democrat Hillary Clinton has made paid family leave a
major platform in her 2016 campaign, but so has Republican hopeful Marco Rubio. Opposing
parties often ground support for work-family policies in different normative frameworks – including
fertility, economic productivity, and women’s equality – according to their broader policy goals
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(market- versus equality-oriented). This makes work-family policy amenable to to ‘ownership’ by
either side. Finally, it is not clear that male party leaders on either side realize the electoral
opportunities of work-family issues (Morgan 2013).
Why don’t women form parties to address these concerns, as environmentalists did? There
are only a few examples of women’s parties in advanced democracies, none of which have been
significant.9 First, women face high barriers to entry in politics, and forming a party is even more
difficult than participating in the established party framework. But perhaps more importantly, on
the whole women’s interests are heterogeneous. As the next section shows, on many issues men and
women have the same interests, or women’s interests correspond to existing party ideologies. It is
unclear that women’s preferences on the issue of maternal employment – as strong as they are – are
enough to outweigh the numerous other issues which are well-represented in the established party
system. This also explains why women don’t punish parties at the polls. When mainstream parties
exclude niche issues from the agenda, and women are unlikely to form a niche party, there are few
political alternatives. Thus, the gendered demand for work-family policies remains largely under-
represented in politics. Another example of a new policy demand that falls in this space is labor
market outsiders’ preferences for active and passive labor market policies. Neither the traditional
left nor the right prefers to invest in these policies (putting them off the main left-right dimension),
and so the issue is likely to remain off the political agenda (Rueda 2005).10
Quotas, and increased numbers of women, are likely to influence all policies that women as
a group prioritize (the bottom row in Figure 2.1). Adding more women to political parties gives them
better opportunities to make their preferences part of mainstream party agendas. However, I expect
quotas to be associated with larger changes to policies that are off the main left-dimension (bottom-
right). This is because parties are unlikely to represent these interests at all, absent women’s
representation. Quotas give women the numbers they need to make their concerns heard within the
9One well-known example is Iceland, where the Women’s Alliance party entered parliament in the 1980s. At its
highest point (1987) it gained 10% of seats in the parliament.
10Rueda (2005; 2006) shows that labor market policies are only likely to be represented when labor market insiders
become more vulnerable to unemployment– i.e., the issue becomes salient to the traditional class-based constituencies
in politics.
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party and parliament. In Kriesi’s terms, having women political actors – who are biased just as men
are – translates a social division into a political one. Quotas can be an important mechanism for the
political expression of new policy demands when group preferences are orthogonal to mainstream
party issues and the group lacks access to political power.
2.4 Gender Differences in Policy Preferences
In this section I provide initial evidence that supports my expectations about the preferences of
women, and the alignment of women’s preferences to the main left-right policy dimension. There
is no consensus in the literature on gender and politics about which policies should be identified as
‘women’s issues’. Definitions are based on a wide variety of criteria such as: feminist theory about
rights and equality, women’s interest group demands, the specific salience of some issues to women’s
bodies, and ‘traditional’ issues of the private sphere.11 I use survey data to define women’s issues,
focusing on issues on which women and men have significantly different preferences. The advantage
of using survey data is that it is more likely to identify ‘women’s issues’ that are inclusive of all
women, rather than only feminists or women’s movements. I can distinguish whether gaps hold
even across subgroups, e.g., ideological lines. A disadvantage is that it is difficult to measure the
intensity of preferences using survey data. This seems like an acceptable trade-off given my interest
in the saliency of policy issues to women across the political spectrum.
Women are not a monolithic group, but there is substantial evidence that women and men
have different preferences on at least a subset of issues in advanced democracies. As previously dis-
cussed, the gender gap has shifted from right to left in recent decades; women are now more liberal
and favor more government spending compared to men across advanced democracies. These gender
gaps are thought to be very much related to the shift from industrial to post-industrial society. The
modern gender gap might reflect the decline of marriage, rise of divorce, and corresponding higher
rates of poverty for women over recent years, or women’s increasing labor force participation and
11For a general overview, see “Critical Perspectives on Gender and Politics: The Meaning and Measurement of
Women’s Interests” in Politics & Gender, Volume 07, Issue 03, September 2011.
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associated need for affordable care services. Both theories suggest that, due to historical discrim-
ination and the structure of markets, women benefit more than men from government spending.
These differences exist even within political parties; e.g., Poggione (2004) finds that women state
legislators in the U.S. express significantly more liberal welfare policy preferences than men, and
the difference is most profound among Republican women. However the literature does not tell us
much about gendered preferences on specific policy issues.
In order to identify policy areas with the largest gender gaps in preferences, I analyzed
survey data from three waves of the International Social Survey Programme’s (ISSP) Role of Gov-
ernment survey (1990, 1996 and 2006) and four waves of the ISSP’s Family and Changing Gender
Roles survey (1988, 1994, 2002, 2012). The ISSP offers perhaps the best comparable data available
on attitudes towards specific social policies. The Role of Government survey covers attitudes to-
wards government spending in different areas, as well as attitudes towards the government’s broader
role in society. The Family and Changing Gender Roles survey covers attitudes towards the em-
ployment of women and mothers. Figure 2.2 shows the average gap in preferences for each issue
area across countries and over time. The horizontal bars represent the difference in percentages of
women and men who agree with each statement (or disagree, when specified). The column on the
right shows the average share of women who agree (disagree).
Across countries, the survey data confirms that women are more supportive of maternal
employment and prefer greater spending on many social policies compared to men. The largest
differences are in attitudes towards maternal employment, where there is an 8 to 9 percentage point
gap between women and men. For example, on average 39% of women disagree that ‘a preschool
child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works’, compared to 30% of men. Similarly, 45% of
women disagree that ‘a job is alright, but what women really want is home and children’, compared
to 37% of men. The next-largest differences are in attitudes towards government intervention to
control prices and provide jobs (women are more supportive, by 6 to 7 percentage points), and
spending on health and old age pensions (5 to 6 percent more women agree compared to men).
Chi-square tests find that these differences are all significant at conventional levels (p < 0.05) for
each survey wave included here. Smaller differences exist on, for example, whether it should be
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the government’s responsibility to provide health care for the sick and a decent standard of living
for the elderly, as well as spending on education. These differences are typically not statistically
significant.
These figures are presented to give a broad sense of gendered policy preferences in Western
advanced democracies. Of course, preferences within specific countries vary and the same gender
gaps are not always significant at conventional levels. Similarly the figures do not provide infor-
mation about trends over time, where considerable variation also occurs in some issue areas. For
example, the gender gap in attitudes towards whether the government should reduce income differ-
ences between the rich and poor has been increasing over time (women becoming more and more
supportive). That said, the largest gender gaps in preferences (maternal employment, government
intervention and social spending) have been well-established since the earliest survey data analyzed.
I discuss relevant country-level differences, including preferences within quota countries, in more
detail below.
By far, the largest gender gap in preferences of any documented here is over the issue of
maternal employment. Specifically, the statement ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or
her mother works’ is often used to assess attitudes towards maternal employment (e.g., Morgan
2013), which is directly relevant to work-family policies.12 Figure 2.3 summarizes the gender gap
in preferences toward maternal employment by country. The average share of women who disagree
with the statement is included in parentheses following the country name.13
Looking at between-country variation, there are large gender gaps in Scandinavia and
many ‘liberal’ welfare states such as Australia and the US. Continental Europe, including Germany,
France, and the Netherlands, is characterized by more moderate gaps. In Southern Europe we see
12Unfortunately, survey data on preferences towards specific work-family policies across all countries of interest
and over time do not exist – but see the gender gap in attitudes towards paid maternity leave in Figure 2.2.
13In order to create a cross-national index I compiled the average gender gap for this question by country using
eight different surveys from 1988 to 2012. Because not all countries of interest are included in the four waves of ISSP
Family and Changing Gender Roles survey, I supplement it with three waves of the European Values Survey (1990,
1999, and 2008) and the Eurobarometer 65.1, from 2006. These surveys ask nearly identical questions. The ISSP
and EVS both ask whether respondents agree or disagree with the statement: ‘A pre-school child is likely to suffer
if his or her mother works.’ The Eurobarometer asks whether respondents agree with the statement: ‘A pre-school
child is more likely to suffer if his her mother works.’
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smaller gender gaps, but they have increased over time – a trend which applies to many countries
listed here. For example, in the ‘quota country’ of Portugal the gender gap in preferences for
maternal employment increased from 3% to 6% from 1990 to 1999 (EVS data). The trend for both
men and women is toward more support for maternal employment over time, but women’s views
seem to be changing at a faster rate. Overall, the gap in preferences in maternal employment is
larger for the ‘quota countries’ of France and Belgium than for Portugal and Spain. Yet even in
these countries it is still significant, particularly in recent years.
Figure 2.4 shows that the gender gap in preferences for maternal employment tends to
increase at higher education levels. This signals that educated women, who are more likely to be in
the workforce, even more strongly support maternal employment. Note that for the quota countries
of Spain and Portugal, the gap increases significantly. Because women in parliament are likely to be
higher status, well-educated individuals this is all the more reason to think that they will be likely
to prioritize these issues in office – even in more conservative countries like Spain and Portugal.
Finally, distinct differences between men and women persist across ideological lines. Fig-
ure 2.5 shows the gender gap in preferences for maternal employment by party affiliation (2002).
Respondents were asked which party they voted for in the last parliamentary election, and the figure
shows the gender gap within the mainstream left and right party supporters in each country (for
details see figure notes). It illustrates that the gender gap cuts across parties – the average gap
within left parties is 11% compared to 9% for right parties.
So far, the survey data demonstrate that women and men have different preferences on
a range of social policies, with women preferring more spending / government support compared
to men, and that the gender gap is largest for the issue of maternal employment. The fact that
gaps persist across party affiliation suggests that this issue does not align with the main left-right
dimension in politics. Another way of investigating this question is to compare the significance of
gender and partisan identity as determinants of policy preferences across a range of issues, controlling
for other factors. We would expect partisan identity to be the strongest determinant of preferences
for most issues related to social spending, even if gender matters as well. If women’s preferences for
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maternal employment are orthogonal to the left-right dimension, then gender ought to be a stronger
determinant of preferences on this issue than party affiliation.
I estimate probit models of policy preferences based on gender, party affiliation, and a
set of controls, using data from the ISSP’s 2006 Role of Government survey and 2002 Family
and Changing Gender Roles Survey.14 The dependent variable is a binary measure that takes
the value 1 if the respondent supports the policy provision, and 0 otherwise. Please see table
notes for survey question details. Female is also a binary variable equalling 1 if the respondent
is female, and 0 for male. Party affiliation is measured as binary variables for Left, Right, and
Center where 1 indicates the respondent reports to sympathize with this party, and 0 otherwise
(the category left out is ‘Don’t know’ and ‘No party preference’). The analysis includes a battery of
individual-level controls that have been shown to influence policy preferences: age, education, social
class (self-reported), supervisory position, self-employment, unemployment, part-time employment,
public sector employment, not in the labor force, retirement status, rural residence (Svallfors 1997;
Cusack, Iversen & Rehm 2006).
Because the coefficients of probit models have little substantive meaning in themselves, I
present the marginal effects in Table 2.1. The coefficients are the estimated marginal effect on the
probability of a respondent expressing support for the policy given a unit increase in the value of
the predictor variable (e.g., going from male to female gender), while holding all other variables at
their sample mean. 95% confidence intervals for the changes in probability are given in parentheses.
The results reveal empirical patterns consistent with the argument that gender preferences
for maternal employment are orthogonal to the main left-right dimension in politics. Left and
right party identification is a large and statistically significant determinant of preferences on social
policy outcomes. In line with conventional understanding of the policy space, left party affiliation
is linked to more support for spending and government intervention while right party affiliation is
associated with less support. For example, identifying with the left is associated with a 10% increase
14These survey waves best correspond to the years quota laws were implemented. I also analyze data from the
1996 Role of Government and the 1994 Family and Changing Gender Roles surveys (before most quota laws were in
place), and my results do not change.
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in supporting the statement that ‘it should be the government’s responsibility to provide a job for
everyone that wants one’, while identifying with the right is associated with an 11% decrease in
support (model 1). The first four models, which all deal with social policies, show this relationship
of left and right identification linked to strong, opposite preferences. Identifying with the center
is not a significant determinant of preferences. In line with the gender gaps shown earlier, female
gender is associated with increased support for many social policies, even controlling for other factors
correlated with gender. However the size of the ‘effect’ is typically not as large as that of left-right
party affiliation. This suggests that partisan identity is a stronger determinant of policy preferences
than gender for most social policy issues.
The last three models (5 - 7) address preferences for maternal employment. As expected,
female gender is associated with large and significant increases in support for this issue, even control-
ling for party and other variables correlated with gender. For example, being a woman is associated
with a 10% increase in disagreeing with the statement ‘a preschool child is likely to suffer if his or
her mother works’ (model 5). Compared to party affiliation, gender is a stronger determinant of
preferences for all of the statements related to mothers working. Model 6 measures disagreement to
the statement that being a housewife is just as rewarding as paid work, and model 7 asks whether
women with children under school age should work outside the home (part- or full-time). Left party
identification is also significant, but the size of coefficients is smaller than gender identity. Right
and center party identification tend not to be significant determinants of preferences on maternal
employment. While the left-right spectrum accurately predicts respondent support for social policy
issues (and the direction of preferences), it is less successful at predicting preferences for mater-
nal employment. Overall, the data presented here suggest that my policy representation model’s
expectations about gender, party, and individual preferences are reasonable. Women have differ-
ent preferences on a range of social policy issues, and particularly strong preferences for maternal
employment which do not coincide with the main left-right dimension in politics.
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2.5 Mechanisms: Identity and Policymaking Power
The discussion so far has emphasized the role of politician identity as a potential determinant of
policy outcomes, but it has not explained how identity can influence change. This question is
particularly important in the context of advanced democracies, where most countries that have
passed a quota law are parliamentary systems. This is perhaps the ‘most difficult’ institutional
setting because scholars have historically assumed that the primary mechanism of representation
is the unitary political party (Sartori 1968; Barnes 1977; Dalton 1985; Esaiasson & Heidar 2000).
Decision-making is highly institutionalized and party discipline strong, so individual politicians have
less power to influence outcomes. In this section I build on literature from comparative party politics,
gender and politics, and policy feedback to propose two main mechanisms through which quotas,
and additional numbers of women in office, will lead to policy change. In subsequent chapters, I
elaborate on how these mechanisms apply at different stages of the policymaking process – party
positions and spending outcomes – and use case studies to explore their plausibility.
I expect that quotas will impact policymaking through two key mechanisms. The first
is that added numbers of women have more leverage to push the party towards their collective
preferences. The second is that quotas increase the salience of gender-related issues, making it
more likely that they will be prioritized in office. Figure 2.6 illustrates the causal logic of these two
mechanism.
Quotas Policy Change
Women in Parliament
Issue Salience
Figure 2.6: Causal Logic Linking Quotas to Policy Change
After a quota law, added numbers of women have more leverage to push the party towards
their collective preferences. Parties today are not as unitary as once believed. Factions are common-
place in many party systems (Greene & Haber 2014; Harmel et al. 1995), and internal ideological
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conflict can explain why parties might not shift policy positions to maximize the female vote share.
For example, conservative Catholic factions might make parties more reluctant to adopt progressive
initiatives with regards to gender and the family (Morgan 2006; Celis 2007). A ‘critical mass’ of
women after a quota law could have more leverage to push the party to shift its positions (Kanter
1977). In a more gender-balanced environment (many scholars use the 30% female benchmark),
women may be encouraged to speak out on behalf of women’ interests, and male majorities more
likely to be open to their views.
There are many examples of parties changing their positions after successful lobbying
by women in the party. For example, the women’s section of the Conservative Party in the U.K.
successfully lobbied party leadership to emphasize education spending and child care packages in the
2001 electoral program (Lovenduski 2001). Similarly the women’s section of the Dutch Christian
Democratic party “challenged the party’s longstanding traditionalism and favored measures that
promoted women’s economic independence and greater choice in matters of child care and work”
(Morgan 2006, p. 91). Finally, over time women are likely to advance to positions of power in the
government and party leadership, and are then able to influence policies more directly.
The literature on policy feedback, the idea that past policies significantly effect future pol-
icy outcomes, suggests that policies send certain messages to the electorate and can shape attitudes
and behavior (Campbell 2003, 2012a). In this case by raising the importance of gender equality to
the national agenda quota laws lead the public to expect greater attention to women in politics.
Irrespective of the numbers of women in office, parties might interpret the growing support for
women in politics after a quota law as a cue to better represent women’s interests and claim credit
with female constituents (Mayhew 1974). Quotas can put women’s political issues on the radar of
male elites who may not have realized the importance of certain policies to women, even if the party
had taken ‘women-friendly’ policy positions. As Laver says, “there is a clear distinction between a
person’s position on an issue and how salient he or she feels this issue is” (Laver et al. 2003, p. 70).
Parties that were openly opposed to the quota might feel an added incentive to highlight and/or
develop their policy positions addressing women’s interests as a sort of defense mechanism, and so
as to not appear outdated. Particularly when the policy space is constrained – as is the case for
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public spending outcomes – it is the salience of the issue rather than the party’s position that often
predicts policy change (Humphreys & Garry 2000).
Policy changes in the direction of women’s preferences could then have their own effects
on future outcomes by creating new constituencies (e.g., users of public child care, women in the
workforce), increasing demand further and setting in motion a chain of greater policy responsiveness
on these issues. Of course, policies do not always produce positive feedback results, particularly if
political institutions allow government actors to adopt policies contrary to the spirit of the law, or
if key social groups do not have the capacity to defend it (Patashnik 2003, 2014). I explore these
dynamics further in the empirical chapters.
2.6 Assumptions, Scope, and Contributions
Before moving to the empirical study, this section clarifies some of the assumptions that underlie
the book’s model of policy change and indicates how it contributes to the existing literature on
identity and politics.
Assumptions
As just laid out, the logic of policy change makes several assumptions about the relationship between
gendered preferences, politician identity, and policymaking power. First, women elected to office
are assumed to have the same general preferences as women in the population. Second, there is an
assumption that the gender gaps in preferences I measure apply to women as group, which ignores
potential intersections of gender and other forms of identity like race and class. Finally, the women
elected to office as a result of a quota law are assumed to have power and agency equal to that of
their peers; that is, the assumption is that they are not ‘tokens’ or otherwise less able politicians.
One potential concern is whether the attitudes of female politicians match up with those
of women in the general public. Research from Sweden and the U.K. comparing elite and mass
preferences finds that there is congruence between the preferences of female politicians and citizens
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(Wängnerud 2000; Campbell, Childs & Lovenduski 2010). Campbell et al. (2010) conclude that in
the the U.K., “in terms of attitudes to traditional gender roles, on average men and women differ,
and women representatives are more like women voters and male representatives are more like male
voters” (p. 194). However, it is also true that women elected to parliament are likely to be more
educated than average women in the population. In general I expect that this means women elected
to parliament will be even more likely to prioritize women’s concerns. This is because progressive
attitudes towards social spending and maternal employment are increasing with education, for men
and women. However, this does raise concerns about whether quotas – and increased numbers of
educated, professional, and most likely white women – can represent the interests of women ‘writ
large’.15
To measure gender gaps in preferences, I use a dichotomous variable of gender identity.
However, I acknowledge that women are not a homogeneous group and that there might be important
variations in preferences among women. I try to overcome some of these problems by testing whether
gender differences in preferences persist even controlling for other social categories like age, class,
and occupational status (see Table 2.1). My results suggest that more women than men, across a
variety of subgroups, favor increases in social spending and support maternal employment. Because
women and men have different preferences, increasing the number of women in parliament should
increase the average presence of attitudes favorable to women’s preferences. Still, it is possible that
gender gaps on specific policy questions, like support for family allowances, might not be consistent
across different social groups (e.g., class). If this is the case we may see trade-offs emerging, where
educated, professional women benefit at the expense of lower-income women. In the course of this
book I avoid making essentialist claims about the preferences of all women by considering potential
differences within relevant subgroups wherever possible.
Lastly, my theory of policy change expects that women elected due to a quota law will
have sufficient power and agency within the party to advocate for their interests. Although the
15The issue of politicians being more ‘extreme’ than those they represent has previously been explained as a form
of strategic voting (Kedar 2005). Instead, I suggest that voters are unable to elect representatives like them on certain
dimensions like education.
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notion that quotas will lead to ‘token women’ or less qualified candidates is common, the empirical
literature increasingly rejects these arguments. Quotas are not associated with lower candidate
quality (Murray 2010b; O’Brien 2012b); in fact, ‘quota women’ have been found to be more qualified
than their peers on several measures (Besley et al. 2013; Weeks & Baldez 2015). Another concern is
that quotas could create ‘token women’ who are marginalized and play little role in the legislative
process (Bauer & Britton 2006). Again most evidence suggests that this is not the case; women
elected via quotas also do not seem to confront more obstacles than other women in the parliament
as we would expect if these women were merely tokens (Zetterberg 2008; Devlin & Elgie 2008; Xydias
2009). One caveat is that quota women are more likely to be newcomers to national parliaments
compared to their peers (Weeks & Baldez 2015), and for any newcomers it takes time to build
up reputation and levels of seniority in the party. My model of policy change is sensitive to this.
It predicts that women in parliament will lead to policy shifts primarily through the leverage that
added numbers give female party members to lobby party leaders for change. In subsequent chapters
I use case studies to investigate the plausibility of this mechanism, and I also explore whether quotas
lead to more women in positions of power over time.
Scope
I focus on advanced democracies because my theory is based on gendered differences in social
policy preferences, which are well-established in developed democracies but not elsewhere. There
is a surprising lack of research on gender gaps in policy preferences across countries; for now,
we know very little about which issues (if any) men and women disagree on in other social and
political settings. Additionally in low income countries states often have insufficient capacity to
provide or implement extensive welfare programs. Advanced democracies thus provide the best
context for testing my theory. Limiting the sample to Western advanced democracies also allows
me control for similar cultural shifts, which could be important given different factors are relevant
for women’s political representation within different cultural contexts. For example, female labor
force participation has been linked to women’s representation in advanced democracies but not
agricultural economies, potentially because subsistence-level primary work is not likely to have an
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empowering effect for women (Matland 1998; Kenworthy & Malami 1999). Finally, the assumption
that female under-representation is about supply-side issues rather than a lack of voter demand
may not be satisfied in developing countries (e.g., Inglehart & Norris 2003; Beaman et al. 2008).
I expect my argument of identity and policy change to hold in parliamentary systems
where parties are strong. It could thus apply to many other countries outside of advanced democ-
racies, provided significant gender gaps in policy preferences exist. The dynamics of party politics
and policymaking in parliamentary and presidential systems vary considerably. In presidential /
majoritarian systems parties are less disciplined, giving individual representatives more power to
propose bills and affect the agenda (Shugart 1998; Carey 2007). In this context of weak parties
the argument that quotas influence policy change through giving women more leverage within the
party would not be appropriate. The stages of the policymaking process are different, and would
require different approaches. For example, in parliamentary systems it is important to consider
party-level policy change, e.g., manifesto promises, whereas in presidential / majoritarian systems
bill proposals and roll call votes are likely more important.
Finally, it is worth noting that quotas and other mechanisms to increase numbers of
women in politics are only one method of furthering women’s substantive interests. Social move-
ments, transnational networks and policy diffusion, and macro-level variables like culture and socio-
economic status are all important mechanisms that have been linked to change in the direction
of women’s interests. In subsequent chapters I account for some of these variables as potential
confounders of the relationship between quota adoption and policy change. Future research that
compares the effects of quotas or women in parliament to these other factors directly could broaden
the theory about identity and policy change, and make it more precise (Wängnerud 2009).
Contributions to the Literature
The book’s theory of identity and policy change produces several implications for the study of iden-
tity politics, political parties, and public policy. First, it shows that it is important to disaggregate
policy demands based on whether groups demanding change face high barriers to entry in politics,
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and whether the policy demand coincides with traditional lines of party competition. This concep-
tual framework links recent scholarship on identity politics to the standard spatial models of party
and voter behavior from political economy. These theories seem to have diverging predictions. In
spatial models rational parties are predicted to respond to voter preferences (Adams et al. 2004,
2006; McDonald & Budge 2005; Ezrow 2007), as well as environmental factors like economic condi-
tions (Adams, Haupt & Stoll 2009; Haupt 2010; Burgoon 2012) and how the party did in the last
election (Somer-Topcu 2009). Existing models largely disregard politician identity.
Yet the findings from the burgeoning literature on identity and policy suggest that politi-
cian identity, including gender and race, affects policy outcomes in favor of that group (Chattopad-
hyay & Duflo 2004; Ueda 2005; Svaleryd 2009; Rehavi 2007; Funk & Gathmann 2008; Washington
2008). This work typically uses the citizen-candidate framework, where political actors are endowed
with the power to make certain policy choices with autonomy. The problem is that it downplays
the role of political parties, which play an essential role in helping voters choose between many
complex political choices and helping politicians coordinate over policy preferences once in office
(Aldrich 1995; Kitschelt 2000a). Neither spatial nor citizen-candidate models provide a satisfactory
framework for understanding when politician identity is relevant to policy outcomes.
The theory presented in this chapter acknowledges the dominant role of parties, and also
provides a framework for understanding which issues are likely to be influenced by politician identity.
It draws attention to systemic bias in candidate selection procedures, which results in some groups
facing high barriers to entry in politics, and the strong incentives of parties to downplay concerns
that split their constituencies. I suggest that the interplay of group status and issue type determines
whether and how identity matters to policies. In particular, the theory predicts that political
market failure can occur for issues that are both off the main-left right dimension and supported
by disadvantaged groups that lack access to office. It is likely that these issues will remain off the
political agenda, and I use the example of women’s demands for work-family conciliation. In this
context I argue that it is especially important to have women in office, and that quotas can be
an important vehicle for achieving both descriptive representation and policy change. The general
logic of this theory should apply in contexts other than women’s policy demands – for example,
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whether the policy demands of immigrants or labor market ‘outsiders’ are addressed. It can also
explain why politician identity has been found to matter for some policy issues but not others; e.g.,
maternity leave policies (Kittilson 2008) but not education spending (Rehavi 2007).
Second, the theory proposed here provides new insights into how identity is linked to
change within the context of parliamentary democracies. Most of the literature on identity and
policy outcomes studies the role of identity in majoritarian settings like the United States (e.g.,
Ueda 2005; Rehavi 2007; Washington 2008) or at the executive level rather than in parliaments
(e.g., Chattopadhyay & Duflo 2004). In line with the contemporary political economy literature, I
expect that the details of legislative structures are important for understanding policy change. In
both majoritarian and executive contexts individual politicians are likely to have more power to
influence policy change than in parliamentary democracies. I draw on the literature on intra-party
negotiation and policy feedback to argue that both increased numbers of women in parliament and
issue salience are likely to be important mechanisms for policy change in the parliamentary setting.
The following chapters build on these theoretical insights, using case studies to explore
these and additional explanations, such as the relative size of gender gaps in preferences for policies.
But first, I turn to the question of why study gender quota laws to test the theory developed here.
The next chapter addresses the causes of quota laws themselves, making the case that quotas can
provide unique causal leverage provided that we control for relevant potential confounders.
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3 | Why Quotas?
Identity is difficult to study. Experts in causality often warn against making causal inferences on the
basis of group identity because it is impossible to randomly assign (Gelman & Hill 2006; Winship
& Morgan 1999). Studying the effects of women in politics is complicated because electorates that
elect women likely differ from those that do not. Policy outcomes may arise not from more women
in office, but from something else that may cause both women’s representation and female-friendly
policy change, such as a cultural shift. To make progress on this question, I examine the impact
of political gender quota laws. As Chapter 4 will demonstrate, quotas lead to large increases in
the numbers of women elected, and – unlike cultural change – these increases are often abrupt.
Measuring changes in policy positions and outcomes following semi-exogenous quota ‘shocks’ allows
me to test whether and how quotas affect the policymaking process. However in order to make
causal claims, it is important to have a good understanding of the causes of quota adoption and
how they relate to policy change. That is the goal of this chapter.
The following chapter gives a brief history of the rise of quota laws in advanced democra-
cies, and discusses potential confounders of the relationship between quotas and policy change for
women. I control for these variables in subsequent quantitative analysis. In the final section of this
chapter I use these confounders to select most similar ‘matched pair’ qualitative case studies in a
statistical matching procedure. The matching procedure successfully identifies paired cases for the
‘quota countries’ of Belgium and Portugal. These paired cases are similar on potential confound-
ing variables, but did not have a quota law. Belgium is paired to Austria, and Portugal to Italy.
Controlling for the relevant confounders allows me to make the claim that differences in the key
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variable of interest, the quota law, are the cause of differences in the outcomes of the pairs. I draw
on these case studies in subsequent empirical chapters.
3.1 The Rise of Quotas for Women in Politics
Over the past twenty years the use of gender quotas has increased dramatically. Three main types
exist: 1) voluntary party provisions ("party quotas"), often included in party statutes; 2) laws that
require all political parties to include a minimum percentage of women on their candidate lists
("quota laws"); and finally 3) laws that require women to be elected to certain positions, rather
than only nominated ("political reservations"). While common in less democratic countries, political
reservations for women do not exist in Western advanced democracies. This study focuses on quota
laws as the main explanatory variable because they oblige all parties in a country to comply, and as
I will demonstrate in Chapter 4 they tend to be more effective at increasing numbers of women in
office than party quotas. I thus expect quota laws to have greater policy impact compared to party
quotas. Over fifty countries have introduced electoral gender quota laws at the national level (see
Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Countries with National Gender Quota Laws
Year Adopted Country Type Threshold (2015)
1 1991 Argentina Electoral Law 40%
2 1993 Italy Electoral Law 50%1
3 1994 Belgium Electoral Law 50%
4 1996 Costa Rica Electoral Law 40%
5 1996 Paraguay Electoral Law 20%
6 1997 Bolivia Electoral Law 33%
7 1997 Brazil Electoral Law 30%
8 1997 Dominican Republic Electoral Law 33%
9 1997 Ecuador Constitution 50%
10 1997 Panama Electoral Law 30%
11 1997 Peru Electoral Law 30%
12 1997 Venezuela Electoral Law 40%2
Continued on next page
1Italy’s quota was declared unconstitutional in 1995, but a 2003 constitutional reform removed these barriers. Another
quota law was passed in 2015.
2Venezuela’s quota was repealed in 2000. In 2015 the electoral council (CNE) adopted new legislation requiring women
make up at least 40% of candidate lists.
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Table 3.1 – continued from previous page
Year Adopted Country Type Threshold (2015)
13 1998 Bosnia & Herz. Electoral Law 33%
14 2000 Colombia Electoral Law 30%3
15 2000 France Constitution 50%
16 2000 Guyana Electoral Law 30%
17 2000 Honduras Constitution 50%
18 2000 Mexico Electoral Law 40%
19 2004 Iraq Constitution 25%
20 2004 Korea Electoral Law 50%
21 2004 Serbia Electoral Law 30%
22 2005 Angola Electoral Law 30%
23 2006 East Timor Electoral Law 25%
24 2006 Mauritania Electoral Law 33%
25 2006 Portugal Electoral Law 33%
26 2006 Slovenia Electoral Law 25%
27 2007 Nepal Constitution 33%
28 2007 Spain Constitution 40%
29 2008 Albania Electoral Law 30%
30 2008 Indonesia Electoral Law 33%
31 2008 Macedonia Electoral Law 33%
32 2009 Burkina Faso Electoral Law 30%
33 2009 Egypt Electoral Law 12%
34 2009 Senegal Electoral Law 50%
35 2009 Uruguay Electoral Law 33%
36 2009 Uzbekistan Electoral Law 30%
37 2010 Cape Verde Electoral Law NA4
38 2011 Algeria Electoral Law 20 - 50%5
39 2011 Armenia Electoral Law 20%
40 2011 Haiti Constitution 30%
41 2011 Mongolia Electoral Law 20%
42 2011 Montenegro Electoral Law 30%
43 2011 Poland Electoral Law 35%
44 2011 Tunisia Electoral Law 50%
45 2012 Greece Electoral Law 33%
46 2012 Ireland Electoral Law 30%
47 2012 Libya Electoral Law 50%
48 2012 Nicaruaga Electoral Law 50%
49 2012 Togo Electoral Law 33%
50 2013 El Salvador Electoral Law 30%
51 2015 Chile Electoral Law 40%
3Colombia’s quota was declared unconstitutional in 2001, but 2003 legislation removed these constitutional barriers. An-
other law passed in 2011.
4Cape Verde’s electoral law includes a requirement for gender ‘balance’ in the candidate lists, but a percentage is not
specified.
5Algeria’s law requires quotas of between 20% and 50% of the candidates for parliament to be women, depending on the
number of seats in each electoral district.
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Notes: Data from www.quotaproject.org, International IDEA’s Global Database of Quotas for Women, www.ipu.org, IPU
Women in National Parliaments Database as of 1 November 2015, Schwindt-Bayer 2009, Schwindt-Bayer 2015, and Hughes
2011.
Voluntary party quotas were the first type of quota provision to be implemented in ad-
vanced democracies, beginning in Norway in the 1970s. For the sake of the book, voluntary party
quotas refer to measures adopted by the party requiring a minimum percentage of women in the
candidates for national level legislative office.6 The Norwegian Socialist Left Party adopted a quota
stipulating that 40% of parliamentary candidates be women in 1975 (Henig, 2002; Matland, 2005).
Other parties in Norway quickly followed suit, and today all but the right wing Conservatives and
Progress Party have established voluntary quota provisions (Dahlerup & Freidenvall, 2005). The
trend for voluntary party quotas spread quickly around Western Europe and other advanced democ-
racies. Today, most of the countries in my dataset have had voluntary party quotas at some point
since the 1970s, with the exceptions being Finland, Greece, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, and the
United States. For a complete list of political parties with voluntary quota provisions, please see
Appendix 4A.
Parties set different thresholds for their quota provisions, and these have tended to increase
over time, ranging from 12% (Party of the Catalan Socialists, from 1982 until 1987) to 50% or parity
(e.g., Germany’s Party of Democratic Socialism since 1990). Implementation of these provisions also
varies, with some parties seeming to take their own quota provisions more seriously than others.
Because they are not bound by law, ultimately the extent to which parties comply with their own
voluntary measures depends entirely on their disposition to do so.
Electoral quota laws began emerging in the 1990s. Figure 3.1 presents a timeline of quota
laws in advanced democracies. The timeline indicates when quota laws were first implemented,
i.e. the first election in which a quota was used. In my sample of advanced democracies, five
countries have passed a quota law: Italy (since repealed), Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal.
Other countries are debating or recently passed such a law for future elections. In Austria a law
6Parties have also adopted quotas for their internal organization, for local and regional candidate lists, and for
European Parliament candidate lists. Because of my focus on the representation of women in national legislatures, I
code for national level quota provisions only.
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was proposed by the national parliament but failed to pass in 1999 (Köpl 2005). Ireland and Greece
both passed a quota law in 2012, to apply from the next general election. Italy’s 2015 electoral law
also includes a gender quota provision, to apply from 2016.
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of Quota Law Implementation in Advanced Democracies
(First Election in Use)
Notes: The figure shows the first year a quota law was used by each country. Regarding adoption of quota laws, Italy
passed a quota law in 1993 (repealed by the Constitutional Court in 1995), followed by Belgium in 1994, France in
2000, Portugal in 2006 and Spain in 2007. Italy’s law was in effect only for the years 1994 and 1995.
Like party quotas, quota laws are characterized by varying thresholds and levels of com-
pliance. While parties are technically obliged to comply with the law, different laws have different
types of enforcement mechanisms – and some have none at all. In Belgium, non-compliance leads to
rejection of the list by the public authorities, whereas in France the sanction for non-compliance is a
financial penalty (Meier, 2004; Fréchette, Maniquet & Morelli, 2008). In addition, some quota laws
have what are known as ‘placement mandates’ while others do not. Placement mandates require
parties to put women in winnable positions on the party list, rather than placing placing female
candidates on the bottom of the ballot where they have little chance of being elected. Using the
same examples, from 2002 the Belgian quota law requires that the first two positions on electoral
lists cannot be occupied by candidates of the same sex (Meier, 2004). France has no requirements
about placement, because it is not possible to have such a rule in a single-member district electoral
system. Because quota laws are imposed on some parties against their will, levels of compliance to
quota laws may vary depending on the strength of the individual law. I come back to the question
of whether the strength of quota laws and outcomes are related in detail in subsequent chapters.
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3.2 The Causes of Quota Adoption: Potential Confounders
What are the causes of quota adoption, and how do these factors affect the probability of policy
outcomes for women? By ‘policy outcomes for women’ I refer to policy changes in the direction
of women’s interests. Recall that survey data on gender gaps in policy preferences (Chapter 2)
show that women prefer more social spending in general, and especially more attention to work-
family issues. In this section I focus on identifying the variables that might correlate with both
quota adoption and social spending. A good understanding of potential confounders is critical for
addressing endogeneity concerns that inevitably arise with a cross-national study of this type.
The following discussion is informed by secondary literature on quota adoption and welfare
state expansion, and by evidence from fieldwork in two quota countries, Belgium and Portugal.
I select these two countries because they are characterized by useful variation on dimensions of
theoretical interest – in particular, the average gender gap in policy preferences and the length of
time a quota law has been in place. In September – December 2013 I conducted approximately
40 interviews in these countries, with past and current party members and politicians, members of
NGOs, government bodies, and political activists. This was the first stage of research in a ‘most
similar systems’ design (Collier 1993), where countries with similar economic, social, and political
contexts are chosen, particularly with regards to the determinants of my main explanatory variable,
quota adoption. The purpose of the fieldwork was to gain knowledge about why certain countries
adopt quota laws, and what effects these laws might have on policy outcomes.
I identify six potential confounders for matching: women in parliament, economic develop-
ment, female labor force participation, Catholicism, proportional representation, and party quotas.
I also discuss four other potential confounders which are not included in matching due to lack of
relevance to these cases or data availability: left party power, women’s movements, international
influence, and the strategic incentives of (male) party leaders. I discuss each of these in turn below.
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Previous percentage of women in parliament
Perhaps the most important cause of adopting a quota law is low and stagnant levels of women’s
representation. Most of the countries that have quota laws are characterized by small numbers of
women in office before the law is passed (Spain is an exception). The motivation for adopting the
law in the first place is overwhelmingly to increase women’s descriptive representation. However,
not all countries with low levels of women in office go on to pass a quota law. For example, before
Belgium introduced a quota law in 1995 the percentage of women stood at 9.5%, similar to the
U.K. and Australia (both 9%), which have never passed a quota law. The under-representation of
women in office signals a problem that could be addressed in various ways besides passing a quota
law (e.g., awareness raising campaigns, internal political party recruiting or training, or internal
political party quotas) and result in similar policy outcomes, making it particularly important to
control for as a potential confounder. The share of women in parliament has also been linked to
increases in overall levels of spending (Bolzendahl & Brooks 2007; Bolzendahl 2009), and spending
on child care and parental leave (Bonoli & Reber 2010; Kittilson 2008).
In both Belgium and Portugal the majority of interviewees stated that the purpose of
the law was to increase women’s representation, in order to achieve more equality with men. For
example, when asked why he decided to propose the law in Belgium (along with Miet Smet), the
former Minister of the Interior Louis Tobback replied:
“Well I am a Socialist as you probably know, and I saw simply the fact that the pop-
ulation was composed of 50.6% of women and 49.4% men, but in parliament and also
on the local and provincial and the Flemish level, the assemblies and the representation
was composed of 90% men, to qualify it simply.” 7
In Portugal, an MP from the left-wing party Bloco Esquerda (BE) commented: “So we
supported it in the first place, I believe we were even pioneers in the project, because we think that
there must be a state guarantee that women – both genders, but in practice women – can be really
7Louis Tobback, personal interview, 20 September 2013, Leuven, Belgium.
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represented in the parliament.”8 Augusto Santos Silva, a former MP and Minister for the Socialist
party in Portugal (the other party supporting the quota legislation), explains further: “It was quite
strange and absurd that the last locus of power not open to women [after the dictatorship ended]
was in fact political power and political parties. So it was not hard to convince the members of the
party that we needed to make a step forward, and that step forward had to have some administrative
dimension.”9
Gender equality was also the stated goal in the push for quotas at the international level.
The former chair of the Committee for Equality in the Council of Europe, Regina Tavares da Silva,
explained that the issue of parity was first discussed in the Council of Europe, and soon after the
European Commission also took up the issue.10 In 1992 these discussions resulted in the first “Eu-
ropean Summit of Women in Power”, where The Athens Declaration was issued. The declaration
was signed by 20 women leaders, and was intended to respond to debates about women’s repre-
sentation and provide a resource to support the case for women’s representation in member states.
The document put the need for gender equality at center stage. For example, it states that, “Formal
and informal equality between women and men is a fundamental human right. Women represent
more than half the population. Equality requires parity in the representation and administration
of Nations.” The declaration goes on to call for action: “We call upon all the political leadership
at European and national level to accept the full consequences of the democratic idea on which
their parties are built, in particular by ensuring balanced participation between women and men
in positions of power, particularly political and administrative positions, through measures to raise
awareness and through mechanisms.”11
Finally the percentage of women in parliament is perhaps the best proxy available for
attitudes towards women in politics (Norris 1985), a very difficult variable to measure. Survey data
8Luis Fazenda, personal interview, 5 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
9Augusto Santos Silva, personal interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
10Regina Tavares da Silva, personal interview, 13 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
11The Athens Declaration. 3 November 1992. http://www.eurit.it/Eurplace/diana/ateneen.html
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are only available for certain countries, with large gaps over time.12 If there were different trends
in attitudes towards women in politics in quota- and non-quota countries before the introduction of
quotas, this would pose serious problems for causal inference. Because including trends in attitudes
directly is not possible, I use the share of women in parliament to control for the concern that
attitudes towards women in politics, and policies that women prefer, were already changing before
the quota law was passed. The next variables I consider address the question of why levels of
women’s representation in political office were so low in the first place in ‘quota countries’, but not
in others.
Economic development and women’s employment
Economic development and associated increases in female labor force participation could be as-
sociated with quota adoption through their link to increases in women’s representation (Matland
1998; McAllister & Studlar 2002; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008; Tripp & Kang 2008). Many ‘quota
countries’ suffer from low levels of female participation in the workforce – e.g., Italy and Spain.
Even in Portugal, where the share of women in the labor force is relatively high, the historical lack
of women in positions of power was cited as one of the reasons numbers of women in parliament
remained low. Center-left (PS) party member Ana Coucello explains, “In the dictatorship there
were practically only men in decision-making, so it was perceived like a man’s thing. . . nowadays
even sometimes it’s difficult for women to speak in public, mainly in gatherings where men are in
the vast majority.”13
Female labor force participation might also be linked to quota adoption through its effect
on voter attitudes. Some argue that quota laws are more likely to be adopted in egalitarian political
cultures (Lovenduski & Norris, 1993). Female labor force participation has also been found to be
an important determinant of female policy preferences (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2006), which could
12The best survey question would probably be the following, from the World Values Survey: “On the whole, men
make better political leaders than women do.” This question is not available for most quota countries before 2010. I
find similar problems with other survey questions.
13Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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in turn affect policy outcomes. Both economic development and female employment are related to
policy outcomes. For example, as incomes and government revenues increase, demand for public
expenditure should also rise (Wagner’s Law). Workforce participation entitles some women to
benefits that they would otherwise not be eligible for and increases their need for services to help
balance work and family.
Culture – history of Catholicism
One of the most common explanations for low levels of women in office in my interviews was
patriarchal culture. In Belgium the French politicians often spoke of ‘machiste’ (chauvinist or
macho) attitudes, while in Portugal interviewees linked low representation directly to the country’s
history of Catholicism and its promotion of traditional values. In fact, every country that has passed
a quota law in Europe has a strong tradition of Catholicism, from France with 75% of the population
Catholic as of 1980, to Spain with 96%. Of course it is very difficult to define and measure culture,
and the history of Catholicism seems to be a stronger factor in Portugal than it was in Belgium.
However, religion is perhaps the most common way of controlling for culture in the comparative
literature, and it most likely correlates highly with other measures such as survey data. I use history
of Catholicism as a proxy for conservative social pressure that may affect the likelihood of women’s
under-representation, the need for quota legislation, and policy outcomes.
In Belgium, the leader of the French ecologist party explains why she came to support
quota legislation:
“You know at first before I became a Green personality I was against this type of policy.
I thought we women have the same quality as men, and we don’t need this kind of help
to get elected. And after that I engaged in politics and I discovered that it was not true,
especially at the communal [local] level. It is quite difficult to find women at this level
to get involved in politics. And if there are ‘machiste’ men... the fight is really hard
at this level because everyone knows each other. So if we don’t do this kind of policy,
women will not come naturally in the communal districts.”14
A politician from the French Socialist party conveys the same sentiment discussing why
14Emily Hoyos, personal interview, 13 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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his party was initially divided on the issue of supporting a quota for women: “ I think that in the
party... you have of course a lot of men in the party who have a ‘machiste’ attitude, which for me
is a contradiction. If you are Socialist or Social Democrat in Europe you have to be feminist.”15
In Portugal, the following comment by a member of the center-right party (PSD) gives a
good sense of the views I heard from many interviewees:
“Personally I am totally in favor of quota systems, especially for some countries that don’t
have the historical background on the fight for women’s rights, and especially where is
a general philosophy in a society that is not much in favor of equality of opportunities
between women and men, which is the case in Portugal. Take the example of the Nordic
countries, where in some countries like Sweden for example, they did not need the quota
law because the political parties made an agreement between themselves, and so actually
they respect the quota law without law. On the other hand you have some countries like
Portugal where it is a patriarchal society, somehow still with traditional values, with the
paterfamilias, the head of a family is a man and everybody has to obey and follow the
orders of the leader.”16
Moreover, in Portugal interviewees directly connect the persistence of traditional values
and patriarchal culture to the Catholic church. The former leader of a feminist NGO involved in the
campaign for gender quota legislation claims that women were under-represented in political office
because, “the culture is very sexist and very misogynist to the protagonism of women and girls.
And one of the dimensions of this is the church and religion, and it is a very important dimension,
because Catholicism appeals to the value of the mother and the value of the virtue of women, but not
the protagonism of women in public space.”17 Catholicism has also been linked to policy outcomes,
including family policy and labor market outcomes for women (Castles, 1994). In Esping-Andersen’s
welfare state typology, Christian Democratic welfare states are characterized by Catholicism, as well
as emphasis on the traditional male breadwinner family, low labor force participation for women,
and relatively low provision of welfare state goods and services (Esping-Andersen, 1990a).
15Yvan Mayeur, personal interview, 17 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
16José Mendes Bota, personal interview, 7 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal
17Maria Jose Magalhaes, personal interview, 8 November 2013, Porto, Portugal.
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Electoral system
Although empirical studies have consistently shown that (especially closed list) proportional rep-
resentation and large district magnitude are associated with higher levels of women in office (e.g.,
Norris 1985; Rule 1987; McAllister & Studlar 2002; Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010), most national
quota laws have been implemented in countries with PR electoral systems. Quotas are thought
to be more compatible with PR systems where the party presents a list of candidates than with
majority systems with lower district magnitude (Matland, 2006). Belgium and Portugal both have
systems of proportional representation; France is an exception to this rule. Recent research has
shown that electoral rules also exert a strong effect on policy outcomes: majoritarian electoral
systems are associated with smaller government spending and smaller welfare states compared to
systems of proportional representation (e.g., Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno 2002; Persson &
Tabellini 2005; Iversen & Soskice 2006).
Another factor that emerged in interviews was the idea (already apparent from previous
comments) that it is harder to achieve gender balance when local party leaders control candidate
selection. The Flemish Social Democrat Louis Tobback described what he termed an ‘interesting
phenomenon’ in Belgium. When there was only one large electoral district as in elections for the
European Parliament, the candidate lists were organized by national party bureaus, and he saw
there was a more balanced representation. Tobback also brought up neighboring Holland, which
has only one large district for national level politics, and said it was the same there. The problem,
for him, “ was in the first place on the local level, where the people in place didn’t want to depart
and leave their places to women.” In Portugal also, the influence of local party structures is an
important factor. Center-right (PSD) party member Teresa Morais says that the lists in her party
are composed by proposals of the regional and local structures, but they are also overseen and
sometimes changed by the national direction of the party, especially now with the quota law. This
is the typical way candidate lists are composed for most parties in both Belgium and Portugal.
Morais states, “I think that in some districts the situation [of women’s under-representation] would
be worse if the national direction didn’t interfere. Because the local structures, I wouldn’t say every
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one of them but some local structures, seem to have a lot of difficulty to find available women.”18
Unfortunately cross-national time-series data on candidate selection procedures are not
available.19 Because of this I pay special attention to checking candidate selection procedures in
the matched pairs for balance.
Voluntary party quotas
Finally party-level experience with voluntary gender quota provisions might also be linked to adop-
tion of a quota law. Previous research posits a ‘contagion effect’ between party and national
level quotas whereby existence of party-level legislation paves the way for the law (Meier 2004).
In Belgium, the French Greens, Flemish Greens, Flemish Christian Democrats, French Christian
Democrats, and Flemish Social Democrats all had voluntary quotas for electoral lists in their party
statutes before the quota law was passed. When asked why a national law was passed, French Green
party leader Emily Hoyos said, “Maybe it’s because we did it and it worked,” referring to her party’s
internal quota. In Portugal, the Socialist party (PS) and left-wing BE both had internal quotas for
women before the law was passed. Christian Democrat MP João Almeida explains that the parties
then went on to support a national law because, “it was a matter of passing to the national agenda
an issue that was in their own agenda within the parties. So the two parties have that obligation
in their statutes and tried to pass it into law because they thought it was a good advancement in
their gender agenda.”20
In most cases internal party quota provisions are passed only after significant debate within
the party. Having this discussion within the party could make members more likely to be unified
in support for a national law. Parties also gain experience implementing the law and are able to
see that it is effective (as in the quote from French Green party leader Emily Hoyos above), which
increases their support. While some party-level experience with voluntary quotas seems to be an
18Teresa Morais, personal interview, 2 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
19The Database of Political Institutions has a ‘select’ variable which in theory codes for this, but data are not
available for the countries or years in my sample, aside from the United States.
20João Almeida, personal interview, 20 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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important factor (in fact all countries that have adopted a quota law in Europe had some previous
party quotas), if most of the parties have already set quotas for themselves it is likely that women’s
numbers have increased as a result, and national legislation might be rendered unnecessary. I expect
that voluntary party quotas are linked to policy outcomes mainly through the indirect mechanism
of increased women’s representation.
To what extent can we treat party quotas and national quota laws as discrete variables?
In many cases, use of party quotas preceded quota laws. However, not all countries that have party
quotas go on to adopt quota laws. There is also considerable variation in the use of party quotas
among countries that pass a quota law. The correlation between quota laws and party quotas
is positive at 0.15, but low and not statistically significant.21 Thus I treat party and national
quotas as distinct phenomena, and consider party quotas an important potential confounder in the
relationship between quota laws and policy change.
Other potential confounding variables
I found the variables discussed above to be the most relevant and convincing causes of quota
adoption from the literature and my field research in Belgium and Portugal. These are the variables
I use for matching to select my case studies. In addition to these, previous literature suggests
that several other variables might be important. I considered four additional variables for inclusion
in the matching procedure: left party power, women’s movements, international influence, and
the incentives of (male) political elites. While I would ideally like to match on other underlying
country characteristics, a larger number of covariates will increase the distance between units in
the covariate space, meaning matched pairs will be generally further apart. For this reason it
can be detrimental to match on variables that are not confounders (Nielsen & Sheffield, 2012).
The following discussion justifies leaving them out of the matching procedure, either because I do
not find them to be important potential confounders within my set of cases, or because of data
availability.
21Point-biserial correlation carried out using Stata package pbis.
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Left party power
Conventional wisdom holds that left parties are more ‘women-friendly’, and this implies that they
may push through both quota reforms and women’s policy agendas. Commitment to sexual equality
has been a longstanding element of socialist (and many other left parties’) ideology (Duverger
1955), while conservative parties tend to favor laissez-faire policies over concrete affirmative action
measures. Left parties have also been linked to increases in social spending and feminist policies in
particular (Huber & Stephens 2000; Allan & Scruggs 2004; Mazur 2002; O’Connor 1999).
However, within my sample of cases left partisanship is not a strong driver of quota reforms.
In two countries, Spain and Portugal, the left-right divide regarding quotas is clearly discernable.
The left pushed through quota legislation when it gained a majority in government (Verge 2012;
Baum & Espírito-Santo 2012). Yet in France and Belgium, center-right parties were instrumental
in proposing and supporting quota legislation. In both of these countries right-wing parties played
key roles in passing quota reforms (Meier 2012; Murray 2012b). In the case of Italy as well a center-
left coalition was responsible for the quota refom, including strong advocates from the Christian
Democratic party (Palici di Suni 2012). Because the evidence that left party power explains quota
adoption seems relatively weak, I do not include it in the matching procedure. I do control for left
party power in the larger-N quantitative analysis.
Women’s movements and women’s party sections
Women’s groups are thought to be at the forefront of many quota reforms, either in the form of
popular women’s movements or party-internal women’s sections (Kittilson 2006; Dahlerup 2006;
Krook 2009). The case of Poland mentioned in the Introduction is a good example. It is very
difficult to measure the presence or strength of women’s movements across countries over time. The
best data available come from Htun and Weldon (2012), who compile measures of the strength
and autonomy of feminist women’s movements over time in 70 countries. Their data show that
there was no change in the strength or autonomy of women’s movements in Belgium, France, and
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Portugal before a quota law was passed. In the remaining two ‘quota countries’, Italy and Spain, the
strength of feminist women’s movements declined before the quota law passed (autonomy remained
the same). Similarly, my interviews suggest little evidence that popular women’s movements were
behind the push for quota laws, with the exception of France. Existing literature suggests that a
popular parity movement was influential in coercing political actors in France to address the issue
(Murray 2012b). However, overall the role of women’s sections within parties was considered to be
much more important.
In Belgium, Flemish Christian Democrat Sabine de Bethune played in a key role in the
quota legislation when she worked in the cabinet of then-Minister for Labor and Employment, and
Equality, Miet Smet. The legislation is commonly known as the Smet-Tobback Law, referring to
the joint proposal of Christian Democrat Miet Smet and Social Democrat Louis Tobback. Smet and
de Bethune were both members of the Christian Democrats’ women’s section, Women and Society
(founded by Smet in 1973). De Bethune states, “We would not have succeeded if it weren’t for
the women’s group in my party. This was the important factor.”22 According to de Bethune, the
women’s section led the campaign for quotas within the party and in the law.
In Portugal also the strength of women’s sections was clearly relevant. Sonia Fertuzinhos,
Socialist party MP and the former President of the Socialist party’s women’s section at the time of
the quota legislation, says of the law, “it was only possible, at that point [2006], because we had in
our party a history of the Socialist women’s department that started before. Since the beginning,
more organized or less, we always had a group of women inside the party that fought for this.”23
Party member and political activist Ana Coucello confirms, “Sonia Fertuzinhos, she did a great job
as president of the women’s department, so Sonia was also very, very crucial, very essential. She
built a lot of constituencies among the women of the party for that.”24
While I agree that women’s sections within political parties seem to be an important factor
in quota adoption, I do not include it in the matching procedure for two reasons. First, we lack
22Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Begium.
23Sonia Fertuzinhos, personal interview, 22 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
24Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
64
data on the presence and strength of women’s sections across countries and political parties over
time. Currently no such dataset exists, and descriptions of women’s groups advocating for quota
legislation tend to come from quota countries only. Second, women’s sections are likely to be highly
correlated with voluntary party quotas, which I do include in the matching procedure. In her study
of ten Western European countries, Kittilson (2006) finds that women’s organizations have often
been instrumental in pushing for internal quotas within parties. In my fieldwork I found this to be
true for most of the parties that passed voluntary quotas in Belgium and Portugal as well. Given
this link, I would expect voluntary quotas within the party to be a more powerful influence on quota
adoption than having a women’s section alone. This is because getting a quota passed in the party
likely indicates that the women’s organization is especially strong, and because having the debate
about quotas within the party ahead of any legislation tends to get all party members, rather than
only women, on board with supporting the principle of quotas.
International influence
Another explanation focuses on the role of international influence and transnational sharing. Quotas
have spread rapidly over a relatively short period of time, and some scholars point to the exchange
of information across national borders as a key reason (Krook, 2006, 2008). While I found this to be
true for my cases, all influence was at the European or global level. In both Belgium and Portugal
the most important international influence cited was the Council of Europe and its initiatives
(discussed above).25 In the early 1990s, Council of Europe member states included all European
states in my sample, and others were granted observer status in 1995 (U.S.) and 1996 (Canada and
Japan). The only countries in my sample that were non-members are Australia and New Zealand.26
Other international influences cited were the European Commission, the European Women’s Lobby,
Socialist Women International, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
25Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Begium; Anne-Marie Lizin, personal inter-
view, 9 September 2013, Brussels Belgium; José Mendes Bota, personal interview, 7 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal;
Regina Tavares da Silva, personal interview, 13 November 2013; Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December 2013,
Lisbon, Portugal.
26http://www.coe.int/.
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(CEDAW), and the Beijing Platform for Action.27 In short this explanation would seem to apply to
most countries in my dataset, i.e. Europe, and is not able to clarify why why international influence
leads to quota reforms in some countries but not others. Thus it is not included in the matching
procedure here. In subsequent party-level analysis, I control for party family in order to account for
the possibility that similar parties (e.g., socialist parties) might have close ties to each other across
countries which affect the likelihood of quota adoption and outcomes.
Incentives of (male) political elites
Finally, another approach focuses on the role of (typically male) political elites and their reasons
for supporting quota laws. After all in every case of quota adoption in Europe the leaders of
supporting parties were male, and their support had to be crucial for getting the legislation on
the agenda and passed into law. The role of then Socialist party leader and Prime Minister Jóse
Sócrates was emphasized by many of my interviewees in Portugal, including the Socialist MEP Ana
Gomes: “by the time the parity law was introduced by the PS they were still a very patriarchal
party, but Sócrates saw this was a question of modernity and he pushed it. Look, in these things
the leadership makes all the difference.”28 In Belgium, the Christian Democrat party leader and
then Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene was in favor of the law, and used his position to influence
other party leaders to support the law in parliament: “Dehaene had to invite the party presidents
of different parties in the majority to ask them to get it through to the parliament, and only then
was it accepted in the Council of Ministers.”29
Previous literature suggests that elites might support quota laws for strategic reasons, such
as gaining more control over their opponents within or outside the party (Panday, 2008; Krook,
2009), or as a way to demonstrate commitment to women without really intending to change the
27Anne-Marie Lizin, personal interview, 9 September 2013, Brussels Belgium; Augusto Santos Silva, personal
interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal; Regina Tavares da Silva, personal interview, 13 November 2013; João
Almeida, personal interview, 20 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal; Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December
2013, Lisbon, Portugal
28Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
29Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Begium.
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existing status quo (Htun & Jones, 2002; Bird, 2003). For example Baldez (2004) finds that in
the context of electoral uncertainty party leaders will support gender quotas as a way of boosting
support among women while also consolidating control over the nomination process. Elites might
also have ideological motives; they might genuinely believe that gender equality is a matter of
justice worth pursuing, even if it means some male politicians in the party lose their seats. This
kind of variable – strategic or ideological motives of party leaders – would be very difficult to define
and measure across countries for use in matching analysis, and for that reason it is not included
here. However, I note that voluntary party quotas, which I do include in matching, are likely to
be correlated with male party leader support for gender equality. I address this question in much
more detail in Chapter 4, which uses detailed case studies of quota adoption and implementation
in Belgium and Portugal to gain leverage on the role of elite incentives.
3.3 Case Study Matching Procedure
I use a statistical matching procedure to select two matched pair cases for qualitative research.
Matching offers a transparent and principled way to select cases when there are many relevant
variables. I select the ‘quota countries’ of Belgium and Portugal because these countries are of
particular interest: in both a quota law led to increases in the percentage of women in office, but
in very different contexts and time periods. Specifically, there is variation in the average size of the
gender gap in policy preferences (women in Belgium tending to be more progressive), and in the
length of time that a quota law has been in place. The following section provides further details
about the matching procedure, including a discussion of similarities and differences between the
matched pair countries and tables showing the data used.
I match on the six variables identified as potential confounders: percentage of women
in parliament, percentage of population Catholic (1980), proportional representation, economic
development (income per capita), women’s labor force participation, and percentage of parties with
voluntary quotas (weighted by seat share in parliament).30 The matching procedure is carried
30Data on percentage of women in parliament, female labor force participation, and proportional representation
67
out using the MatchIt package version 2.4-20 in R version 2.14.0. I conduct separate matching
procedures for Belgium and Portugal, subsetting the data to countries with elections in the years
including and immediately preceding the year in which a quota law was adopted for each case (1994
in Belgium and 2006 in Portugal). I include only one election-year per country.
I drop other ‘quota countries’ before matching. I use nearest neighbor, Mahalanobis match-
ing. Nearest neighbor matching selects the single best control match for each ‘treated’ unit (i.e.,
Belgium and Portugal). Matching is done using a distance measure, and here the Mahalanobis
option is used because it allows for continuous covariates (Ho et al. 2011). The match is selected
based on Mahalanobis distance, a generalization of Euclidean distance that accounts for correlations
between variables (Rubin 1973). Tables 3.2 and 3.3 at the end of this section present data used in
the matching procedures. Matched pairs are in bold.
The matching procedure successfully identifies matches for both Belgium and Portugal.
Belgium is matched to Austria, and Portugal is matched to Italy. Taking Belgium and Austria first,
both are considered social democratic welfare states, and as Table 3.2 shows they had very similar
levels of economic development and female labor force participation in this time period. Before the
Belgian quota law both had relatively few women in office – although Belgium especially so (9%,
compared to Austria’s 22%). The electoral systems in the two countries are similar, both having
closed list PR systems with medium-sized districts (about 14 - 20 legislators elected per district on
average) in the early 1990s.31 Both countries have a strong history of Catholicism, with 89% and
90% of the population identifying as Catholic in 1980 in Austria and Belgium respectively. Both
also had political parties with voluntary quota laws, including the socialist SPÖ in Austria and
the Flemish Christan Democrats and Social Democrats in Belgium. Finally, I note that Austria is
one of the only advanced democracies where a quota law was proposed by the national parliament
following the 1994 elections but failed to pass (in 1999) (Köpl, 2005). This suggests that it is a
come from the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, February 2014 version; income per capita comes from the U.N.
World Development Indicators (2014); percentage of the population Catholic as of 1980 from (La Porta et al. 1999);
and the share of parties with voluntary gender quotas comes from an original dataset (see Appendix 4A for details).
31After 1995 Belgium adopted several changes to increase the importance of preference votes, so it is now considered
an open list system.
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particularly good counterfactual for the case of Belgium.
Portugal and Italy are Southern European countries with similarly low levels of women
in office before the Portuguese quota law was adopted (21% and 10% respectively). The electoral
systems at the time were similar, with both having closed list PR systems and multi-member
districts. Catholicism is also very strong in both countries. The main left-wing parties in both
countries had a voluntary party quota at the time (the DS in Italy and the PS in Portugal). The
match is less close on the economy and women’s employment. Italy is a higher income country,
but in Portugal a greater percentage of women are active in the labor market. However, since both
of these factors are hypothesized to lead to greater levels of women’s representation and higher
social spending, the bias from the mismatch ought to even out. I also note that the two countries’
economies are often compared due to high national budget deficits relative to GDP, and high, or
rising, government debt levels (as in the derogatory ‘PIGS’ acronym).
Finally, I have extra confidence in this match because – as in the case of Austria – a quota
law was proposed in Italy around the same time as in Portugal. Italy was on the verge of passing
a national quota law in 2006, the same year that Portugal passed its quota law, but the proposal
elapsed at the end of the legislature. In fact Italy is the only other advanced democracy in my
sample besides Austria where a quota law was proposed in parliament but failed to pass.32 This
suggests that the covariates I match on should be considered appropriate determinants of quota
adoption, and lends extra confidence to the general matching procedure.
Balance on other potential confounders
First, I am concerned that my measure of electoral system, proportional representation, does not
capture the degree of national party control in the candidate selection process. In Austria, as of 1989
the three main political parties (the Social Democratic Party, the Austrian People’s Party, and the
Freedom Party of Austria) were all characterized by decentralized candidate selection procedures.
In each of these parties the subnational units propose candidates which are subject to the national
32Italy has since passed a quota law (2015), which comes into force in 2016.
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organization’s approval (Bille 2001). This is similar to the way most political parties composed their
party lists in Belgium at that time. In Italy, the electoral system has been through many changes.
However before a quota law was passed in Portugal (in the early 00’s), candidate selection in Italy
was mostly decentralized. Lists were composed by sub-national units, with national level organs
retaining the power to approve or reject candidates, in the main left parties (the Democratic Party
of the Left and the Refounded Communists) and in most of the right-wing parties as well (Lega
Nord, National Alliance). Exceptions were right-wing Forza Italia and centrist Christian Democrats
(UDC). In these parties, the national party organization was the one to nominate the candidates,
after consulting with the sub-national party (Calossi & Pizzimenti 2013). Still, the majority of
parties gaining seats in the parliament selected their candidates in a decentralized procedure.
Turning to the other variables that have been cited as causes of quota adoption in the
literature, we can see that both matches are European countries, and thus would have been subject
to similar influence by the Council of Europe, European Commission, and other European-level
and global organizations. Both Austria and Italy also have some political parties with established
women’s sections, like their counterparts in Belgium and Portugal. In Austria both the Social
Democratic party and the Austrian People’s Party have had a women’s section since 1945.33 In Italy
the Democratic Party of the Left established a women’s section in the party in 1991 (Guadagnini
2005).
33http://frauen.spoe.at/ueber-uns;
http://www.frauenoffensive.at/service/geschichte-der-oesterreichischen-frauenbewegung.html; and see Kopl 2005.
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Table 3.2: Data for Matching: Belgium
Country Election % Women GNI PR Female labor % Catholic Party quotas
year in parliament per capita force participation (1980) (%)
Belgium 1991 9.4 28,513 1 41.81 90 35
Australia 1993 8.8 24,411 1 41.74 29.6 0
Austria 1994 21.9 29,186 1 42.81 88.8 43
Canada 1993 18 25,412 0 44.74 46.6 63
Denmark 1994 33.5 38,630 1 45.66 0.6 35
Finland 1991 39 25,295 1 47.18 0.1 0
Germany 1994 21.9 29,396 1 NA 35 45
Great Britain 1992 9.2 25,533 0 43.77 13.1 0
Greece 1993 6 15,632 1 37.25 0.4 57
Iceland 1991 23.8 38.706 1 45.77 0.7 38
Ireland 1992 12 20.952 1 NA 95.3 0
Japan 1993 2.67 32,574 1 40.53 0.6 0
Luxembourg 1994 20 51,662 1 36.14 93 0
Netherlands 1994 31.3 31,122 1 41.32 42.6 28
New Zealand 1993 21.2 19.172 1 43.53 18.7 0
Norway 1993 39.4 47,290 1 45.42 0.3 76
Sweden 1991 33.5 29,576 1 47.98 1.4 5
Switzerland 1991 17.5 48,306 1 41.73 52.8 21
United States 1992 11 32,791 0 44.83 30 0
Table 3.3: Data for Matching: Portugal
Country Election % Women GNI PR Female labor % Catholic Party quotas
year in parliament per capita force participation (1980) (%)
Portugal 2005 21.3 17,994 1 46.75 94.1 52
Australia 2004 24.7 32,379 1 44.65 29.6 40
Canada 2004 21.1 33,704 0 46.61 46.6 50
Denmark 2005 36.9 48,209 1 47.33 0.6 0
Finland 2003 37.5 34,774 1 48.17 0.1 0
Germany 2005 31.8 33,922 1 45.18 35 81
Great Britain 2005 19.7 39,130 0 45.97 13.1 0
Greece 2004 13 21,094 1 40.66 0.4 39
Ireland 2002 13.25 37,004 1 41.65 95.3 0
Italy 2001 9.8 30,204 1 38.74 83.2 26
Japan 2005 9 36,615 1 41.35 0.6 0
Luxembourg 2004 23.3 68,354 1 41.96 93 75
Netherlands 2003 36.7 38,146 1 44.17 42.6 33
New Zealand 2005 32.3 25,711 1 46.42 18.7 0
Norway 2001 35.8 61,673 1 46.6 0.3 59
Sweden 2002 45 37,583 1 47.96 1.4 54
Switzerland 2003 25 53,493 1 44.65 52.8 26
United States 2004 14.9 43,615 0 46.18 30 0
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3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have reviewed the historical development and causes of quota adoption in advanced
democracies. The basic story is that quota laws are likely to emerge in countries with low levels of
women’s representation (which is driven by cultural and economic factors), proportional electoral
systems, and some experience with party-level quotas. I have argued that analysis of the effects of
quotas on policies ought to pay special attention to six potential confounders that capture these
dynamics. Some of these variables have been identified in the literature, and some derive from my
qualitative research in the ‘quota countries’ of Belgium and Portugal. Accordingly, I then used these
confounders to select ‘most similar’ pairs, countries which are alike to Belgium and Portugal but
did not pass a quota law. This process results in two sets of matched pairs – Belgium and Austria,
and Portugal and Italy. I conducted fieldwork in all four countries, and use the evidence to support
quantitative findings and shed light on mechanisms in subsequent chapters.
I now turn to a series of empirical analyses. First, I validate the underlying assumption
that quotas will lead to more women in office, and that this increase is often abrupt and large.
The next chapter demonstrates that quota laws are important determinants of women’s descriptive
representation (moreso that party quotas) and draws on case studies of quota implementation in
Belgium and Portugal to explain why. Next, I carry out tests of the effects of quota laws on political
party positions and spending outcomes related to women’s preferences.
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4 | Quotas and Descriptive Representa-
tion
The theory presented in Chapter 2 relies on a key assumption: that quota laws increase the numbers
of women in office. It hypothesizes that in certain contexts (when a group lacks access to political
power and its preferences are orthogonal to mainstream party issues), women and other disadvan-
taged groups can face a political market failure whereby their interests are not represented. Quotas
are one way of correcting this market failure. The following chapter serves two purposes. First, it
validates the assumption that quotas lead to more women in office, and it shows that these changes
are often abrupt. This matters because dramatic increases in women’s representation constitute a
‘shock’ that helps isolate the effect of identity. Second, this chapter demonstrates that quota laws
are more effective at increasing women’s descriptive representation than other types (specifically,
party quotas), and contributes a new explanation for why this is the case. The results help us
understand not only women’s representation, but also more generally how institutions like quotas
can set in motion new dynamics that make the political process more inclusive.
In general, the literature is not very clear about why quotas should matter. If parties
concerned about gender equality have the votes to pass quota regulations, why do they not simply
choose to select more women candidates? And would we not expect them to do so if there were
no quotas, rendering the quota redundant? In Chapter 3, I addressed the causes of quota adoption
in a comparative framework, identifying the key potential confounders of the relationship between
quotas and policy change. However the question of why male party leaders would support quotas
73
remains. As one Portuguese legislator put it, “They [men] want to keep control of the power.”1
It is not easy to measure the attitudes and motivations of political elites on this question; as I
state in Chapter 3, such a variable would be very difficult to define and operationalize for use in
quantitative analysis. In this chapter I use qualitative evidence from two case studies to shed light
on how the incentives of male party elites relate to quotas. Detailed narratives of quota adoption
and implementation in Belgium and Portugal provide new insights into why quotas are passed and
how they work.
Related to this question, existing literature is unable to explain whether some types of
quotas are more effective at increasing numbers of women than others. Quantitative analysis has
been slow to differentiate between types of quota provisions. Studies tend to either group all quotas
together or assess the effect of only one type. Some scholars believe that party quotas are more
effective because they have been voluntarily adopted rather than imposed; others argue that national
quota laws are more effective because they are less easy to ignore. This chapter addresses this gap
by examining the relative importance of party and national level quota provisions in advanced
democracies.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I build on the literature from gender and politics
and endogenous institutions to propose a new theory for why quotas, and quota laws in particular,
will increase numbers of women in office. I argue that quota laws have both ‘vertical’ and ‘hori-
zontal’ effects – helping party leaders overcome local-level opposition and forcing skeptical parties
to comply, respectively. They also tend to generate significant public support, creating a power-
ful ‘policy feedback effect’ not present with party quotas alone. To test my argument I compile
a unique new measure of party quotas and use fixed effects regression to measure the impact of
both types of quotas in 21 countries from 1975 to 2010. I find that both types of quotas improve
women’s representation significantly, but quota laws are more effective than voluntary party quotas.
I confirm my results using synthetic control methods, which estimate the causal effect of quota laws
in individual countries. Case studies of quota implementation in Belgium and Portugal help unpack
1Anonymous (PS MP), personal interview, 26 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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the ‘black box’ of how different quota policies work and provide initial support for each of the three
mechanisms I identify. I conclude with a discussion of implications for future research.
4.1 Theoretical Development
As discussed in Chapter 2, previous literature suggests that the most important determinants of vari-
ation in women’s representation in advanced democracies are structural factors, especially women’s
labor force participation and electoral rules (Norris 1985; Rule 1987; McAllister & Studlar 2002;
Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008). Yet the recent growth of party and
national level gender quotas casts doubt on the continued importance of these traditional expla-
nations in contemporary politics (Wängnerud 2009). Because quotas are such a new phenomenon,
they have not been included as an explanatory variable in much of the previous literature on de-
terminants of women’s representation. Studies assessing the impact of gender quotas are mostly
single cases (e.g., Jones 1998; Baldez 2004; Meier 2004; Jones 2004; Schmidt & Saunders 2004;
Davidson-Schmich 2006), and the few comparative studies that exist find mixed results.
This is likely because scholars define gender quotas differently, and often do not distinguish
between party and national level quotas. Some focus on one type of quota only, while others use a
broader definition of having any type of quota. Some scholars include reserved seats (which require
women to be elected rather than only nominated) in their definition while others do not. Part of
the reason for these many different approaches is data availability. Perhaps the most widely used
data source is the website quotaproject.org, set up by International IDEA to provide information
about different types of quota policies around the world. While it serves as a useful initial resource,
it is not frequently updated, especially information on party quotas. Researchers who work on the
database even warn against using it in scholarly work (Krook 2013).
The handful of studies that compare countries with and without quotas show mixed ef-
fects. Hughes (2009) finds no effects of national gender quotas, but Paxton, Painter and Hughes
(2010) show that national level quotas (including reserved seats) increase women’s representation.
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Considering party quotas, Studlar and McAllister (2002) find that they increase levels of repre-
sentation, but are not nearly as influential as well-established determinants like electoral system.
Finally, Kunovich and Paxton (2005) find no evidence that quotas (defined as either national or
party level quotas) result in increases for women. However Tripp and Kang (2008) find the opposite:
quotas (defined as having any type of quota, including reserved seats) are the single best predictor
of women’s representation.
None of these studies include both party and national level quotas as separate variables.
Thus far Hughes (2011) is the only study to do so, and finds that national level quotas increase
women’s representation far more than party quotas or structural factors. However this study uses
cross-sectional data, which has the limitation of capturing only one historical context rather than
assessing changes over time, and there are measurement issues that could be improved. The variable
for national gender quotas used includes both electoral quota laws and reserved seats for women,
and the measure of party quotas is a dummy variable, coded 1 if one or more parties in the country
use a voluntary gender quota, and 0 otherwise. Longitudinal studies are needed in order to better
understand trends in women’s representation, and more precise measurements to gauge the relative
effects of different types of quotas on women’s representation.
Building on this literature, I propose that both party and national level quotas will increase
numbers of women in office. But this presents a puzzle, because if supporters of more gender equality
in representation have the votes to adopt quotas, why do they not simply choose to nominate more
women directly? One explanation, adapted from the literature on endogenous institutions, is that
while a party may be ideologically committed to equality at the top it can face internal opposition
at the local level. Previous studies have identified this issue, noting that national leaders are more
concerned with women’s representation and equality than local or regional party branches (Matland
& Studlar 1996; Hinojosa 2012). A quota can be a way to try force the hands of local party leaders,
who typically have significant power over nominations. I refer to this mechanism as the ‘vertical
effect’. Theoretically, both internal party quotas and national quota laws can help to overcome this
problem. I thus hypothesize the following:
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Hypothesis 1: All else equal, both party quotas and the adoption of quota laws will
increase rates of female representation in national parliaments.
Yet party and national quota provisions operate differently, so we should expect them to
lead to different results. Party quotas are voluntary, and there are two potential explanations for
adopting them: 1) ideological commitment to equality and women’s representation, and 2) strategic
behavior, in hopes of electoral gain. First, presumably parties that are committed to equality for
ideological reasons have a strong incentive to respect the rules they set for themselves. Yet, if parties
are committed to women’s representation, why not choose the same number of women candidates
directly? In other words, for a quota to be necessary in the first place there must be some resistance
inside the party organization to nominating women. In particular, local level opposition to a party
quota might render it ineffective even if party leadership is genuinely committed to equality.
This suggests that the ‘vertical effect’ might be more successful when reinforced by national
legislation. The idea of national party leaders using institutional change to squash intra-party
conflict has parallels in the literature on early democratization. In the case of Britain, Lizzeri
and Persico (2004) argue that national political elites wanted more spending on public goods, but
(corrupt) local opposition made it difficult to implement. National level politicians expanded the
suffrage in order to shift power at the local level, because particularistic politics became less feasible
with larger constituencies. Iversen and Soskice (2007) expand on their argument, suggesting that
extending the franchise, as opposed to simply having a legislative majority, offers elites a long-
term solution to the collective action problem posed by the political entrenchment of local elites.
Similarly, quota laws could provide national political elites with a way of shifting power at the local
level, towards the more diverse demographics they value.
The second scenario is more straightforward. Parties might also pass internal quotas for
strategic reasons, to gain votes from those who support female candidates or egalitarian values. The
party thus makes an ‘empty gesture’, intending to raise positive press without actually respecting
the quota. Or, change in party leadership over time may impact the implementation of a quota; e.g.,
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one faction controls the party and is pro-quota, then another faction takes control and is anti-quota
but doesn’t want to repeal it for strategic reasons, so ignores it. In either case, the incentive for the
party to comply is low.
How do national quota laws compare? Unlike party quotas, quota laws are imposed on
all parties, and thus have greater potential impact. Parties may want to use a majority in the
legislature to impose equality on other parties, again for ideological or strategic reasons. I will
call this the ‘horizontal effect’, and it is only present in the context of quota laws. By forcing
parties with few women in their ranks to promote female candidates, they place these parties at
a competitive disadvantage. The flip side of this logic is that it alleviates the concerns parties
considering party-internal quotas might have that they will put themselves at a disadvantage (at
least initially). Importantly, the parties forced to comply are also likely to be the ones with the
lowest levels of women in their ranks, meaning they have the biggest room for improvement. The
horizontal effect gives quota laws an advantage over internal party mechanisms.
Finally, I propose that a third ‘policy feedback’ mechanism also makes quota laws more
effective than party quotas. As argued in Chapter 2, quota legislation spurs public support that
parties find hard to ignore, a pressure that is not present when quotas exist only at the party level.
The importance of policy feedback – the idea that past policies significantly effect future policy
outcomes – is well-established in the literature (for an overview, see Campbell 2012a). For example,
the design of welfare policies shapes the attitudes and behavior of target constituencies, affecting
participation in the political process, and, in turn, the outcomes of subsequent welfare policies (e.g.,
Campbell 2003). Policies send certain messages to the electorate, and in this case by raising the
importance of gender equality to the national agenda quota laws lead the public to expect a greater
role for women in politics.
Public pressure compels parties to comply with the spirit of law, even if it is possible to shirk
by exploiting certain loopholes. For example, many scholars have discussed the case of France, where
the quota law is considered weak. Initially many parties ignored the law (paying a fine instead), or
placed women in unwinnable seats (Fréchette, Maniquet & Morelli 2008; Murray, Krook & Opello
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2012). Although the enforcement loopholes in France have not changed, in subsequent elections
parties have put forward more female candidates, complying with the law to greater extent (Murray
2010a). In 2000, the percentage of women in parliament in France was 11%. As of January 2014 it
has almost tripled to 27%. Why the change? The concept of parity, once deemed unconstitutional
and the subject of hostile debate, now enjoys sustained support in public opinion polls (Murray
2012a). France is not a unique case; recent literature suggests that the degree to which parties will
intentionally thwart a quota law declines over time (Paxton & Hughes 2015).
In summary, national legislation is more likely to disrupt local power monopolies compared
to voluntary quotas, it obliges all parties to comply, and it also elevates the issue of women in politics
to the national agenda, spurring a policy feedback loop that even reluctant parties find compelling.
This leads me to expect the following:
Hypothesis 2: National quota laws will increase rates of female representation more than
party quotas.
Finally, the case of France notwithstanding, the success of quota laws is likely to depend
on their policy design. Previous research suggests that although even ‘weak’ quotas (as in France)
lead to increases in women’s representation, higher thresholds, placement mandates, and strict
enforcement mechanisms have been shown to enhance quota effectiveness (Schwindt-Bayer 2009;
Paxton, Hughes & Painter 2010; Paxton & Hughes 2015). Higher thresholds require a greater
share of female candidates, placement mandates require women occupy certain seats on candidate
lists, and strict enforcement mechanisms require parties to comply with the quota for the list to be
accepted. Thus I expect:
Hypothesis 3: Quota laws with stronger rules (strict enforcement mechanisms, placement
mandates, and higher thresholds) will increase rates of female representation more than laws without
such provisions.
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4.2 Data & Methods
I test this argument in three ways: a time-serial cross sectional analysis of 21 countries from 1975
to 2010, a synthetic control analysis of national quota laws in 5 democracies, and two case studies
exploring causal mechanisms in Belgium and Portugal. First, I analyze women’s political repre-
sentation over time using cross-national time-series data. In order to ascertain the importance of
quota laws and party quotas for female representation, I estimate a model that controls for all other
cross-national differences using country-specific intercepts (or fixed effects). However, regression
suffers from well-known endogeneity issues, even when fixed effects are included as in this analysis
(e.g., Angrist & Pischke 2008, 3.2). As a robustness check on results using regression analysis, I
use synthetic control methods to estimate the effect of quota laws in individual countries. If re-
sults using synthetic control estimators are similar to regression results, this adds confidence to the
strength of the findings. Lastly, I use case studies to explore the soundness of my arguments about
the causal mechanisms linking different types of quotas to varying levels of effectiveness.
The dependent variable is the share of seats in national legislatures held by women in
election years (observations are not retained through the inter-election period). Since quotas only
came into existence in the 1970s and have become most popular in recent years, I begin the sample
in 1975 and extend it to 2010. Data include 21 advanced democracies: Australia, Austria, Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
The baseline regression model with country fixed effects can be written as:
Yit = 1Quota Law it + 2Party Quota it + 3Zit + i + it
where Yit is the outcome of interest and measures women’s representation in country i in the
election-year t; Quota Law is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the implementation of a quota law
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and 0 otherwise,2 and 1 is the coefficient for this key independent variable; Party Quota is the
share of parties with voluntary quotas, weighted by the parties’ share of seats in parliament, and
2 is the coefficient for this key independent variable; Zit represents a vector of covariates, and 3
the coefficients for these covariates; i is the country fixed effects; and it is the error term. All
models correct for first order (AR-1) serial correlation in the residuals. Original data on party quotas
were compiled using secondary literature, party documents, and correspondence with political party
representatives (see Appendix 4A for further details).
I control for standard determinants of women’s political representation, as discussed in
Chapter 3. I focus only on time-varying confounders here, because all models include fixed effects
which account for any time-invariant confounders. Specifically, the fixed effects account for pro-
portional electoral system and culture (history of Catholicism), two variables that I link to both
quota adoption and women’s representation in the earlier discussion. I control for: Female share of
labor force, GDP per capita (year 2000 dollars), Left party power, EU membership, and Strength of
women’s movement. I also include an interaction term to test the theory that the effect of female
labor force participation is conditioned by different institutional settings (Programmatic parties), a
key finding from Iversen and Rosenbluth (2008).3 Below I discuss each of the variables in turn.
As discussed in Chapter 3, economic development (measured as GDP per capita here) and
associated increases in Female labor force participation have been linked to increases in women’s
representation (Matland 1998; McAllister & Studlar 2002; Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008; Tripp &
Kang 2008). The effect of female labor force participation has also been found to be conditional
on the nature of the electoral system. Holding constant women’s employment, women are likely to
do better in systems with Programmatic parties that reward loyalty and than personalistic parties
that reward seniority (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008). Left party power has also been associated with
gender equality (Duverger 1955), but the evidence on their link to women’s representation is mixed.
Some studies showing a strong association between left party rule and women’s representation
2This includes five countries which have passed a quota law: Italy, Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal
3The parameter ‘Programmatic Parties’ captures the effects of pooling and district size in an additive index,
meant to gauge the extent to which the electoral system incentivizes candidate loyalty to the party’s platform (as
opposed to candidate-oriented parties) (Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008).
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(Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Reynolds 1999; Rule 1987), but others find no link (Caul 2001; Iversen
& Rosenbluth 2008). Some authors allege that the role of left parties has been decreasing over time
as parties from across the political spectrum increasingly nominate more women and pass voluntary
quotas (Lovenduski & Norris 1993; Caul 1999; Tripp & Kang 2008).
Finally I control for two other variables that have not traditionally been included in studies
of women’s representation, but are of particular concern as potential causes of quota adoption in
recent times. Both of these variables encourage changing norms about women in politics in general,
and so it is important to include them as potential confounders. First, popular Women’s movements
are thought to drive many quota reforms (Kittilson 2006; Dahlerup 2006; Krook 2009). As discussed
in Chapter 3, the best data we have on women’s movements come from Htun and Weldon (2012),
who compile measures of the strength and autonomy of feminist women’s movements over time in
70 countries. Recall that their data show that in each of the quota countries in my sample, the
strength and autonomy of women’s movements was either stable or declining before a quota law was
adopted. Nonetheless I include women’s movements in the regression analysis here to control for the
possibility that both quotas and women’s representation are correlated with women’s movements.
I also include EU membership as a measure of international influence. Again as discussed
in Chapter 3, scholars point to international information sharing as a key factor in quota adoption
(Krook 2006, 2008) – and in my cases, particularly at the European level. Two of the international
influences most frequently cited in my interviews were the European Commission and Council of
Europe.4 A general increase in advocacy and information sharing across European borders could
also encourage higher levels of women’s representation even if quotas are not passed.
Summary statistics of all variables used in analysis are presented in Appendix 4B, along
with details about data sources and operationalization. All covariates are expected to increase levels
of female representation.
4Other international influences were either global, e.g. CEDAW, or party-level, e.g. Socialist Women Interna-
tional, and thus not possible to include in the current national level analysis. In the subsequent chapter on party
positions I include party family as party-level control for international influence.
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4.3 Time Series Analysis of Quotas and Women’s Representation
Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of women in parliament (lower house) across 22 democracies for
35 years, from 1975 to 2010. Women’s descriptive representation has increased dramatically since
1975 in countries both with and without quotas, but the figure shows some large cross-national
differences. Note that the ordering of many countries has changed over the past ten to fifteen years.
For example, as of 2000 the United States had a greater percentage of women in parliament than
France or Italy, but as of 2010 it has fallen behind these countries. Portugal has also made a jump
of nearly 10 points, placing it ahead of Canada and Great Britain. The trends suggest that there
have been important changes over recent years worth further study.
The main results are presented in Model 1 of Table 4.1. Confirming Hypothesis 1, I find
evidence that both types of quotas are important determinants of variation in female representa-
tion over time. All else equal, going from no quota law to having a quota law increases women’s
representation by nearly 6% . Party quotas are also significant, although the size of their predicted
effect depends on the share of parties that adopt them. The mean weighted share of parties with
voluntary quotas has increased from 0.4% in the 1970s to 32% in the 2000s, or about 30 percentage
points. All else equal, a 30% increase in the weighted share of parties with quotas is predicted to
increase female representation by 2.7%. If we consider a larger increase in the share of relevant par-
ties with quotas such as 50% (this is not unrealistic; for example in Norway the majority of parties
have had quotas in recent times), then the predicted increase in female representation is 4.5%. If
100% of relevant parties were to pass voluntary gender quotas the increase in female representation
is predicted to be 9% – even higher than the increase associated with quota laws. However, thus
far no country has achieved this.5 This estimate does not seem like a relevant quantity of interest
particularly because parties on the right are often ideologically opposed to the concept of quotas.
Overall, the results suggest that the size of the increase associated with party quotas has been
smaller than that of national quota laws, in line with Hypothesis 2.
5Most country election-years are characterized by no relevant parties with gender quotas (57%). Of those that do
have party quotas, only 10% of election-years have been characterized by more than 60% of parties with voluntary
gender quotas. The maximum was Austria in 2002 at 90%.
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Several control variables emerge as statistically significant. As expected, economic de-
velopment and women’s labor force participation are both associated with increases in women’s
representation. The increase associated with quota laws is similar to a 5% rise in female labor force
participation, which is predicted to lead to a 6% increase in women’s representation. The interaction
between female labor force participation and programmatic parties shows that, across countries, the
rate of change in response to higher female labor force participation increases in systems with strong
incentives for programmatic parties (the coefficient on female labor force participation rises from
1.03 to 1.37). EU membership is associated with a small (less than 2%) but statistically significant
bump in representation.6 Contrary to expectations, the presence of strong and autonomous women’s
movements tends to hinder women’s representation. While a full explanation is beyond the scope of
this book, I note that this finding could reflect the nature of the data on women’s movements that
is currently available – it is very broad, and does not specify what the goals of women’s movements
are. However it does cast doubt on the role of women’s movements in successfully advocating for
women’s representation in advanced democracies. Finally, note that the models show no evidence
of an association between left party power and women’s representation.
The next three models (2-4) in Table 4.1 address questions about whether the specific rules
of the quota provision – threshold, placement mandates, and enforcement mechanisms – matter.
These models use the same previously described fixed effects specification. Consistent with Hypoth-
esis 3, all three rules are associated with higher levels of women’s representation. Model 2 separates
the quota variable into laws that require parties to comply with the law for the list to be accepted
(Quota, strict sanctions, representing Spain and Belgium after a quota law was passed) and those
that do not (Quota, weak sanctions). Results show that quotas with strict enforcement sanctions
have larger effects on representation than those that do not. Women’s representation is expected to
increase by 8% after a quota law requiring compliance for the list to be accepted is passed, whereas
it is only be expected to increase by 3.6% if the penalties for compliance are weaker. However it is
worth noting that quota laws lead to statistically significant increases in representation regardless of
6I also ran models including a binary measure equalling 1 if the country had a neighboring country with a quota
law and 0 otherwise, as an alternate measure of international influence. My results do not change.
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Table 4.1: Quotas and women’s representation, 1975 – 2010
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quota law 5:63
(1.50)
Quota, strict sanctions 8:08
(2.41)
Quota, weak sanctions 3:60
(1.57)
Quota, 50% threshold 7:05
(1.98)
Quota, < 50% threshold 3:49
(1.94)
Quota, placement mandates 9:21
(1.88)
Quota, no placement mandates 1.96
(1.75)
Party quota 0:09 0:09 0:09 0:08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Female share of labor force 1:03 1:03 1:04 1:06
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
GDP per capita (year 2000 dollars) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Left party power 2.14 1.89 2.65 2.92
(2.22) (2.15) (2.28) (2.07)
Female share of LF x Prog. parties 0:17 0:16 0:17 0:17
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Women’s movements  1:17  1:12  1:24  1:34
(0.49) (0.50) (0.48) (0.46)
EU membership 1:72 1:81 1:87 1:87
(0.80) (0.85) (0.76) (0.74)
Constant  42:90  42:69  43:35  44:33
(3.54) (3.55) (3.51) (3.55)
R-squared 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95
N 189 189 189 189
Number of Countries 21 21 21 21
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Correction for AR-1 yes yes yes yes
Rho 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.55
Notes: Analysis carried out using Stata version 14.1. Panel corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
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enforcement, and a Wald test of the difference between quotas with and without strict compliance
sanctions shows this difference is only borderline significant (P=0.10).
Model 3 separates the quota variable into laws that require women to make up a high
threshold, 50% of the list (Quota, 50% threshold, representing France after it passed a quota law
and Belgium from 2003), versus those that do not (Quota, < 50% threshold). The results show
that quotas with higher thresholds are more effective at increasing numbers of women in office. A
quota with 50% threshold is predicted to increase representation by 7% compared to 3.5% when a
smaller percentage of women required. However, a Wald test finds that the difference between these
coefficients is not statistically significant.
Model 4 tests the impact of placement mandates (when the law includes specific rules
about the rank-ordering of candidates, represented by Quota, placement mandates). Of all the
rules tested, we see the largest change in the size of predicted effects for countries with placement
mandates (Italy, Portugal, and Belgium after 2002). A quota with placement mandates is predicted
to increase representation by 9% compared to 2% when a no placement rules are included. A
quota with no placement rules also drops below conventional levels of statistical significance. A
Wald test finds that the difference between quotas with and without placement rules is significant
at conventional levels (P=0.00). This suggests that placement rules are a particularly important
aspect of quota policy design.
Results are robust to several sensitivity checks. First, to investigate the possibility that
findings are driven by factors specific to a single country, I exclude one country at a time and
re-estimate the specifications. While some countries are found to be more influential than others –
e.g., estimates of the impact of quota laws decrease when Belgium is excluded – the estimates for
quota law and party quota remain positive and significant upon elimination of any country from the
sample. Second, results hold up to the inclusion of a linear time trend, which controls for spurious
correlation between any pair of similarly trended dependent and independent variables. Finally, I
take advantage of new synthetic control methods to estimate the causal effect of quota laws within
individual countries. This is described in the section below.
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4.4 Synthetic Control Methods Analysis of Quotas and Women’s
Representation
Synthetic control methods approximate the most relevant characteristics of the treated unit (here,
country that passes a quota law) prior to treatment by using a matching estimator that measures the
quality of each other unit (countries without quota laws) as a control. The method uses a weighted
average of the best control countries for each ‘treated’ country to come up with a synthetic version
which does not undergo the treatment. The effect of a quota law on women’s representation can
then be estimated as the difference in levels of women’s representation between a ‘treated’ (quota)
country and its synthetic counterpart in the years after the quota law was implemented. This
method has been used to estimate the effects of terrorist conflict in the Basque Country on the
economy (Abadie & Gardeazabal 2003), and the effects of a California tobacco control program on
tobacco consumption (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2014), amongst others. It is well suited to
measure the impact of national quota laws, which are either present or absent, but it cannot be
applied to continuous variables like the party quota measure. I therefore focus on quota laws below.
Figure 4.2 displays trends in women’s representation over time for each country that
adopted a quota law, before and after the law was implemented (dark solid line). Counterfactual
values estimated using synthetic control methods (assuming no quota was introduced) are shown in
dark dashed lines. Finally, the figure also shows predicted values for women’s representation based
on Model 1 of Table 4.1, as well as ‘counterfactual’ predicted values where quotas are assumed not
to have been introduced, using the same regression results (dark and light dotted lines). To save
space I present all technical details in Appendix 4C. This includes tables showing the comparison
of pre-treatment characteristics of quota countries and their synthetic versions, the weights of each
control country composing synthetic countries, and placebo tests to assess the robustness of results.
Figure 4.2 shows that the counterfactuals produced from synthetic predictions (dark dashed
line) are similar to the real trends (solid line) in women’s representation before a quota law was
passed in most cases. The exceptions are Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy, where the synthetic
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Figure 4.2: Trends in percentage of women in parliament: ‘treated’ (quota) countries vs. synthetic
counterparts, and predicted values
Notes: Predicted values are based on regression results shown in Model 1 of Table 4.1. Synthetic counterfactuals
are based on analysis conducted using Synth for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011.)
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control method was not able to exactly reproduce the path of women’s representation before the
quota law. For Spain especially, it is likely that much of the post-quota gap between the real and
synthetic Spain is artificially created by the lack of fit, rather than by the effect of the quota law.
Accordingly I drop the case of Spain in further analysis, and interpret the results of the case of Italy
with caution. In the rest of the cases – Belgium, France, and Portugal – the synthetic control method
achieves a good fit between synthetic and real countries on pre-quota women’s representation.
In all countries, both counterfactuals predict levels of women’s representation to be lower
had a quota law not been adopted. Compared to the predicted values from regression (represented
by dark and light dotted lines), synthetic counterfactuals typically do a better job of simulating the
actual trend in women’s representation up until the quota law is passed. Immediately after the law’s
passage the two lines (actual and synthetic trends in representation) begin to diverge noticeably,
especially in Belgium and Portugal. While female representation in the synthetic versions continues
on its moderate upward trend, the real country trends experience a sharp uptake. The discrepancy
between these lines suggests a large positive effect of quota laws on female representation.
I estimate the effect of a quota law on women’s representation as the difference in levels of
women’s representation between a quota country and its synthetic counterpart after the quota law
was implemented. We can then compare this to the ‘effect’ of quota laws estimated by predicted
values with and without quota laws, using regression results. Table 4.2 summarizes these effects (in
bold). The table shows that effects estimated using synthetic counterfactuals are similar or larger
than those estimated using predicted values from regression results in every case but Italy, which
shows a positive but much smaller size effect. In fact the average effect estimated from synthetic
methods is larger than that from regression results, at 8.4 compared to 5.6. If I remove Italy from
the comparison (given the synthetic control method does not perform as successfully in Italy), the
average effect estimated from synthetic methods increases to 10.5 percentage points.
The most striking finding here is how much larger the effect of a quota law was in Belgium
than in other countries. After only two elections with a quota law, female representation is predicted
to have increased by more than 20%. This is likely due to the strength of Belgium’s law, a finding
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Table 4.2: Estimated Effects of Quota Laws
Synthetic Control Results Regression Results
Country % women in Synthetic Effect Predicted vals Predicted vals Effect
(year) in parl counterfactual (difference) (quota) (no quota) (difference)
Italy (1994) 15.1 13.2 1.9 15.1 9.5 5.6
Belgium (2003) 35.3 14.7 20.6 27.8 22.2 5.6
France (2007) 18.2 12.6 5.6 20.9 15.3 5.6
Portugal (2009) 27.4 22 5.4 27.4 21.8 5.6
Average 8.4 5.6
Notes: Predicted values are based on regression results shown in Model 1 of Table 4.1. Synthetic counterfactuals are
based on analysis conducted using Synth for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011).
that is also reflected in regression results. From 2002 Belgium’s law requires parties to nominate
50% women, the first two positions on the list must alternate by gender, and compliance is required
for the list to be accepted. In France and Portugal compliance is not required for lists to be accepted
(instead, parties face financial penalties). In Portugal the quota threshold is 33% with mandated
gender alternation on the party lists, while France requires 50% but has no placement mandates. It
is thus no surprise that these countries are characterized by smaller estimated effects than Belgium.
Even so, these estimated effects are still larger than estimated effects of party quotas from the
regression analysis. In Italy, the relatively small effect estimated is likely due to the quota law’s
narrow application. The quota law applied only to the PR portion of the then-mixed electoral
system, which made up just 25% of representatives. Overall these results suggest the strength of
the law makes a large difference to expected effects, but effects are still sizable even in the context
of weaker laws.
4.5 Causal Mechanisms: The Cases of Belgium and Portugal
The analysis so far has demonstrated that both quota laws and party quotas are associated with
higher levels of female representation in political office, but quota laws are linked to greater increases
than party quotas. The causal processes through which different types of quotas operate and lead to
different results remains an open question. This section investigates the mechanisms linking different
types of quotas to effects on women’s representation, giving empirical findings greater plausibility
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and deepening our understanding of the way these provisions work in practice.
Three potential mechanisms proposed in the theoretical section could explain how quota
laws lead to greater increases to women in parliament compared to party quotas. First, the ‘vertical
effect’ suggests that quota laws are more effective tools to force local party leaders’ hands than
voluntary party quotas. Second, they oblige even parties that are not committed to equality to place
more women on their lists (‘horizontal effect’). Finally, the ‘policy feedback loop’ mechanism focuses
on the public support and pressure that tends to build for quota laws over time. To investigate
the relative importance of these mechanisms, I focus on the countries of Belgium and Portugal.
As discussed in Chapter 3, these two countries were selected because they are characterized by
useful variation on dimensions of theoretical interest: specifically, the cultural context (with women
in Belgium tending to have more progressive attitudes) and length of time a quota law has been
in place. Yet, in both of these countries quota laws have led to abrupt, large increases in the
percentage of women in parliament (see Figure 4.2). Both countries also had a history of political
party quotas, enabling me to compare the effects of voluntary party quotas and national quota laws
within each country. This type of ‘most different’ approach relies on identifying cases where the main
independent and dependent variables covary, while other plausible factors differ (Gerring 2006, p.
139). It is particularly well-suited to exploring causal mechanisms, complementing the quantitative
analysis which establishes a causal relationship between quota laws and women’s representation.
Cases that feature the relationship of interest between quota laws and women’s representation allow
us to examine the functioning of mechanisms across theoretically interesting contexts.
To understand how quotas work in these countries, I draw on over forty interviews with
past and current members of parliament and government, party members, and political activists
conducted in Belgium and Portugal from September to December of 2013. I deliberately chose
interview subjects that could offer the best evidence about quota adoption and implementation,
such as party leaders, cabinet members, and politicians and activists with a track record of work
on women’s political participation.
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Belgium: ‘If we cannot change it in the party, we will change it in the law’
Political parties in Belgium were among the first to adopt internal quotas for women, and it was
not only parties on the left. The Flemish Liberals (VLD) had quota provisions in place from 1985
until the party’s disbandment in 1993, and the Flemish Christian Democrats had them from 1975,
although not at the federal level. The Greens and Social Democrats also had quotas in place from
the early 1990s, amongst others. In most of these parties, however, quotas were not popular. Getting
internal provisions passed involved long, difficult debates within the party. The Secretary-General
of the Flemish Social Democrat’s women’s section (Zij-kant) Vera Claes explains, “There was a lot
of opposition from the men. They didn’t recognize the use of it, or the democratic need.”7 Even
when internal provisions were successfully passed, women within the party noted that the changes
made were not enough, and that they didn’t work well.
Flemish Christian Democrat Senator Sabine de Bethune recalled that in the early 1990s
she campaigned, with the women’s section of her party, to increase the size of the quota within
the party statutes. At the time 1/5 of local party list positions were reserved for women, and de
Bethune pushed for this to be increased to 1/3. De Bethune recounts giving a speech to the party
Congress in 1993 in support of this amendment and facing vocal opposition from male local party
leaders, who controlled list selection and made up the majority of voters in the party Congress. Her
amendment was rejected. De Bethune describes:
Then we [the women] all stood up and left the Congress, and they had to stop and the
Congress was finished. It was on all the news, the main points of political news of the
year – the great Congress for renewal of the party was broken, finished, because the
women walked out. Many men left also, hundreds left the place. It was a very dramatic
moment. The women then thought, if we cannot change the party, we will change it in
the law.8
De Bethune went on to help draft the text of the quota bill that became law in 1994,
working in the Cabinet of then Minister of Labor, Employment, and Equal Opportunities Miet
7Vera Claes, personal interview, 10 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
8Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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Smet, who co-sponsored the legislation. Support from male party leaders was crucial. The other
co-sponsor of the law was Louis Tobback, a Flemish Social Democrat and then Minister of the
Interior, and it was also backed by the Prime Minister, Jean-Luc Dehaene (a Christian Democrat).
Dehaene personally met with relevant party presidents (those in the majority) to ask them to push
the bill through parliament.9
Why would male party leaders favor quota legislation, given it could put their own political
positions at risk? Party leaders saw the quota as a way to bring the party more in line with standards
of democracy, and possibly increase their control over candidate selection at the same time. Tobback
likened the legislation to women’s suffrage, noting his party had ‘commited the stupidity’ of voting
against the women’s vote in the 1940s and shouldn’t make the same mistake twice. He notes, “So
there’s one thing that you can’t deny: if you don’t consider that women are more stupid than men
or less qualified than men, and so on, then one has to conclude that there is something wrong in the
composition of our political system.”10 Flemish Social Democrat MP Renaat Landuyt explained
that the law was part of a wider movement to strengthen democracy in Belgium given the rise of
extremist parties in the early 1990s. He says, “the atmosphere in these years was that there was an
upcoming extremist party and there were difficulties in our democracy, and the reaction was that
we have to get farther on with gender and race. And that’s the structural reason that we have had
this legislation at that time.”11
Perhaps more cynically, the law gave national party leaders an excuse to exercise more
control over candidate selection, shaping the party to their preferred – most electable – demographic
make-up. Landuyt explains that party leaders used the law as “an argument to rearrange their own
parties” in the face of a perceived democratic deficit and local party organizations unwilling to
change. “The party leaders want to have a certain influence and they have more influence to make a
law than to make the lists for the elections, so they used the law to have more power to make better
9Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
10Louis Tobback, personal interview, 20 September 2013, Leuven, Belgium.
11Renaat Landuyt, personal interview, 23 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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lists.”12 This is in line with previous studies which have found that party leaders will support quota
laws when they strengthen their power relative to individual candidates (Baldez 2004). Similarly
in Lizzeri and Persico’s account of why elites extended the suffrage, national party leaders used an
institutional reform (the suffrage) to force unwilling local party leaders to increase public goods
provision, which national leaders saw as fundamental to democratic government.
Since the law passed de Bethune says that while the party’s general candidate selection
process has not changed, more women are now recruited and come forward. Other members of
parties that had internal quotas before the law agree: for example, Tobback explains that his party
had to go out and actively recruit more women even when it was difficult. He says, “Even today at
each local election when they compose their lists, you still encounter the local responsible people
who say, ‘Well my list is almost complete, but finding women, to find women it’s. . . why did you
vote for such a stupid law!” ’13 These conversations suggest that dissatisfaction with the effectiveness
of internal party quotas was one of the reasons the quota law was passed in the first place. However
the main take-away here is that national elite consensus on women’s representation is not necessarily
enough to overcome internal dissent.
In line with the expectations of quota law supporters, after the law was passed parties were
obliged to comply in a way that they did not when the quota was merely self-imposed. Moreover,
the law increased percentages of women in office for all parties. Why would those parties that did
not support the quota law comply? Recall that in Belgium compliance is mandatory for the list to
be accepted, although there are still certain loopholes parties can use to avoid complying with the
spirit of the law.14 So while this makes the law likely to be effective, what is striking is that today
every political party openly supports it. Take the far-right Vlaams Belang, which was staunchly
opposed to the measure when it passed. Party leader Gerolf Annemans asserts:
I can say that the way women entered in politics was extremely affected by this measure,
that is a fact that I cannot deny. So although we had attention for the female role before
12Renaat Landuyt, personal interview, 23 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
13Louis Tobback, personal interview, 20 September 2013, Leuven, Belgium.
14The main issue seems to be list placement, as men are still most often placed in the first position.
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and for female spokeswomen even in a so-called far right movement like VB, I must admit
as an older statesman that we would never have come so far as we have done had the
law not imposed this quota.
When asked how his party changed in response, Annemans describes a ‘dramatic’ change
in the way the party recruited politicians, actively looking for female candidates outside the normal
party militant base.15 Since the quota law has been in place the social and political landscape in
Belgium has changed, altering both public and elite perspectives on the role of women in politics.
While it seems that women are driving this shift, even men agree that compliance with the quota is
necessary lest their party look backward. The President of the Liberal party Open VLD, Gwendolyn
Rutten, is personally in favor of quotas and describes how her party has gradually changed its views:
It’s [quotas] a debate you can’t win within my party. But over time, we’ve been arguing,
we’ve been studying, and I’ve been telling them the way it works. It’s about when you
have to choose people, people choose someone like them. . . So this legislation kind
of pushes people to look for diversity in a way. And then you see that after a while it
becomes normal and it’s kind of an advantage.16
Conservative (MR) party representative Viviane Teitelbaum explains that her party com-
plies because, “I think it’s something that’s now trendy. Mentalities have changed, and I think
people agree mostly that it’s important to have men and women. . . everyone [in the party] agrees
now because it would look like we are sort of outdated if we didn’t.”17 This sentiment reflects Erzeel
and Meier’s (2011) findings that right parties in Belgium are motivated to include more women on
their lists to get rid of their image as a ‘macho’ or ‘traditional’ party. In summary, the Belgian quota
law was effective because it forced all parties to change their recruitment practices and actively look
for women, particularly local party leaders (horizontal and vertical effects), but also because parties
that did not initially support it were influenced by growing public support for the concept (policy
feedback loop).
15Gerolf Annemans, personal interview, 9 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
16Gwendolyn Rutten, personal interview, 2 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
17Viviane Teitelbaum, personal interview, 23 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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Portugal: ‘it [the law] has had a very considerable effect in the right wing parties’
In Portugal, the debate about a quota law was a more partisan issue. The two main parties on the
left, the Socialist party (PS) and the Left Bloc (BE) had both instituted quotas for women within
their own party structures from the late 1990s. The newer, non-traditional left party the Left Bloc
had quotas from its founding, with no great debate about it.18 In the PS conversely, women within
the party struggled for many years to get a quota provision passed. Eventually in 1995 then party
leader António Guterres imposed an internal quota, against the will of most of the party according
to MP and former President of the PS women’s section Sónia Fertuzinhos. Fertuzinhos recalls that
Guterres believed in this agenda: “he was influenced by women’s groups, and he gave them strength,
supported them.”19 While the internal quota proved difficult to implement at first (“it had not really
worked,” claimed PS MEP Ana Gomes20), by the mid-2000s things had changed. Fertuzinhos says
that while the party was still patriarchal, the leadership – notably then-party leader José Sócrates
– continued to push the issue as a question of democratic legitimacy.
By 2005, 29% of the PS party’s MPs were women, well above the self-imposed 25% party
quota, and 50% of the Left Bloc’s MPs were women. The two left parties joined together in
proposing a law that would extend their own gender quota agenda to the rest of the parties. The
two main parties on the right, the Social Democrats (PSD) and Democratic and Social Center –
People’s Party (CDS-PP) boasted a less-impressive 8% female MPs each at the time (Citizenship
2007). Why would these parties support national quota legislation, given their internal party quotas
seemed to be relatively effective? As in the case of Belgium, supporters framed their case in terms
of advancing democracy, in particular after the dictatorship when women’s roles in public life were
severely restricted. Again, problems were seen to loom largest at the local level, where lists are
prone to being “hijacked by local party leaders,” in the words of PS MEP Gomes.21 One anonymous
interview with a female socialist (PS) MP suggests that women pushed this agenda forward in order
18Luis Fazenda, personal interview, 5 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
19Sónia Fertuzinhos, personal interview, 22 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
20Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
21Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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to institutionalize quotas, perhaps to prevent future party leaders from reneging on the internal
quota policy:
Men with power choose another man, like a mini-me, to say OK, after me, you are the
person who will have the power. Like succession. The others, and women in particular,
they can have some power but power with control. So this is not a formal issue, but it’s
very informal and more difficult to fight against than formal issues, because formal we
know the rules. And when you don’t know the rules it makes everything more difficult.22
Male party leaders of the PS might have also seen the quota legislation as a way to
distinguish the party from competitors, gaining an electoral advantage. The law was packaged as
part of a broader set of reforms to increase political participation and democracy, including a term
limit measure for mayors. PS Minister Augusto Santos Silva says of the quota bill:
On one hand we could differentiate more the socialist party from the center-right party
PSD that is very akin to the PS in terms of financial issues, European issues, defense,
foreign affairs. . . so there, we could have a rather clear differentiation between left
and right in Portugal. And on the other hand we could conquer some electorate, more
urban and younger electorate, and of course the new professionals, more educated, young
women, we could steal them from the new extreme left party that is called the Left Bloc
(BE).23
Silva refers to the party’s initial strategy, before the BE joined them in supporting the
concept. In 2006 the PS used its majority in parliament to push through the legislation without
additional support. In the end, the BE declined to support the bill after sanctions for non-compliance
were weakened.
In the first election after the law was adopted (2009), the percentage of female MPs for
the right wing PSD and CDS-PP parties shot up from 8% (each) to 28% and 19%, respectively.
The percentage of female MPs elected from the PS held steady at 29%, while the percentage elected
from the BE decreased (from 50% to 38%) (Santos & Amâncio 2012). In Portugal the greatest
increases occurred in those parties that did not have previous party quotas, the parties on the right
(horizontal effect). This is interesting considering that the penalty for non-compliance in Portugal
22Anonymous (PS MP), personal interview, 26 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
23Augusto Santos Silva, personal interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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is relatively weak – parties can pay a fine to avoid it. Given this, what explains the law’s success?
As in Belgium, members of right-wing parties now mostly support the quota law. When
the legislation was passed there was an amendment included requiring that the law be re-assessed
after five years. CDS-PP MP Teresa Caeiro, who was initially against the law, explains that the
this never came to pass: “It didn’t occur to anybody to enter into a proposal of law to invert it.
We [the CDS-PP] get along with it quite well. We’re pacified.”24 Female MPs of the conservative
Social Democratic Party (PSD) are not only in favor, but say that they would go further. PSD MP
Monica Ferro, elected in 2011, says, “I am totally in favor of a quota system. . . but I would go
further because we have a 33% quota in the parliament but what you see in the parliament is that
if a woman steps out, because she is elected to government, goes to a municipality, or decides to
leave, it’s not mandatory that she’s replaced by another woman. So this actually means that you
don’t have 33% women in parliament in Portugal.”25
Both main right wing parties say that candidate recruitment has changed since the quota
law. Helder Amaral, MP for the CDS-PP, explains that his party complies, “Because I feel that the
public opinion, they value that. When I was in charge of municipal elections I wanted every list to
comply with the law.”26 A 2008 national survey confirms that a plurality of voters believe quotas
are a necessary measure to increase women’s political presence (47% agree overall, 42% men versus
51% women; while only 20% of both sexes disagree with this idea) (Baum & Espírito-Santo 2012).
As in Belgium, the selection process itself did not change for these parties, but they were obliged
to look outside their normal recruitment base to find women. PSD MP José Mendes Bota explains
how the law changed his party:
The [local] short committees that take decisions on the lists are the same as they were
before. The only difference is that they have to follow the new rules. And the new
rules tell them that they have to choose women for this and that position. But basically
what was the biggest obstacle for women’s accession to power, it was that inside the
parties, the committees that decide the candidates, they are controlled by men. That
24Teresa Caeiro, personal interview, 5 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
25Monica Ferro, personal interview, 5 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
26Helder Amaral, personal interview, 6 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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is the major problem, and it has always been the major problem. And that is why the
legislation was important, because it forced those committees, controlled by men and
many times composed only of men, and they were choosing who they wanted, and they
were choosing men mainly before the law.27
The cases of Belgium and Portugal illustrate that forcing local leaders from all parties
to comply, paired with the pressure of public opinion spurred by the law itself, led quota laws to
be more effective than party quotas. While strong enforcement mechanisms may lead to greater
increases for women (as the empirical evidence suggests in the case of Belgium), these case studies
indicate that the strength of the law isn’t the whole story. The horizontal effect, in which quotas
force even parties that are opposed to the measure to comply, is particularly strong in the case of
Portugal, despite the law’s weak enforcement mechanisms. Even when compliance is not required
for list acceptance, parties change their recruitment processes and nominate more women due to
growing public pressure from policy feedback loops. I note the need for more data on this last
mechanism in particular. My conversations in Belgium and Portugal suggest that the debate about
the quota law itself leads to greater awareness and positive opinion towards such policies over time.
An interesting avenue for future research would be to examine public opinion before and after a
quota law was passed in one country but not another.
As recent work has emphasized (Falleti & Lynch 2009), whether these mechanisms are
triggered likely depends on the context. Two conditions seem particularly important: local party
power in the candidate selection process and previous use of party quotas. First, the cases of Belgium
and Portugal both point the finger at (male) local party monopolies unwilling to change recruitment
practices. When candidate selection is determined by primaries or national party leaders, quota laws
may be less influential or not necessary in the first place. For example, Flemish Social Democrat
Louis Tobback described what he termed an ‘interesting phenomenon’ in Belgium. When there is
only one large electoral district as in elections for the European Parliament, the candidate lists are
organized by national party bureaus, and there is more balanced representation. The problem, for
him, “ was in the first place on the local level, where the people in place didn’t want to depart
and leave their places to women.” Secondly, case studies also suggest that a country might need to
27José Mendes Bota, personal interview, 7 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal
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’practice’ with party quotas in order to build support for and pass quota laws in the first place; i.e.
party quotas might be a necessary if not sufficient condition for effective quota laws.
These same contextual factors are common in advanced democracies and indeed many
countries throughout the world, suggesting that the causal mechanisms identified here are portable
and relevant to many potential scenarios. One or more parties has adopted a voluntary gender
quota in at least sixty countries, and the number is growing (Dahlerup 2008). While systematic
data on candidate selection methods across countries is not currently available, detailed studies from
secondary literature find that local party selectorates have significant influence in many countries
throughout the world – to name a few, Austria (Bille 2001), Italy (Calossi & Pizzimenti 2013), Chile
and Mexico (Hinojosa 2012).
Finally, horizontal effects, vertical effects, and policy feedback loops are just some of the
many potential mechanisms through which quotas might lead to increases in female representation.
While these three factors stand out as crucial to the causal chain linking quotas to immediate gains
in women’s representation, other mechanisms might well be at play over the long term. For example,
greater numbers of women elected due to a quota law might spur a role model effect whereby young
women are then more likely to aspire to and put themselves forward for political office. Similarly if
the quota law applies to the local level (as it does in many countries), increases here could lead to
more women in national parliaments over time, as women gain more experience with political roles.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the impact of newly popular party and national level quotas in West-
ern advanced democracies. It finds that quotas are important tools that have influenced trends in
women’s representation in recent years. Unlike previous studies, it is able to compare the effective-
ness of party and national level quotas using new data on party quotas. The findings suggest that
quota laws are more effective at increasing women’s representation than party quotas, although both
make a significant difference. The results of analysis using synthetic control methods suggest that
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strict enforcement mechanisms, the size of the quota, and especially placement mandates increase
the law’s expected effects – but strong effects are seen even in the context of weaker quota laws.
The policy implications of this are clear: for parties and governments looking to raise numbers of
women in office, national quota legislation is more effective than voluntary party quotas, and strong
rules, especially placement mandates, should be included in the law to achieve optimal results.
Structural and institutional factors like women’s employment and electoral rules are noto-
riously hard to change. The role of quotas may be to help countries achieve increases in women’s
representation despite ‘sticky’ factors like women’s employment, electoral design, or conservative
culture. Moreover, many countries still have relatively low levels of women’s representation despite
theoretically ideal structural conditions. Take the case of Austria, which has a closed-list PR system
with relatively high district magnitude, and high levels of female employment. These factors suggest
it ought to have one of the highest levels of female representation, but in fact Austria ranks squarely
in the middle of Western advanced democracies (30% women in parliament as of 1 November 2015).
Quotas might prove a valuable tool to help countries like Austria overcome other unobservable and
hard-to-change factors, such as culture, that might be stalling the growth of women’s representation.
The results help us understand not only women’s representation but more generally why
institutions are more consequential than simple majorities, such as those responsible for passing a
voluntary party quota. The mechanisms through which quota laws work – subverting local power
monopolies across parties and policy feedback loops – shine a light on broader dynamics that can
make the political process more inclusive. The findings add evidence supporting the idea that
gender-related policies and institutions are not only outcomes in the political process, but also
shape attitudes about women in politics, even within parties that were initially highly skeptical
(Kittilson 2010). While this research focuses on gender, clearly other forms of identity from race to
class to religion are relevant.
There is much room for future research on the long term impacts of different types of
quotas. For example, how does the use of quotas affect the ability of women to reach the highest
levels of office in the long run, such as cabinet positions or the executive? Another important series
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of questions is how quotas affect outcomes beyond numbers, such as the substantive representation
of women’s interests. In the next two chapters I turn to these questions, looking first and political
party positions and then at budgetary outcomes related to women’s preferences.
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5 | Quotas and Policy Outcomes: Party
Positions
Quotas increase numbers of women in office. The key question is, do they also increase attention to
women’s substantive policy preferences? This chapter explores the effects of quotas on political party
positions, an early but critical stage of the policymaking process. Decisions about party agendas are
crucial because they set the bounds for future policy change. According to some theorists, agenda-
setting is the most important measure of political power (Bachrach & Baratz 1962; Gaventa 1982).
Just as they are under-represented in parliaments, women have traditionally been blocked from
the upper echelons of party leadership, who typically take the final decisions about party positions
(Rule 1994; Reynolds 1999; Kittilson 2006). Can quotas shift these dynamics and help put women’s
issues on the agenda?
This chapter provides the first cross-country evidence that quotas affect party policy agen-
das. Previous literature suggests that environmental factors like public opinion, ideology, and orga-
nizational structure are the most important determinants of party positions. No study addresses the
relationship between quotas and party positions across countries, despite their growing popularity
and advocates’ claims that they will make a difference. Chapter 2 suggests that after a quota law
we should expect change on issues characterized by a gap in preferences, especially if they are or-
thogonal to the main left-right party dimension. Accordingly, this chapter examines whether quotas
lead to shifts in party positions related to welfare state expansion. This is a broad category, but it
accurately describes the gender gaps on many social policy issues – such as health care and unem-
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ployment – outlined in Chapter 2. The quantiative data do not allow me to distinguish individual
policies within this category, such as work-family policies. However, evidence from a matched pair
case study provides initial evidence supporting the claim that quotas matter especially for these
orthogonal issues.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I draw on literature from political parties and
gender and politics to develop a theory of quotas and policy change specific to intra-party deci-
sionmaking. Recall that Chapter 2 highlights two mechanisms through which quotas are likely to
influence policies: increased numbers of women and issue salience. I suggest several ways these
mechanisms are likely to operate in the context of party position taking, including: increased nego-
tiating power for women within the party; greater numbers of women in leadership positions; and
the strategic incentives of party leaders. To test the link between quota laws and party positions I
analyze party manifesto data for 22 countries from 1965 to 2011. I examine political party positions
on welfare state expansion, an issue characterized by a gender gap in policy preferences (women
preferring more spending compared to men), and environmental protection, an issue with no such
gender gap in preferences. I find that passing a quota law coincides with increases in political party
attention to welfare state expansion, but not to environmental protection. The effect is slightly
larger for right-wing parties (but significant for both), and is also larger in size in when the quota
law has strict enforcement mechanisms. A matched pair case study of far right parties in Belgium
and Austria offers initial evidence about the content of policy change and causal mechanisms. I
conclude with a summary and discussion of future research implications.
5.1 Theoretical Development
Party positions are set out in manifestos, the formal declaration of what the party will attempt to
do if it is elected to government. The manifesto provides a program for the winning party to follow
and be held accountable for once in office. Manifestos aren’t just ‘cheap talk’: while parties are
not bound by the contents of the manifesto, generally behavior in office correlates with manifesto
promises (Klingemann et al. 1994; Walgrave, Varone & Dumont 2006). Recent comparative work
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has shown that variation in pledge fulfillment depends on the level of control parties have over
government office and economic conditions. For example, single party governments are more likely
to fulfill election pledges than many governing parties in multiparty coalitions. However even in
coalition governments, parties in government typically fulfill at least half of their manifesto promises
(Thomson et al. 2012). Party manifesto decisions are significant not just for the party’s electoral
success, but because they dictate the topics of political debate in a society. Party positions thus
have important implications for policy outcomes for women, and more broadly the size and shape
of welfare states.
A recent study of manifesto ‘life cycles’ in Austria provides useful details about how the
manifesto-writing process works, not just in Austria but for European parties in general. First,
the party in central office and the party in public office make strategic decisions about the main
campaign messages. Typically the party in central office coordinates the drafting process, asking
those in public office – government ministers and the parliamentary party – to provide expert policy
input. Then a task force drafts the manifesto around these issues, pulling content from other
documents such as party programs, ministerial documents, and previous manifestos. Although
many parties have close relationships with interest groups (e.g., the social democrats and the labor
movement), these groups mostly play a marginal role in providing content for the manifesto. Party
officials, and sometimes external consultants, review and comment on the manifesto, and it may
be revised many times. The party leaders see the draft at a late stage, and may still change some
details before a final vote, usually by the party executive committee. The entire process takes up
to four months for the largest parties in Austria (Dolezal et al. 2012).
What determines policy change in the manifesto? Existing scholarship demonstrates that
parties change their position in response to environmental factors, such as shifts in public opinion
(Adams et al. 2004, 2006; McDonald & Budge 2005; Ezrow 2007), economic conditions (Adams,
Haupt & Stoll 2009; Haupt 2010; Burgoon 2012), and how the party did in the last election (Somer-
Topcu 2009). However not all parties respond to these conditions in the same way. Studies have
shown that parties of the left have less ideological flexibility (they are more ‘policy-seeking’), and
so are less responsive to both economic conditions and public opinion (Adams, Haupt & Stoll
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2009). The party’s organizational structure also plays a role. Parties that are leadership-dominated
tend to adjust their positions in line with the mean voter, while parties that are more open and
encourage activist involvement in decision-making are more responsive to the preferences of their
own rank-and-file (Schumacher, De Vries & Vis 2013).
Thus far, little research has focused on the impact of gender identity or quotas on party
positions. This could be partially due to the fact that the empirical study of party positions is
relatively new, and we are still building an understanding of the different factors that affect party
calculus. None of the studies cited above includes gender as a category of analysis – e.g., women in
the party, women in national parliaments, or female labor force participation. A notable exception
is Kittilson (2011), who finds that the share of women and women’s organizations in the party are
associated with increased attention to social justice issues, but not welfare or education, in party
platforms. O’Brien (2012a) also addresses the issue of gender and policy representation, focusing
on the conditions under which parties give attention to women and gender in the manifesto.
However, evidence from studies of legislative behavior suggests that the agenda-setting
stage is particularly important for women policymakers. Previous research consistently finds that
women raise new issues that are important to women as a group and show greater commitment
to these issues in the policy process (e.g., through bill initiation and debate), even if they differ
on the specific policy details (e.g., Skjeie 1991; Thomas 1994; Swers 2002; Schwindt-Bayer 2006;
Catalano 2009). The evidence on roll call voting and policy outcomes, where women (and men)
are more constrained by party affiliation and institutional rules, is more mixed. For example, party
is typically a larger determinant of roll-call votes than gender (Welch 1985; Burrell 1994; Vega &
Firestone 1995; Shwindt-Bayer & Corbetta 2004). Women might be especially influential early on
in the policymaking process, when decisions about whether certain issues reach the agenda at all
are made.
Overall, research on the effect of women’s representation on party positions is at very early
stage, but there is good reason to think that women’s presence makes a difference to at least a subset
of issues. Unlike previous studies, the theory of quotas and policy change outlined in Chapter 2
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suggests that quotas will lead to policy change for issues characterized by a gender gap in preferences,
especially if these issues are off the main left-right party dimension. This is the main relationship
I test in quantitative analysis. How exactly will quotas affect political party decisionmaking? In
Chapter 2 I proposed two key mechanisms that link quotas to policy change, broadly considered.
First, increased numbers of women in the party have greater leverage to pressure party leaders
to shift the agenda in the direction of their collective interests, or to change it themselves when
they become leaders. Second, quotas increase the salience of gender-related issues, making it more
likely that they will be prioritized by party elites. This section applies the theory to the specific
context of party position taking, outlining how increased numbers of women and salience might
affect intra-party decisions. Building on Figure 2.6 in Chapter 2, Figure 5.1 illustrates the causal
logic linking quotas to party position change. I provide evidence exploring the relative importance
of these mechanisms in the qualitative case study.
Figure 5.1: Causal Logic Linking Quotas to Party Position Change
After a quota law an influx of women can push the party towards their collective preferences
on certain policies. There are several ways that increased numbers of women might influence political
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party positions. First, a ‘critical mass’ of women after a quota law could have more leverage within
the party (Kanter 1977). In a gender-balanced environment, women may feel more comfortable
expressing ‘gendered’ preferences, and men more likely to be receptive to their views. Mendelberg
et al. (2013) find that as numbers of women increase so does their authority, and that with a critical
mass women begin discussing different issues. Specifically, they bring up care responsibilities more
often.
However, the concept of ‘critical mass’ has been challenged in the gender and politics
literature (Crowley 2004; Childs & Krook 2006; Chaney 2012), with some scholars calling for a
focus on ‘critical actors’ over ‘critical mass’ (Childs & Krook 2009; Krook 2015). This is to avoid
essentialist portrayals of women and acknowledge the reality that not all women prioritize women’s
concerns. In line with this argument, the second way that additional numbers of women could
influence party positions is through their ascent to positions of power within the party. Over time
quotas are likely to increase the number of female ministers and party leaders, who can then influence
the content of the manifesto more directly. Of course, the concept of critical actors still requires
an assumption that some women will work to bring about women-friendly policy change – and that
these types of women will reach leadership roles. As such, the relationship between critical mass,
critical actors, and policy impact seems an empirical question.
Finally, additional numbers of women may strengthen the negotiating power of women’s
sections in the party. Many assume that party leaders alone wield power in European party sys-
tems, but parties today are not as unitary as once believed. As previously discussed, factions are
commonplace in many contemporary party systems. Perhaps the best example of this is cross-class
Christian Democratic parties, which bring together a range of economic interests, leading Manow
and van Kersbergen (2009) to refer to them as ‘negotiating communities’. Women’s sections have
been particularly successful at lobbying parties to change their positions in the past (Lovenduski
2001; Morgan 2006).
The second way in which quotas can influence intra-party decisions is through changes to
expectations and norms about women in politics. The issue salience mechanism suggests that quota
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policies increase public awareness and support for women in politics, and this then cues party elites
to prioritize women’s concerns. Studies suggest that quotas attract media attention to (the lack
of) women in politics (Sacchet 2008; Sénac-Slawinski 2008). Rather than being an ‘one-off’ change,
quotas tend to highlight the issue of women in politics repeatedly at every subsequent election, with
media coverage comparing how parties are faring (which aren’t complying?) and who the female
candidates are. For example, Portugal passed a quota law in 2006. In the most recent 2015 federal
election – the third since the quota law has been in place – national newspapers covered the share
of female candidates and elected MPs, referencing the 2006 law specifically. Some of the headlines
include “Men continue to dominate electoral lists. Only 25% of the 2015 heads of lists were women”
(Espresso, 5 October 2015) and “History was made. One-third of the seats will be occupied by
women” (Observador, 5 October 2015). Media also paid particular attention to whether specific
parties complied with the quota requirements.1
Initial evidence also suggests that quotas can lead the public to change their views about
the role of women in politics, although I note the need for more research in this area, particularly
comparative studies. In India, Beaman et al. (2008) find that quotas weaken negative stereotypes
about women in public life, particularly among men. In Rwanda, Burnet (2011) shows that quotas
lead to changes in the status of women and their role in society, again especially for men. These
shifts in media attention and public attitudes are likely to affect the incentives and strategies of party
leaders. Specifically, elites might use party positions to associate the party with women’s policy
concerns in order to raise their visibility on these issues and claim credit from female constituents
(Mayhew 1974). Less cynically, it is also possible that changing norms are internalized by party
elites themselves, regardless of electoral incentives. Over time elites may come to accept the notion
that a more balanced representation of gendered policy concerns is normatively appropriate, and
shift party positions accordingly. Some of these party positions might result in actual policy changes
(e.g., investment in public daycare), which in turn creates new constituencies and increases demand,
raising the likelihood of further policy shifts (Skocpol 1995; Pierson 1993; Mettler 2002). In short,
1Some examples are: “For the first time, the list of PSD / Azores has more women than men” (Publico, 16 June
2015), “List of PS in Santarem violates parity law” (Espresso, 28 August 2015), “Setúbal is the district with most
women elected as heads of lists” (Espresso, 6 October 2015).
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quotas might set in motion a self-reinforcing cascade of changes to media attention, public attitudes,
and policy responses (policy feedback).
Which issues should we expect to change? First, my theory suggests that expectations
about policy change should be guided by gender differences in policy preferences. Once the quota
law is in place, we should expect to see change only on those issues men and women have different
opinions on. In some contexts, male and female political preferences are indistinguishable. My
initial hypothesis is that in this scenario, politician gender should not matter at all. I expect no
change to party positions in issue areas on which men and women agree.
Hypothesis 1: The effect of quotas on party positions is conditional on the existence of
significant differences in political preferences between men and women in the electorate. No change
is expected on issues on which men and women agree.
However, Chapter 2 demonstrates that there are large gender gaps on many issues. Specif-
ically, women prefer more social spending and government intervention on policies including health
care, pensions, and maternal employment. The theory outlined in Chapter 2 suggests that quotas
are likely to influence all policies that women as a group prioritize, but especially those that are
off the main left-dimension, like maternal employment and associated work-family policies. I thus
expect women’s preferences for greater attention to welfare policies to be reflected more accurately
after a quota law is passed, particularly on issues related to maternal employment.
Hypothesis 2: Quotas will increase political party attention to issues that women prefer
when gender differences in policy preferences exist. In advanced democracies, I expect parties to
increase the attention they give to social policies, particularly those related to maternal employment.
Party ideology could also condition the effect of quota laws. Many left parties have adopted
voluntary quota measures within the party (Caul 2001), and even without quotas left parties tend to
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send higher percentages of women to parliament (Kenworthy & Malami 1999; Caul 1999; Reynolds
1999; Kittilson 2006). It is no surprise, then, that quotas often lead to larger increases in numbers
of women for right parties – as Chapter 4 shows for the recent case of Portugal. Parties that were
openly opposed to the quota might feel an added incentive to highlight and/or develop their policy
positions addressing women’s interests as a sort of defense mechanism, and so as to not appear
outdated. Because of this I expect:
Hypothesis 3: Quota laws will have a larger effect on attention to social policy issues in
right-wing parties than in left-wing parties.
Finally, the specific requirements of the quota law are likely to influence the size of its
potential effects. As shown in Chapter 4, quotas with larger thresholds, placement mandates,
and stricter enforcement mechanisms are likely to be more successful at increasing the numbers of
women in office. Greater numbers of women in office are likely to increase the leverage women have
to influence party leaders, and the salience of women’s issues to the public. I therefore expect the
following:
Hypothesis 4: Quota laws with placement mandates, strict enforcement mechanisms, and
high thresholds are likely to have a larger effect than laws that lack these provisions.
5.2 Data & Methods
I test this argument in two ways: a longitudinal analysis of 22 countries from 1965 to 2011, and
a matched pair case study exploring the content of policy change and causal mechanisms. First, I
analyze the link between quotas and party positions over time using cross-national time-series data.
Second, I use a matched pair case study of far right parites in Belgium and Portugal to explore the
the content of policy change after a quota law, and the causal mechanisms linking quotas to shifts
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in party positions. As I will explain in the next section, the quantitative data on political party
positions does not distinguish among different types of welfare state expansion policies. This makes
it suitable to test only the first part of Hypothesis 2, that quotas increase political party attention
to social policies. Because of this I use qualitative evidence to test the second part of the hypothesis,
that quotas lead to policy shifts especially for those issues that are off the main left-right agenda
(maternal employment and associated work-family policies). Below I discuss the empirical strategy
for quantitative analysis, and describe the data and relevant covariates.
Quota laws are not randomly assigned to countries. A major concern is that the effect
is not causal and that something else, such as culture or attitudes towards women, is determining
both adoption of a quota law and party positions on social policy. I deal with this concern in two
ways. First, I identify and control for potential confounding variables, factors which could affect
both the probability of quota adoption and party positions. By conditioning on these observed
characteristics I ensure that the groups being compared are really comparable, and that quota
legislation can be interpreted causally. I use an OLS model with lagged dependent variable, which
controls for time-varying pre-treatment trends; i.e., if quota adoption is correlated with past party
priorities. However, the OLS model cannot account for unobservable omitted variables, such as
culture or machismo in political parties.
In order to control for a wider range of potential omitted variables I also estimate models
that include party fixed effects (which in linear combination are equal to country fixed effects) and
year fixed effects (which deal with trends over time e.g., political cycles). Fixed effects models
control for any party or country-specific omitted variables (observable and unobservable) that are
constant over time – a potentially large source of omitted variable bias. Results should be interpreted
as within-unit changes in treatment, i.e., the link between quotas and policy change within quota
countries. As with the difference-in-differences approach, the critical assumption is that there are
no potential time-varying confounders that have not been accounted for in the analysis.
A benefit of estimating both the lagged dependent variable and the fixed effects specifica-
tions is that they can be interpreted to ‘bracket’ the true causal effect of the treatment variable (An-
113
grist & Pischke 2008, 245). The fixed effects estimator is based on the presumption of time-invariant
omitted variables – unobserved party- and country- specific variables that determine assignment to
treatment, e.g. culture or attitudes towards women. The assumption underlying the lagged de-
pendent variable estimator is that the omitted variable bias arises not from a time-invariant factor
but from time-varying pre-treatment trends (i.e., if adopting a quota law is correlated with past
party positions, a lagged dependent variable). If the fixed effect assumption is correct but lagged
dependent variable is used, estimates of a positive treatment effect tend to be too small, and vice
versa if the lagged dependent variable assumption is right but fixed effects are estimated the effect
will tend to be too large. Thus by reporting both lagged dependent variable and fixed effects results,
I can obtain upper and lower bounds on the effects of quota laws (see also Guryan 2001, who uses
this technique to analyze the effect of school desegregation on dropout rates).
I take several steps to ensure that findings are not the result of model misspecification.
One potential concern is that unobserved election-specific factors may influence all parties’ policy
positions in a given election, leading to correlated errors among the parties standing in that election.
I use robust standard errors clustered by election to address this problem (Rogers 1994; Williams
2000). Another well-known problem for difference-in-differences style estimation using panel data
with fixed effects is serially correlated errors. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004a) discuss
this problem, which arises when the dependent variables are highly positively serially correlated,
especially when working with long time series data. They show that in this case the standard
deviation of the estimated treatment effects could be understated.
To deal with this I follow Bertrand et al.’s recommendation and ignore the time series
information. The simplest way to do this would be to collapse the time series information into a
‘pre’- and ‘post’-period and study the impact of the quota law on policy positions on a two-period
panel. However, this approach is possible only when the laws are created at the same time in
all countries, which is not the case here. Following Bertrand et al. I slightly modify the simple
aggregation technique in the following way: first, I regress policy positions on party fixed effects,
year dummies, and all relevant covariates. Then I divide the residuals of the treatment countries
only into two groups, residuals from before and after the laws, and run a simple regression of the
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impact of quota laws on party priorities using this two-period panel of residuals. Bertrand et al.
show that this procedure produces consistent standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan
2004a).
Data
I analyze party positions on welfare policies using party manifestos in 22 countries, from 1965 to
2011.2 The manifesto data come from the Comparative Manifesto Project (MARPOR), which mea-
sures party positions on particular policy issues in the party’s election-year manifesto. MARPOR
coders match up ‘quasi-sentences’ in the manifesto with a category of policy. One quasi-sentence is
one statement or message – this can be a full sentence, a clause, or a bullet point. To account for
the different length of party manifestos, each category is standardized by taking the total number of
quasi-sentences coded in the same document as a base. The resulting percentage can be taken as a
measure of the party’s policy priorities at the time of election (Budge 2001; Klingemann et al. N.d.;
Volkens et al. N.d.).3 Manifestos are only coded in election years (observations are not retained
through the inter-election period). Data analyses include 179 parties – every party listed in the
MARPOR dataset for these countries and time period whose policy program was coded in at least
two consecutive elections.4
I operationalize the main dependent variable as the share of political party manifesto
devoted to Welfare State Expansion. This is one of 56 policy categories coded in the MARPOR
data. Welfare State Expansion includes favorable mentions of the need to introduce, maintain, or
expand any social service or social security scheme (the category excludes education). While the
category is very broad, it encompasses many of women’s policy priorities identified in the ISSP data;
2The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States.
3All parties that gain at least one seat in parliament are included in the MARPOR dataset. In party splits, the
party that takes on a new name is given a new party ID and coded separately; the original party retains the same
ID. Similarly when party mergers lead to new parties these are recognized with a new party ID. Note that the data
are operationalized as units, not ratios. For example, if 8% of the manifesto is coded as welfare state expansion, this
is operationalized as 8, not 0.08.
4At least two consecutive party program codings are required in order to construct the lagged dependent variable.
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notably, health care, child care and parental leave, pensions / retirement, unemployment benefits,
and the government’s responsibility to provide decent housing and a decent standard of living for
the unemployed (see Figure 2.2, Chapter 2). Although ideally I would like to assess how party
positions on specific policies like health care or child care change over time, this is not possible with
the existing data.
The mean value of Welfare State Expansion in the sample is 7.62, with standard deviation
6.09. An example of a quasi-sentence coding that falls under this category is, “During the next term
Labour’s Working for Families package will be boosted to provide even more help for families raising
children" (Labour Party, New Zealand, 2005 manifesto). According to my theory, we should expect
political parties to increase the attention they devote to these issues after a quota law is passed.
In addition to the main dependent variable Welfare State Expansion, I also include the
dependent variable Environmental Protection as a placebo test. This variable is included to test
the theory that we should only see changes in party priorities after a quota law for issues that are
characterized by a gender gap in policy preferences. The MARPOR data includes the following
categories that are, on average, not characterized by a statistically significant gender gap in prefer-
ences: the environment, culture and the arts, and law enforcement (see Figure 2.2, Chapter 2). Of
these, I select the environment because parties in Western advanced democracies on average pay
more attention to issues of environmental protection in their party manifestos than the other issue
areas: the mean percentage of manifesto devoted to environmental protection is 5.29, compared
to 2.4 for law and order and 2.2 for culture and the arts. Compared to the other issue areas, the
data on environmental protection is more likely to be consistent and relevant for a larger number
of parties.
Environmental Protection includes mentions of the preservation of countryside, forests,
etc.; general preservation of natural resources against selfish interests; proper use of national parks;
soil banks, etc; environmental improvement. An example of a quasi-sentence coding that falls under
this category is, “We need an energy revolution" (The Greens, 2008 manifesto, Austria). My theory
predicts no change in party attention to this issue after a quota law is passed.
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The key independent variable is Quota Law, operationalized as a dummy variable coded
“1” for countries which have adopted a national quota law, after the law was implemented (including
and after the first election in which the quota was in operation). In my dataset, five countries have
passed a quota law: Italy (since repealed), Belgium, France, Spain, and Portugal. Data include four
post-quota elections in Belgium, two in France, and one each in Spain and Portugal. In the case of
Italy, which adopted a gender quota law in 1993 and repealed it in 1995, 1994 is the only election
coded for the quota.
Covariates
To specify the covariates to be used as controls, I consider how the adoption of quotas is related
to well-established determinants of party positions. The key issue is whether adopting a quota
causes parties to change their policy priorities, or there is something else that both contributes
to a quota getting adopted and also causes a shift in policy priorities. I control for six variables
potentially linked to both adopting quotas and party positions: PR Electoral System, % Women in
Parliament, Female Labor Force Participation, Income per capita, Party Quota, and Party Family.
The relationship between quota adoption and most of these variables is outlined in detail in Chapter
3. Below I briefly review how they could also be related to party positions.
First, research has shown that electoral rules also exert a strong effect on policy outcomes:
majoritarian electoral systems are associated with smaller government spending and smaller welfare
states compared to systems of proportional representation (e.g., Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno
2002; Persson & Tabellini 2005). The percentage of women in parliament could be related to policy
outcomes either through the efforts of female politicians, or because it reflects attitudes towards
women and equality, which are also likely correlated to policies. Economic development is also
related to policy outcomes; for example, as incomes increase and government revenues increase,
demand for public expenditure should also rise (Wagner’s Law). Workforce participation entitles
some women to benefits that they would otherwise not be eligible for (e.g. health insurance). Finally,
voluntary party quotas could be linked to party priorities through the mechanism of increased
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women’s representation.
Another factor thought to be related to quota adoption is international policy diffusion.
Similar parties might have close ties to each other across countries which affect both the likelihood
of quota adoption and party positions. To control for this, I include a series of Party Family dummy
variables coded by the Comparative Manifesto Project: Ecology Parties, Communist Parties, Social
Democratic Parties, Liberal Parties, Christian Democratic Parties, Nationalist Parties, Agrarian
Parties, Ethnic and Regional Parties, and Special Issue Parties. The party family variable also
controls for ideological incentives for supporting quota laws, i.e. the potential role of left parties.
Additionally I control for a set of standard covariates from the literature on determinants
of government spending which are not known to affect quota laws. These are included to increase
the accuracy of model estimates. Given the close relationship between party positions and policy
outcomes, I make the assumption that these factors are also closely correlated with determinants
of party positions at the country level. The following national-level institutional and structural
variables are commonly assumed to affect political decision-making on spending, redistribution,
and/or partisanship: Presidentialism, Unionization, Inequality, Unemployment, % Population 65+.5
I control for Effective number of parties in the system because previous evidence suggests
that parties rarely cross over one another on the ideological spectrum (Adams 2001; Budge 1994),
so as the number of parties increases it should become more difficult for parties to change their
positions. I control for Total number of quasi-sentences in the party manifesto because the lengths
of the coded manifestos vary significantly and, for example, very short manifestos written for snap
elections may not include a broad range of policy positions. Finally I control for the Party vote
change, the difference in the party’s percentage of the vote from the previous to the current election,
because evidence suggests that parties change their positions based on the signal they receive from
5A number of studies have found that presidential regimes spend less (e.g., Persson & Tabellini 2005; Edwards
& Thames 2007; Baldez & Carey 2001). Higher unionization is linked to greater political pressure for redistribution,
according to power resource theory (e.g., Korpi 1978; Esping-Andersen 1990b). The median voter theorem proposed
by Meltzer and Richard (1981) predicts that as inequality increases so should redistribution; however, much of the
subsequent literature on redistribution has found no relationship, or the opposite (Alesina & Rodrik 1991; Persson &
Tabellini 1991). Higher unemployment is linked to greater redistribution, because countries have public unemployment
insurance programs. Finally older populations are likely to prefer more government contribution to pensions, health,
and other social spending.
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the previous election (Somer-Topcu 2009). I lag all control variables by one year (t-1 ) because they
can be affected by the treatment and may induce post-treatment bias (King & Zeng 2006), and
because of the time it takes parties to respond to political and economic developments.6 Appendix
5A shows the summary statistics for all parameters used in the analysis, and provides details about
data sources.
5.3 Time Series Analysis of Quotas and Political Party Positions
Table 5.1 reports the results showing the effects of quota laws on political party positions towards
welfare state expansion and environmental protection. Providing support for Hypotheses 1 and
2, the estimates imply that after a quota is adopted parties shift their positions on welfare state
expansion, devoting a greater percentage of their manifesto to this issue compared to others. No
consistent or significant association is found between quotas and environmental protection.
Model 1 presents the simple specification, including potential confounders and standard
controls as well as the lagged dependent variable. The coefficient of 2.1 on Quota Law indicates that
a one-unit change in Quota Law, i.e. going from not having a quota to adopting a quota, is associated
with a 2.1 percentage point increase in party attention to welfare state expansion. For example, a
party that spent 10% of its manifesto discussing welfare state expansion would be expected to spend
12.1% of its manifesto on welfare state expansion after a quota law is passed. Model 2 includes
party and year fixed effects, and all time-varying potential confounders. This model controls for
omitted variable bias both across time and political parties, and should be interpreted to estimate
within-unit changes in treatment.
Again the coefficient of the indicator for quota law is positive and statistically significant.
The association between quota laws and policy change increases in size to 4.58 when party and year
fixed effects are included. Within parties in quota countries, adopting a quota law leads to about
a 4.6 percentage point increase in party attention to welfare state expansion. A party that spent
6Party-level variables are lagged by one election-year given the structure of that data.
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10% of its manifesto discussing welfare state expansion before the law would be expected to spend
14.6% of its manifesto on welfare state expansion after a quota law is passed.7
One potential concern is that some control variables are inconsistent or do not behave
as expected. Specifically, the lagged percentage of women in parliament is not significant, and is
negative in the fixed effects specification. It is difficult to interpret many of the control variables
because they are correlated with the treatment variable. They are included in the analysis only to
adjust for selection into treatment groups. The result for lagged percentage of women in parliament
is likely a legacy of the fact that quota laws are often passed in countries with low levels of women’s
representation. A simple bivariate regression shows that lagged percentage of women in parliament is
negatively correlated with quota law. Alternative models where women’s representation is included
as the main independent variable, and quota law is not included in the analysis, found that women’s
representation is significantly associated with increases in party attention to welfare state expansion
(both OLS and fixed effects specifications).
Models 3 and 4 show that results hold up to the simple aggregation procedure to deal with
serial correlation. The coefficient for quota law is positive and statistically significant in the two-
period panel regression of the residuals from the regression of quota law on all controls. Consistent
with Hypothesis 2, in all models adopting a quota law is associated with increases in political
party attention to welfare state expansion, and the estimates are statistically significant. Turning
to environmental protection, Models 5 and 6 show that quota laws are not associated with party
positions toward environmental protection. No specification shows a significant link (and because
of this the simple aggregation models are unnecessary). Hypothesis 1 suggested that when male
and female political preferences are virtually indistinguishable quota laws should not matter much,
and the initial evidence here supports this argument.
Table 5.2 reports coefficient estimates for model specifications designed to evaluate the
effects of quota laws for left- and right-wing parties. Models 1 and 2 of Table 5.2 estimate the fixed
effects model previously specified (Model 2 of Table 5.1) for left-wing and right-wing parties. Model
7Models including only year and only party fixed effects (not included to save space) returned similar results,
with quota laws associated with a significant increase in attention to welfare state expansion in the party manifesto.
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1 includes parties identified by the MARPOR as members of the green, communist, or social-
democratic party families. Model 2 includes partues classified as liberal, Christian democratic,
conservative, nationalist, agrarian, or ethnic / regional. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, adopting a
quota law is associated with larger increases in party attention to the welfare state for right parties
than left parties, although the size of the difference is small (the coefficients are 4.64 and 3.49
respectively). Overall the key finding from these models is that quota laws affect policy priorities
across parties. For both left and right parties quota laws lead to greater attention to welfare state
expansion.
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Table 5.2: Results by Party Type
Dependent variable: Welfare State Expansion
(1) (2)
Left parties Right parties
only only
Quota Law 3.49 4.64
(1.28) (1.49)
Party Quota(t 1) -2.39 2.25
(1.04) (1.16) Labor Force Part.(t 1) -0.48 -0.10
(0.19) (0.17)
%  in Parl.(t 1) 0.12 -0.07
(0.08) (0.07)
Unionization(t 1) -0.04 -0.12
(0.07) (0.06)
Inequality(t 1) -0.04 -0.02
(0.15) (0.15)
Income per capita(t 1) -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment(t 1) 0.02 -0.17
(0.15) (0.14)
% Population 65+(t 1) -0.08 -0.77
(0.39) (0.31)
Total quasi-sentences -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Party vote change(t 1) 0.06 0.02
(0.05) (0.04)
Effective no. of parties(t 1) -0.10 -0.57
(0.52) (0.50)
Constant 59.31 50.13
(12.64) (11.11)
N 523 593
R-squared 0.53 0.45
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.29
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered around election are in parentheses.
Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
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Finally, Table 5.3 addresses questions about whether the specific rules of the quota provi-
sion matter. These models also use the same previously described fixed effects specification. Model
1 of Table 5.3 separates the quota variable into laws that require parties to comply with the law for
the list to be accepted (Quota, strict sanctions, representing Spain and Belgium after a quota law
was passed) and those that do not (Quota, weak sanctions). Consistent with Hypothesis 4, results
show that quotas with strict enforcement sanctions have larger effects on party positions than those
that do not, and a Wald test of the difference between quotas with and without strict compliance
sanctions shows this difference is significant (P=0.04). A party that spent 10% of its manifesto
discussing welfare state expansion would be expected to spend 16.6% on this issue after a quota
law requiring compliance for the list to be accepted is passed, whereas it would only be expected
to spend 13.1% of the manifesto on welfare state expansion if the penalties for compliance are less
strict.
Model 2 separates the quota variable into laws that require women to make up a high
threshold, 50% of the list (Quota, 50% threshold, representing France after it passed a quota law
and Belgium from 2007), versus those that do not (Quota, < 50% threshold). The results show that
quota laws increase attention to welfare state expansion regardless of the threshold, but contrary
to expectations requiring 50% of candidates to be women does not lead to a larger effect. The
coefficients are 3.56 for a quota with 50% threshold and 5.06 with a smaller percentage of women
required, although a Wald test finds that the difference between these coefficients is not statistically
significant.
Model 3 tests the impact of placement mandates (when the law includes specific rules about
the rank-ordering of candidates, represented by Quota, placement mandates). Again quota laws are
shown to increase attention to the welfare state regardless of the rule, but contrary to expectations
the effect is larger for those countries without placement mandates (France, Spain, and Belgium
before 2002). However a Wald test of the difference between quotas with and without placement
mandates finds that the difference between these two coefficients is not statistically significant.
While Hypothesis 4 suggested that strict enforcement sanctions, larger thresholds, and placement
mandates would all increase the effectiveness of quota laws, I find strong support only for the use
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of sanctions. This result is somewhat puzzling, given that results from Chapter 4 suggest all three
legal provisions lead to the election of more women. One interpretation is that, more than the other
provisions, strict enforcement mechanisms oblige all parties to comply with the law – and perhaps
this increases media attention and public awareness of the issue, encouraging parties to respond with
position shifts. Although quota laws influence policy agendas regardless of their specific provisions,
the impact is greatest when all parties are forced to adhere to the law.
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Table 5.3: Results by Specific Provisions of Quota Law
Dependent variable: Welfare State Expansion
(1) (2) (3)
Sanctions Threshold Placement
Mandates
Quota, strict sanctions 6:59
(1.30)
Quota, weak sanctions 3:07
(1.26)
Quota, 50% threshold 3:56
(1.22)
Quota, < 50% threshold 5:06
(1.35)
Quota, placement mandates 3:97
(1.60)
Quota, no placement mandates 5:14
(1.22)
Party Quota(t 1) -0.07 0.11 0.07
(0.69) (0.69) (0.70) Labor Force Part.(t 1) -0.20 -0.22  0:20
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
%  in Parl.(t 1) -0.05 -0.01 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Unionization(t 1) -0.13 -0.12  0:12
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Inequality(t 1) -0.08 -0.07 -0.06
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Income per capita(t 1) 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Unemployment(t 1) -0.06 -0.09 -0.09
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
% Population 65+(t 1) -0.40 -0.40  0:40
(0.31) (0.31) (0.31)
Total quasi-sentences -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Party vote change(t 1) 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Effective no. of parties(t 1) -0.38 -0.37 -0.33
(0.39) (0.40) (0.39)
Constant 51.54 51.24 50:18
(8.87) (8.91) (9.03)
N 1225 1225 1225
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46
Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.33 0.33
Party family controls Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Party fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered around election are in parentheses.
Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
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Robustness Checks
The results hold up to several robustness checks. First, in order to investigate the possibility that
results are driven by factors specific to a single country, I exclude one quota country at a time
and re-estimate the specifications. While some countries are found to be more influential than
others – for example, estimates of the impact of quota law on welfare state expansion decrease when
Belgium is excluded from the sample – the estimates for quota law remain positive and significant
upon elimination of any country from the sample.
The potential endogeneity of quota reforms remains another concern. For example, parties
might increase attention to women’s preferences in response to perceived need for a quota law,
which might be greater for those parties that propose quota legislation in the first place (they are
typically left wing and likely to focus more on welfare state expansion). To address this concern, I
remove the political parties that were responsible for proposing quota laws from the dataset. These
are: the Flemish Social Democrats (SPA) and the Christian Democratic and Flemish (CD & V)
in Belgium, the Democratic Party of the Left in Italy, the Socialist Party in France, the Socialist
Workers’ Party in Spain, and the Socialist Party in Portugal. Many of the parties that remain in
the sample did not support a quota law and indeed campaigned and voted against it. I make the
claim that because the quota law was imposed on these parties without their support, we can view
it as an exogenous source of change in the political atmosphere and numbers of women required
for the remaining parties. I re-estimate models using the new sample and find that results do not
change; in fact, the size of effects is slightly larger when parties that proposed the quota law are
excluded (e.g., the coefficient for quota law in the party and year fixed effects specification is 4.65
for this sample compared to 4.58 in the original sample). Overall, the results seem to be reasonably
robust across a range of specifications and sample sets.
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5.4 Case Study: The Far Right in Belgium and Austria
The analysis so far demonstrates that quota laws lead to greater party attention to issues related
to welfare state expansion. Unfortunately, the manifesto data do not allow us to distinguish which
issues specifically are driving the increase in attention to welfare state expansion. According to
the theory proposed in Chapter 2, quotas ought to lead to policy change especially for those issues
that are off the main left-right agenda, like work-family policies. This is because parties have little
incentive to address issues that cross-cut their constituencies, potentially exacerbating internal
divisions. Are these issues in fact driving the results here – for example, parental leave and child
care? The purpose of this case study is to explore how individual parties respond to quota laws,
and to shed light on the causal mechanisms at work. By investigating the policy responses of
individual parties, this case study gives the empirical findings greater credibility and deepens our
understanding of quotas’ political influence.
I focus on far right parties in Belgium, which passed a quota law in 1994, and Austria,
which has no quota law. This is one of two ‘most similar’ matched pair case studies I conducted for
the sake of this book project (see Chapter 3 for details about how cases were selected). In future work
I plan to expand these case studies, using evidence from both matched pairs to assess arguments
about the impact of quota laws on party positions and policy outcomes. For now I note that the
case of Belgium is of particular interest for two main reasons. First, the quota law is considered
very strong, with a 50% threshold, placement mandates, and strict enforcement mechanisms. It
has been in place for nearly twenty years, allowing me to assess whether effects have increased over
time. Second, the gender gap in preferences for maternal employment is relatively large in Belgium
(9% on average), making it all the more likely that these issues will be prioritized after a quota law.
I concentrate on the far right because these parties tend to be the most opposed to quota
laws. The quota can thus be seen as an exogenous change imposed on the party, strengthening the
case that policy changes after the law are in fact due to the quota law and not incentives endogenous
to the political party. I am also particularly interested in these parties because my theory expects
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the most change in parties of the right, since they typically promote fewer women and have less
egalitarian views compared to left parties. Comparing the far right after a quota law was passed in
Belgium but not Austria thus constitutes a case characterized by multiple factors (strength of quota
law, size of gender gap, far right parties) that make it most likely to fulfill theoretical predictions
(Gerring 2007).
To understand how party positions changed after a quota law was imposed, I used Google
Translate to translate and read every party manifesto for Belgium’s Vlaams Blok / Vlaams Belang
(VB)8 and Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) for three elections before and after the law was imple-
mented (i.e., I read a total of twelve manifestos). I also utilize interviews with current and former
party members undertaken in 2013 and 2014, official party documents, newspaper coverage, and
secondary literature describing policy change before and after a quota law was passed in Belgium
but not Austria.9 Both parties are described as far-right and are known for their anti-immigration
policies. They have also both been criticized for their conservative views towards women. While
the percentage of women in parliament for Belgium’s VB increased after a quota law was imple-
mented, from 0% in 1987 to 33% in 2016, the percentage of women in parliament for Austria’s FPÖ
essentially stayed the same, at 17% in 1986 compared to 18% in 2016.
In general both parties’ manifestos initially pay little attention to social policies, with
the exception of pensions. However Belgium’s VB gradually increases attention to several social
policies after the quota law, including child care, parental leave, and elderly care. No such trend is
apparent for Austria’s FPÖ. Please see Appendix 5B for a table summarizing social policy coverage
in these manifestos over time. Of particular interest here, there is a striking shift in the content
of work-family policies in Belgium’s VB after the law. Both parties initially advocate increases
in family allowances and child benefits, promoting care for children within the family. The role
of the mother as primary carer is stressed emphatically. For example, the FPÖ’s 1994 manifesto
8Vlaams Blok was the direct predecessor of Vlaams Belang. The party was forced to change its name in 2004 after
a Supreme Court ruling forbidding the party’s continued existence because of incitement to discrimination. The party
moderated some of its most radical views, but the party leader made it clear that the party would fundamentally
remain the same.
9Documents were translated using Google Translate.
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states, “Kindergarten places are important, but do not replace the mother... The care of children
and elderly in the family is usually better and cheaper than preschools and nursing homes” (p. 20).
The VB’s 1995 manifesto conveys a similar theme, but ostracizes working women and feminism in
particular:
We advocate a healthier balance between individual ambition, career opportunities,
and financial independence, and also the irreplaceable tasks that women can fulfill as
mothers and educators. We believe that the balance is broken. Here in a catastrophic
way feminism has led to a one-sided, selfish and socially destructive mentality, in which
the female nature is grossly misunderstood, and that leaves no place for children. . .
homemakers play a valuable role. No school, no kindergarten can replace the nurturing,
protective and educational role of the family. (p. 20)
After the quota law is implemented, VB continues to push for increased benefits, but also discusses
the need for development of affordable daycare centers with greater flexibility. In 1999, the manifesto
is strikingly different:
The Vlaams Blok is in favor of a real choice between working at home and working
outside the home. For the families who deliberately choose this second option, supportive
policies should be developed.... The existing legislation on child care should be expanded
and made more flexible. Also, the rates for low-income families should be reduced. (p.
77-78)
The VB continues to advocate for additional affordable and higher quality child care fa-
cilities in their 2003 and 2007 manifestos. The 2003 manifesto states, “The Vlaams Blok argues
for a decent, affordable, and high quality child care,” (p. 9) and similarly in 2007, “Vlaams Belang
supports the development of a harmonious combination of family and work. Here a good quality
and affordable child care program is essential.” (p. 14). In contrast, the FPÖ does not mention
public child care until the 2006 manifesto, when it suggests that public child care facilities must
guarantee a high quality of educational care (p. 3). Instead the FPÖ advocate for additional
family allowances (1999), tax reforms to benefit large families (2002 and 2006), and strengthening
the family relationship through educational skills and support like counseling (2002). In summary,
attitudes in the VB towards whether women should stay at home with children have shifted, while
attitudes in the FPÖ remain the same.
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Why did the VB shift its direction on these issues? The first proposed mechanism linking
quotas to policy change is added numbers of women, who can impact party positions in three main
ways: a ‘critical mass’, women’s sections, or reaching positions of leadership. The second proposed
mechanism is that quotas lead to an increase in the salience of gender issues. Rising public awareness
and media attention to women’s political issues spurs party leaders to prioritize issues that women
prefer, and any policy changes serve to reinforce issue salience in a policy feedback effect.
An interview with the former party chairman of the VB Gerolf Annemans suggests that
party change in Belgium’s far right was primarily due to the first mechanism, increases in the
number of women. According to him, the debate about a quota law was in the papers but it wasn’t
a popular issue at the time (“That was why we as a growing party at that time could afford our
opposition without breaking our neck.”). However, it is worth noting that far right parties like the
VB draw a disproportionate share of their electors from young men (Givens 2004). Compared to
other parties, they might not be as susceptible to growing pressure to address gender equality issues.
Interviews with members of more mainstream parties in Belgium suggest that elites have perceived
a shift in the salience of women’s concerns. This is reflected in the case study in Chapter 4, e.g., the
quotes from liberal and conservative party members Gwendolyn Rutten and Viviane Teitelbaum
(p. 97-98). Another example comes from Flemish Socialist party member Vera Claes, who suggests
that men who were able to pivot and address women’s concerns have benefited electorally:
There is less opposition against women, and women’s issues [after the quota], and also
a lot of men have taken over these issues. I think about parental leave, work-life bal-
ance, positive action, violence against women, child care, these things are no longer
women’s issues. And I think that men who were conscious of the fact of these issues and
who started to promote and give attention to these issues, they found themselves in a
favorable position towards women in fact.10
Instead, Annemans suggests that change within the far right was driven by women in the
party, who represent certain points of view:
You must not as a man try to explain things that women can better explain. What
should we do with children while mama is going to work? What should we do about
10Vera Claes, personal interview, 10 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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child care? . . . so talking about child care and designing child care should be done by
women. This is not a matter of the party president designing an image for the party,
women being more telegenic etc, but about letting things be done by those who do them
the best. So for instance how could you talk about these things without a woman in the
driver’s seat?11
Annemans stops short of saying that the addition of more women in his party changed the party’s
positions. At the same time, he makes the case that policies like child care are bigger issues for
women than for men, and that it’s not credible to have a policy debate about them without women.
Neither the VB in Belgium or the FPÖ in Austria have a women’s section in the party, so
in this case it is not a relevant explanation. This leaves the critical mass and women in leadership
arguments. Although numbers of women in the party did increase significantly, I find little evidence
that a critical mass of women worked together to negotiate for women’s interests within the party.
Instead, women in leadership roles made substantial changes to party policy. Since the quota law was
implemented, women have risen to top positions in Vlaams Belang, and they have also emphasized
social policies that help women combine work and family.
Barbara Pas was first elected in 2007 and became parliamentary party leader in 2013, the
first woman in her party to do so. When she took power she told the party that they could expect
new issues on the agenda, in addition to the classic Flemish independence themes. In a May 2013
interview she explains, “Socio-economic issues in the first place. On June 2, our party is organizing
a conference under the title ‘Social People’s Party’. We are in various working groups to prepare.
The intention is that we tighten our social positions and put them more into the spotlight.”12
The conference text stresses the need for affordable child care, linking it to women’s labor force
participation specifically:
Child care for families with children is often a necessary condition for activation in the
labor market. Employment is the best safeguard against poverty. Therefore Vlaams
Belang wants to create a sufficient number of child care places in Flanders.13
11Gerolf Annemans, personal interview, 9 October 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
12“Kennismaking met Barbara Pas,” Golfbrekers, 31 May 2013.
13“Vlaams Belang: Sociale Volkspartij,” Congresteksten, September 2013, p. 55 - 56. Retrieved from
http://www.vlaamsbelang.org/files/sociaalprogramma.pdf, 24 August 2015.
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Anke Van dermeersch is another female party leader outspoken on work-family issues. Van
dermeersch was first elected to the Senate in 2003 and went on to be group leader in the Senate
from 2011 to 2014 – again, the first woman in her party to hold this position. Both women have
sponsored bills to extend maternity and parental leave, which is short in Belgium compared to
many other European countries, and to better protect pregnant workers against discrimination. In
a speech to a party conference in Antwerp in 2012, Van dermeersch draws from her own experiences
to advocate for child care:
As a wife and mother of two young children, child care in my home town is very close to
my heart. Far too few Antwerp families find a place in child care. The number of child
care places in our city is well below the Flemish average. . . The Vlaams Belang would
like more, cheaper and quality child care because your children are our future.14
How do these mechanisms apply in the shadow case of Austria? First, there is little
evidence supporting an increased role for women in the party, since the share of women in parliament
has not increased over the course of thirty years.15 Former FPÖ member Martina Schenk said that
the negative atmosphere for women within the party contributed to her decision to leave and join
another party on the right (she is currently an MP for Team Stronach). She says, “There was a
feeling that women were. . . some people in the party were treating women in a way that was not
equal to men, and they treated them in a different way. So this is one of the reasons I left.”16
I also find little indication that increasing public pressure influenced the FPÖ’s positions,
absent a quota law. In fact, in the 2000s the FPÖ was responsible for what many consider to be a
step back in family policy, in terms of maternal employment. In 2000, FPÖ party member Herbert
Haupt was appointed Minister of Social Services, with responsibility for women’s affairs. Haupt was
responsible for proposing a new law establishing family allowances independently of the parental
leave benefit. Previously, parental leave and family allowances had been linked together and aimed
14“Toespraak Anke Van dermeersch op programmacongres in Antwerpen,” 27 May 2012. Retrieved from
http://www.vlaamsbelangantwerpen.be/4/428, 24 August 2015.
15The highest proportion of women elected in FPÖ’s parliamentary party was 26%, in 2002. The lowest was 8%,
in 2006. Overall, the average share of women elected since 1999 (when a quota was implemented in Belgium) is 18%,
compared to 29% for Belgium’s VB.
16Martina Schenk, personal interview, 7 May 2014, Vienna, Austria. Translation assistance by Denise Aichelburg,
present at interview.
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at supporting working mothers, i.e., compensating for lost wages while maintaining ties to the labor
market. Since 2001, the Law on Child Care Allowance replaced this with a family allowance available
to all parents regardless of whether they had previously worked. It also extended the length of time
that the benefit can be claimed from two to three years (Pfeiffer 2005; Haussman & Sauer 2007).
Haupt explained that the policy change was intended to stop the erosion of the traditional family,
even claiming that public child care institutions contributed to increases in drug abuse and violence
in society. According to Minister Haupt, mothers should stay home with children and only after
several years take on at most a part-time job (FPÖ Minister Herbert Haupt, Nationalrat 2001, as
cited in Haussman & Sauer 2007, p. 28).
In summary, the cases of the VB in Belgium and the FPÖ in Austria offer initial insight into
how and why parties alter their policy positions after a quota law. The VB shifts its views towards
more state provision of child care while the FPÖ maintains strong advocacy for care within the
home. Evidence suggests that change within the VB was due mainly to women’s growing influence
in the party, particularly as they gained access to top leadership posts. This finding confirms
previous research suggesting that women are particularly influential at the agenda-setting stage. At
the same time, it is worth noting that the unique context of far right parties might influence which
causal mechanisms are triggered. Far right parties are typically opposed to organized women’s
sections, while in many socialist parties they are well-established. When the structure of a women’s
section already exists, women may find it easier to lobby party leadership for change, even without
gaining access to leadership positions themselves. In addition, the gender gap in voting for far right
parties is well-known – the majority of supporters are typically men – and so rising issue salience
of gender equality issues may be less persuasive than in the typical party.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the impact of quota laws within parties in advanced industrial democ-
racies. It finds that parties in countries with gender quota laws increase the attention they give
to welfare state expansion, an issue on which women prefer more spending and government inter-
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vention than men. Gender quota laws increase coverage of welfare issues even after controlling for
institutional and structural factors, party ideology, party and year effects, and a lagged dependent
variable. Yet, consistent with hypotheses, gender quota laws only change political parties’ attention
to issues on which men and women have different opinions; I find no evidence that quotas lead to
changes on policies that are not characterized by a gender gap in preferences, such as environmental
protection. The findings suggest that quota laws increase party attention to women’s preferences
even in right-wing parties, many of which did not support the law. In fact, the size of the quota’s
effect is greater among right parties. Finally, the design of the law matters, but only strict enforce-
ment mechanisms. Quotas can have important implications for intra-party change even if they are
comparatively ‘weak’ laws (i.e., lacking placement mandates or a 50% requirement).
A large literature in political economy has tried to identify the causes of inequality and
differing levels of redistribution across countries. The results of this chapter imply that the identity of
policymakers (here, gender identity) may be an important variable that has been largely unexplored.
Men and women prioritize different issues. Quotas are one mechanism that can lead to greater
substantive representation of women’s interests within political parties, particularly if interests are
orthogonal to the standard class-based issue dimension. The case study suggests that change is
mainly due to women’s growing influence within the party, particularly gaining access to leadership
roles. However, male party elites also had to decide to listen, given that the party platforms were
always approved by men. This suggests that quotas also had some role in changing attitudes,
whether it be in the public mind, among male party leaders, or both. Do male party leaders
listen because they perceive a shift in constituency support for these issues, or do they feel more
comfortable addressing certain issues like care when women are around, as recent literature suggests
(Murray 2014)? More research is needed to unpack the question of how quotas influence public and
elite attitudes.
Agenda-setting is an important stage of the policymaking process. The results here suggest
that quotas, and the presence of disadvantaged groups like women, can expand the scope of decision-
making beyond standard issues of importance to dominant groups. Quotas are one way of shifting
the distribution of power in politics. Yet the question of whether party positions translate into
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national level policy outcomes remains. Particularly in parliamentary democracies with strong
party discipline, individual legislators may have less influence on the later stages of the policymaking
process. The next chapter turns to this question, exploring the effects of gender quotas on work-
family spending outcomes.
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6 | Quotas and Policy Outcomes: Work-
Family Spending
Do gender quotas matter to policy outcomes, or are they just ‘window dressing’? Chapter 5 provides
evidence that quotas, and increased numbers of women in office, lead to shifts in policy priorities
within parties. While party positions correlate with behavior in office, ultimately political rep-
resentation is about policy choices. There are many different theories of what constitutes ‘good’
representation, but in the vast majority representatives are judged by their actions in the policy-
making process (Mansbridge 2003).1 Party positions could be ‘cheap talk’, but spending decisions
don’t lie.
In my interviews in Western Europe, many politicians claimed that quotas had made a
difference to policies ‘for’ women. For example, Flemish Christian Democrat Senator Sabine de
Bethune said:
My feeling is that more women in politics has broadened the political agenda, more
things became politics. When I entered the political committee of my party, we were
only three or four women in a committee of 60 people. Now we are more than half.
When we tried to talk about child care, some men said what is this, etcetera – and
now we change it. It is one of the biggest budget points. . . although maybe still not
enough.2
1An exception is symbolic representation, in which representatives are assessed based on how their presence
(typically as members of an under-represented group) affects public attitudes and behavior (Pitkin 1967).
2Sabine de Bethune, personal interview, 5 September 2013, Brussels, Belgium.
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Yet, the argument that quotas will lead to policy change is controversial for a number of reasons.
First, some question the notion that distinct ‘women’s interests’ exist in the first place (Young 1997;
Weldon 2002). Chapter 2 refutes this argument, showing that clear and persistent gender gaps exist
over social policy preferences, especially issues to do with maternal employment. While intra-group
differences certainly exist, on average women in advanced democracies share a clear set of concerns
related to their historical, shared group experiences. Others argue that quotas give concessions in
terms of numbers, but men still pick the candidates. The women elected could be family members
or others easily controlled by the party – ‘tokens’ (Abou Zeid 2006; Bauer & Britton 2006). Finally
there is a fear that quotas could lead to backlash, whereby resentful male politicians try to prevent
‘quota women’ from exercising political power (Hawkesworth 2003; Michelle Heath, Schwindt-Bayer
& Taylor-Robinson 2005). In light of these concerns, can quotas provide access to the true halls of
power in politics?
The chapter proceeds as follows. After reviewing the literature on social spending and
identity and outcomes, I propose a theory of quotas and policy change specific to national level
policy change. The main argument is that quotas will lead to policy change for work-family issues
because they are characterized by a gender gap in preferences and are orthogonal to the mainstream
policy dimension. Building on Chapter 5’s discussion of mechanisms, I suggest that women in
leadership and issue salience will be especially important in the context of government actions. To
test this argument I analyze public spending on work-family policies for 22 countries from 1980 to
2011. I find that implementing a quota law leads to greater spending on child care, a policy that
encourages maternal employment, and less spending on family allowances, which tend to discourage
women from returning to paid work. Effects are larger in size in the context of countries with larger
average gender gaps in policy preferences (e.g., France as opposed to Portugal). A matched pair case
study of work-family policy evolution in Portugal and Italy sheds light on the mechanisms linking
quota laws to policy change. The chapter concludes by discussing implications for the broader
welfare state literature and potential extensions of this work.
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6.1 Theoretical Development
The extensive literature on redistribution and social spending points to several key determinants, in-
cluding: inequality (Benabou 1996; Lindert 1996; Milanovic 2000; Moene & Wallerstein 2001), elec-
toral institutions (Austen-Smith 2000; Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti & Rostagno 2002; Persson & Tabellini
2005; Iversen & Soskice 2006; Edwards & Thames 2007), partisanship (Korpi 1983; Esping-Andersen
1990b; Klingemann et al. 1994; Huber & Stephens 2001; Korpi & Palme 2003), and skill specificity
(Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice 2001; Iversen & Soskice 2001). The standard political economy
literature addresses identity only insomuch as it relates to voters and their preferences. Ethnic and
other forms of identity-based cleavage have been explored as potentially important determinants
of policy choice (Roemer 1998; Austen-Smith & Wallerstein 2006; Scheve, Stasavage et al. 2006;
Anesi & Donder 2009). For example, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that racial heterogeneity
can explain much of the gap in welfare spending between the United States and Europe, because
racial divisions distract from the traditionally key class divisions. Huber and Stephens (2000) show
that women’s labor force participation is an important determinant of the expansion of social wel-
fare services, and they argue that this is because women’s employment generates new demand for
services such as caregiving. And Roemer (1998) proposes a model in which, if voters care deeply
about some non-economic issue (like integration or religion), then they may not necessarily support
a party which proposes the most economically rational policy for them. However, these studies do
not apply the same logic to policymakers themselves.
There are good reasons to suspect that the identity of policymakers has important conse-
quences for their choices in office – and, potentially, for policy outcomes. As discussed in Chapter
5, a substantial literature suggests that gender matters to legislative behavior, although the size
of its effect and relative influence, compared to e.g. party ideology, is less clear. For example,
party is typically a larger determinant of roll-call votes than gender in the United States (Welch
1985; Burrell 1994; Vega & Firestone 1995; Shwindt-Bayer & Corbetta 2004), and evidence that
policy promotion translates into outcomes is rare, especially in parliamentary democracies. Rehavi
(2007) finds that female U.S. state legislators invest more in health, but not on other spending areas
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widely associated with women such as education. Conversely, Ferriera and Gyourko (2011) find no
evidence that the gender of U.S. mayors affects city spending outcomes. Other studies link women’s
representation to higher spending on education and child care in Sweden (Svaleryd 2009) and the
environment in Switzerland (Funk & Gathmann 2008).
These studies use micro-level data, most likely because the setup offers methodological
advantages for making causal inferences – e.g., regression discontinuities based on extremely close
elections where a woman opposed a man and ‘just won’. The downside of this is that findings may
not be generalizable to important national level policy outcomes. Few scholars examine the link
between gender identity and policy outcomes across countries. Most quantitative studies of social
spending do not include gender in models of development over time. Still, the few studies that
do find a relationship between women’s representation and spending levels, from overall spending
(Bolzendahl & Brooks 2007; Bolzendahl 2009) to child care (Bonoli & Reber 2010) and defense (Koch
& Fulton 2011). Looking at other types of policy outcomes (besides spending), O’Regan (2000) finds
that higher shares of women in office are associated with stronger employment and wage protection
and equal wage policies. Kittilson (2008) shows that women in parliament significantly influence
the adoption and scope of maternity and child care leave policies. Overall, research on the effect of
women’s representation on policy outcomes is at a relatively early stage compared to the decades of
work on the impact of electoral systems, political parties, and even female labor force participation.
Thus far, no study addresses the relationship between gender quotas and policy outcomes
across countries. The best evidence on the causal effect of quotas on policy outcomes comes from
the case of India. India’s constitution was amended in 1992 to require that one-third of seats at the
local level be randomly reserved for a woman. Research utilizing this natural experiment seems to
confirm the theory that quotas alter policy outcomes: female leaders are more likely to adopt laws
and invest in resources that women favor – specifically, water and roads (Chattopadhyay & Duflo
2003, 2004; Besley, Pande & Rao 2005a; Clots-Figueras 2011). However, this finding has yet to be
replicated in advanced democracies, where women have a different set of policy preferences and the
behavior of individual representatives tends to be more constrained by their parties. For example,
studies of the effects of quota laws in Spain and Italy find no evidence that quotas have a significant
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effect on the size or allocation of local-level government expenditures (Campa 2011; Rigon & Tanzi
2012).
The disparity in these findings may be due to differences between developing and developed
countries, which differ in culture, socio-economic level, and type of political institutions. It is not
clear that we should expect gender to operate in the same way across such divergent socio-political
contexts. Moreover, they focus on different types of affirmative action laws (political reservations,
which require a woman to be elected, versus gender quotas, which require women to be nominated
rather but not necessarily elected), and different political positions (executive positions e.g. local
mayor versus legislative bodies). My research contributes to the emerging identity politics literature
by providing a comparative study of the effects of the same type of measure (national quota law) over
similar units (political parties in advanced democracies). Comparative analysis allows us to explore
whether the effects of quota laws ‘travel’ across political contexts, and how effects are mediated
by political preferences in different societies. The theory of quotas and policy change outlined in
Chapter 2 suggests that quotas will lead to policy change for issues characterized by a gender gap
in preferences, especially if these issues are off the main left-right party dimension. This is the main
relationship I test in quantitative analysis.
How exactly will quotas affect policymaking in the ‘most difficult’ scenario of parliamentary
democracies? My starting point is the same two mechanisms proposed in Chapter 2: increased
numbers of women and rising issue salience. In Chapter 5, I suggested several ways that these
mechanisms could apply to the specific context of intra-party position taking. Here I argue that
the same mechanisms apply within the context of governments, with a few key differences. Figure
6.1 illustrates the causal logic linking quotas to national level policy change. It shows the same
main causal pathways detailed in Chapter 5, but those expected to be particularly important in
the context of government actions are highlighted in bold. These are women in leadership positions
and issue salience. Mechanisms expected to be less important in this context, compared to intra-
party decision-making, are shown in light grey. These are critical mass and women’s sections. As
in Chapter 5, I provide evidence exploring the relative importance of these mechanisms in the
qualitative case study.
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Figure 6.1: Causal Logic Linking Quotas to National Policy Outcomes
First, the role of increased numbers of women (a ‘critical mass’) in parliament is likely
to be minimal. This is because policy in parliamentary democracies typically originates in the
party leadership and the cabinet, rather than the legislature (Laver & Shepsle 1996; Strøm 2000;
Martin 2004). I would expect women’s sections to be less powerful in the context of national level
policy making than intra-party position taking for the same reason. Instead, increased women’s
representation is more likely to influence policy outcomes if it translates into greater numbers of
women in leadership positions, such as party leaders and cabinet members, as well. I focus mainly
on women in the cabinet and party leadership here, because the number of women prime ministers
and presidents is miniscule (Reynolds 1999; Jalalzai 2013). None of the countries that passed a
quota law in my sample has subsequently had a female leader.
Government ministers, in particular, play a crucial role in shaping the policy agenda by de-
termining the form and content of draft legislation within their portfolio area. At the same time, it is
notoriously difficult to assess the relative weight of individual ministers in the development of policy
(Blondel & Müller-Rommel 1993). Individual ministers differ in their ability and desire to shape
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policy beyond their party leaders’ preferences (Indridason & Kam 2005; Dewan & Hortala-Vallve
2011). Alexiadou (2015) finds that certain types of cabinet ministers (‘partisans’ and ‘ideologues’)
are more influential than others (‘loyalists’) in changing social welfare policy. Thus the background
of female ministers and their allocation of ministries is likely to be especially important for this
mechanism.
Second, rising issue salience might trigger policy response at the national level, even among
parties who have already taken ‘women-friendly’ policy positions, such as left parties. In line with
spatial models of party competition, parties might have already shifted their positions to cater to
women voters without a quota law in place. This would explain Chapter 5’s finding that quotas lead
to slightly less change to party positions among left parties compared to right parties. However,
progress on party positions does not necessarily mean that left parties prioritize the issue in office.
If quotas ramp up the importance of women’s policy concerns, party leaders are more likely to move
to get these policies enacted in order to benefit electorally. And once policy attention to these issues
increases, rival parties are likely to respond with policy shifts of their own (Adams & Somer-Topcu
2009; Lindvall & Rueda 2014; Williams, Seki & Whitten 2014).
Following on the movement of women voters from right to left in recent decades, women
are often perceived to be ‘swing voters’ (Norris 1996; Carroll 2006; Campbell 2012b). Parties on the
right, particularly Christian Democrat parties which once counted women as core voters (Inglehart
& Norris 2000; Leonardi & Wertman 1989), might be triggered to compete with the left on women’s
policy concerns if they perceive other parties encroaching on this space. Government actions are
more visible than party positions, and the information and resources generated by these policies
can affect the attitudes and decisions made by individuals in their everyday lives (Esping-Andersen
1990b; Pierson 1993). Quotas could spur a policy feedback effect whereby rising issue salience leads
to policy change, these policy changes create new resources and incentives for women in the public
to lobby for further change, and party elites are more and more likely to prioritize the issues.
This chapter focuses on policies related to maternal employment because it is both or-
thogonal to traditional party lines and characterized by a large gender gap in policy preferences.
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Fortunately national level spending data allow me to analyze policies specifically related to maternal
employment, which was not possible using party-level manifesto data. I expect changes to policies
that either help or hinder women returning to paid work after a quota law is passed. I focus on
three main ‘work-family’ policies: 1) public child care provision and 2) maternity and parental leave,
both of which facilitate maternal employment, and 3) family allowances / child benefits, which tend
to discourage maternal employment.3 Below, I discuss the implications of different work-family
policies for maternal employment and related hypotheses.
A substantial literature links generous public child care policies to the growth of maternal
employment over recent decades (e.g., Lewis 1992; Attanasio, Low & Sanchez-Marcos 2008), and
suggests that child care is a key determinant of cross-country differences in female labor force
participation (Jaumotte 2003; Del Boca 2002; Del Boca et al. 2005). When the state is able to
take on some of the caring responsibilities, mothers have more time to to engage in paid labor.
Some examples of public child care programs are municipal-run crèches collectives in France (public
center-based care, beginning as young as 2 months) and Italy’s scuole dell’infanzia for 3 to 6 year-
olds.
Maternity and parental leave policies have also been correlated with maternal employment,
particularly if they are well-paid and include job protection (Rønsen & Sundström 1996; Bergemann
& Riphahn 2011; Baker & Milligan 2008). Leave policies enable women and men to continue
employment while temporarily giving priority to care responsibilities. For example, Switzerland
offers mothers 14 weeks of maternity leave paid at 80 percent of earnings while in Austria up to 2
years can be taken, paid at various rates. Leave policies can be a double-edged sword; leave that
is too short may not provide women with enough incentive to return to paid work, while leave
that is too long may break women’s ties to the labor market (Baker & Milligan 2008; Dustmann &
Schönberg 2012). Still, most of the literature considers leave policies to be a positive influence on
women’s employment overall. Previous research has found that women in parliament are associated
3A fourth set of policies of interest are measures that enable part-time work, which is more attractive than
full-time work for many mothers of young children (Morgan 2006, p.169). Because comparative data on part-time
working policies is not currently available it is not included in analysis here.
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with longer leave periods, and the assumption is that longer leaves enhance women’s work-family
balance (Kittilson 2008). In line with this I assume that leave policies will facilitate women’s
transition back to paid work. I expect:
Hypothesis 1: Quota laws will lead to more spending on family policies that help mothers
return to paid work; namely, child care and leave policies.
Conversely, quota laws ought to lead to less spending on family policies that discourage
women from returning to paid work, or do not prioritize it. Child benefits and family allowances
enable mothers to stay at home as full-time caregivers, rather than supporting involvement in paid
work. These programs are cash transfers to families with children, with payment levels that can
vary with the age of the child and number of children, and are sometimes means tested. An example
is the allocations familiales in Belgium, which provide monthly payments to the primary caregiver
(typically mothers) up until the child is 18. Family allowances are also sometimes contingent
the family deciding not to use daycare (as in recent legislation in Germany, the so-called ‘stove
premium’). Scholars argue that these types of programs lower incentives for women to work, and so
often foster single-earner patterns that continue to support the male breadwinner model (Gornick,
Meyers & Ross 1997; Gottfried & O’Reilly 2002; Naldini 2004). Thus I expect:
Hypothesis 2: Quota laws will lead to less spending on family policies that do not en-
courage mothers to return to paid work; namely, child benefits and family allowances.
Finally, the size of the gender gap on maternal employment varies across countries. As
previously discussed, women in countries such as Italy and Portugal continue to hold more traditional
views on maternal employment. Accordingly, I expect the impact of quota laws to be conditioned
by the gender gap in policy preferences.
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Hypothesis 3: The size of the effect of quota laws will be greater in countries where the
gender gap in policy preferences is relatively large.
6.2 Data & Methods
To test these hypotheses, I analyze government spending on work-family policies for 22 countries
from 1980 to 2011, using data from the OECD Social Expenditures Database.4 The main inde-
pendent variable is Quota Law, a binary variable that equals 1 when a country has implemented a
gender quota law and 0 otherwise. Ideally, in order to make causal inferences about the effect of a
quota law on policy outcomes, a quota law would be randomly assigned to countries. Given that
this is not possible, a concern is that the effect is not causal and something else such as culture or
attitudes towards women could be determining both adoption of a quota law and policy outcomes.
I cannot fully resolve this problem, but I take several steps to alleviate concerns. First,
I estimate models that include country and year fixed effects. Country fixed effects control for
any country-specific omitted variables (observable and unobservable) that are constant over time, a
potentially large source of omitted variable bias. Year fixed effects deal with group-invariant trends
over time, e.g., global economic conditions. The two-way fixed effects design is a generalization of
the difference-in-differences approach, where countries implementing a quota law are the ‘treated’,
and those that do not are the ‘controls’. The specification compares average policy outcomes post-
quota minus policy outcomes pre-quota in the treated countries to the change in policy outcomes
in the control countries over the same period. Results should be interpreted as within-unit changes,
i.e., the link between quotas and policy change within quota countries.
The critical identifying assumption in this approach is that there are no potential time-
varying confounders that have not been accounted for in the analysis. To deal with this concern I
carefully identify and control for potential confounding variables, factors which could affect both the
probability of quota adoption and policy outcomes. Conditioning on these observed characteristics
4These are the years covered by the OECD Social Expenditures Database as of April 2015.
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helps ensure that the groups being compared are really comparable, and strengthens support for a
causal interpretation of results.
The baseline model with country and year fixed effects can be written as:
Yit = 1Quota Law it + 2Zit + i + t + it
where Yit is the outcome of interest and measures work-family policy spending in country i in the
year t; Quota Law is a dummy variable equal to 1 after the implementation of a quota law and 0
otherwise, and 1 is the coefficient for this main independent variable; Zit represents a vector of
covariates, and 2 the coefficients for these covariates; i and t are country and year fixed effects,
respectively; and it is the error term. Quota Law is lagged by one year to acknowledge the time it
takes to influence spending outcomes, and the other right-hand side variables are lagged by 2 years
because they can be affected by the treatment and may induce post-treatment bias (King & Zeng
2006).
I take several steps to check that findings are not the result of model misspecification.
A well-known problem with using panel data with fixed effects is serially correlated errors. Tests
suggested by Wooldridge (2010) show AR(1) serial correlation is present in the data used here.
To deal with this I follow Beck and Katz (1995) and correct for AR(1) serial correlation in the
residuals by estimating Prais-Winsten regressions with panel-corrected standard errors. Another
concern with fixed effects models is that they tend to produce “false-positive” results at high rates
(Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan 2004b). In order to alleviate this concern I estimate a set of
placebo regressions, which test the research design by examining whether “no effect” is observed
when the date of quota implementation is moved back a number of years. In the following section
I describe the data and relevant covariates.
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Data
I analyze government spending on work-family policies in 22 countries, from 1980 to 2011.5 The
OECD Social Expenditures Database measures overall government expenditures on family services,
and it can be further divided to measure spending on: 1) family allowances; 2) child care and early
childhood education systems, and; 3) maternity, paternity, and parental leave policies. Spending
on family allowances refers to child-related cash transfers to families with children, with payment
levels that in some countries vary with the age of the child, and sometimes are income tested.6
Spending on child care and early childhood education refers to public financial support for families
with children participating in formal daycare services (e.g., creches and daycare centers for children
under 3) and pre-school institutions (including kindergartens and daycare centers which usually
provide an educational content for children ages 3 to 5).7
Lastly, spending on maternity, paternity, and parental leave refers to public income support
payments during periods of maternity, paternity, and parental leave. Maternity and paternity leave
are defined as employment-protected leave of absence for employed mothers and fathers, respectively,
at or around the time of childbirth or adoption in some countries. Parental leave is employment-
protected leave of absence for employed parents, which is often supplementary to specific maternity
and paternity leave periods.8 Data are measured as percent of GDP.9 The mean percent of GDP
devoted to family policies in the sample overall is 1.96. Family allowances constitute most of this
spending (mean = 0.92), followed by child care and early childhood education (mean = 0.49) and
leave policies (mean = 0.24).
5The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great
Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United States.
6“PF1.3: Family cash benefits.” OECD Family Database. 1 Last updated 14/07/2014.
7“PF3.1: Public spending on child care and early education.” OECD Family Database. Last updated 29/07/2013.
8“PF2.1: Key characteristics of parental leave systems.” OECD Family Database. Last updated 01/05/2014.
9Spending-to-GDP ratios are calculated by the OECD using their National Accounts data (where GDP is recorded
for the calendar year). The recording period for social expenditure data is typically the calendar year; in cases where
the financial year recorded differs from the calendar year special adjustments for GDP are made. For full details see
Adema, Fron & Ladaique 2011 p. 100.
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The key independent variable is Quota Law, a binary variable coded 1 for the five countries
which have implemented a quota law (including and after the first election in which the quota was in
operation) and 0 otherwise. Appendix 6A shows summary statistics for all parameters used in the
analysis, and provides details about data sources. To specify the covariates to be used as controls, I
consider how the adoption of quotas is related to established determinants of work-family policies.
The key issue is whether adopting a quota causes parties and governments to change their policy
priorities, or there is something else that both contributes to a quota being adopted and also causes
a shift in spending outcomes. I focus only on time-varying confounders here, because all models
include fixed effects which account for any (observable or unobservable) time-invariant confounders.
I control for five variables potentially linked to both adopting quotas and family policy
outcomes: % Women in Parliament, Female Labor Force Participation, GDP per capita, Left Cab-
inet, Party Quota, and EU Membership. These covariates are familiar to those used in previous
analysis of quotas and party positions, and their potential link to quota adoption is outlined in
detail in Chapter 3. Below I briefly review how they are also related to social policy outcomes.
First, the % Women in Parliament has been linked to increases in spending on child care
and parental leave (Bonoli & Reber 2010; Kittilson 2008). Economic development (measured as GDP
per capita) and associated increases in Female Labor Force Participation are also related to policy
outcomes; for example, as incomes and government revenues increase, demand for public expenditure
should also rise (Wagner’s Law). Workforce participation entitles some women to benefits that they
would otherwise not be eligible for and increases their need for services to help balance work and
family. The variable Left Cabinet controls for the possibility that left-wing parties and governments
push through both quota laws and women’s policy preferences. Left parties have also been linked to a
range of feminist policy outcomes (Huber & Stephens 2000; Mazur 2002; O’Connor 1999). Left power
is operationalized as the share of left cabinet seats rather than parliament seats because previous
research identifies government partisanship as particularly important for social policy outcomes (e.g.,
Huber & Stephens 2000). I include the share of relevant parties with voluntary gender quotas (Party
Quota) to control for concerns that internal party quotas are driving change both to national quota
legislation and policy outcomes for women. I expect that voluntary party quotas could be linked
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to policy outcomes mainly through the indirect mechanism of increased women’s representation.
EU Membership is included as a control for international quota policy diffusion across Europe. EU
membership may lead to convergence on higher family policy spending levels. The EU has issued
directives on maternity and parental leave and advocates targets for child care provision, which
continue to be monitored by the European Commission.10
Additionally I control for a set of standard covariates from the literature on determinants of
social policy spending which are not known to affect quota laws. These are included to increase the
accuracy of model estimates. Union Density is linked to greater political pressure for redistribution
according to power resource theory (e.g., Korpi 1978; Esping-Andersen 1990b), so perhaps we should
expect greater spending on family policies where unions are stronger. Yet, traditionally male-
dominated unions have often been hostile to feminist demands (Gelb 1989). Unions might support
the interests of (male) low wage workers over gender equality in the labor market when the two are
competing (Huber & Stephens 2001; Gelb 1989). Previous research finds that countries with high
unionization are less likely to adopt leave policies (Kittilson 2008). I control for Wage Bargaining
Level because centralized wage bargaining is strongly associated with generous welfare states (Hicks
1999; Swank 2002) and has been linked to gender egalitarian employment policies (O’Connor 1999).
Fertility Rate is included because many family policies are only granted in connection with the birth
of a child. Higher fertility rates suggest a greater need for work-family policy spending. Finally I
include a measure of overall Social Expenditures as a percentage of GDP, because countries that
spend more on social policies might also spend more on family policies as part of this general
commitment.
10See Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on maternity leave; Council Directive 2010/18/EU on
parental leave; and Barcelona Council (2002) targets for child care in the EU.
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6.3 Time Series Analysis of Quotas and Work-Family Policy Spend-
ing
Table 6.1 reports the results showing the effects of quota laws on work-family spending. All models
include country and year fixed effects and (observable) time-varying potential confounders. As
discussed, a fixed effects regression of this form estimates the effect of changes within countries
over time in quota implementation on spending outcomes, while also partialing out any time-based
shocks and trends common to all countries. Model 1 addresses overall spending on work-family
policies, while Models 2, 3, and 4 address spending on family allowances, child care, and parental
leave respectively. Model 3 (child care) includes a dummy variable which equals 1 for years 1998
and greater, because pre-primary education data from the OECD Education Database is included
for the first time in this year.
Providing support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, the estimates suggest that after a quota is
adopted governments spend more on child care and devote a smaller percentage of the budget to
family allowances. No significant association is found between quotas and overall family spending, or
(contrary to Hypothesis 1) spending on parental leave policies. Model 1 addresses overall spending
on family policies. It shows that quota laws are associated with a decrease in family policy spending,
but the link is not statistically significant. Model 2 examines spending on family allowances, and the
coefficient for quota law is negative and statistically significant. Within countries, adopting a quota
law leads to a 0.11 percentage point decrease in spending on family allowances. For example, a
country that spent 1 percent of its GDP on family allowances before a quota law would be expected
to spend 0.89 percent of its GDP on family allowances after a quota law is implemented. Model 3
shows that the opposite is true of child care spending: adopting a quota law is associated with a
.06 percentage point increase in spending on child care policies.
The size of these predicted changes may not seem large, but it is significant. Table 6.2
shows real spending changes from before versus after a quota law in all five countries. Spending
decreases are in italics. For a larger welfare state like France, the quota law translates into the
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Table 6.1: Determinants of Family Policy Spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overall Family Family Child Care Parental Leave Family Child Care
Policy Spending Allowances Allowances
Quota Law(t 1) -0.037  0:114 0:059 -0.004 0.0035 -0.009
(0.059) (0.038) (0.032) (0.012) (0.037) (0.029)
Quota Law(t 1) Preference Gap  0:024 0:015
(0.009) (0.007)
% Women in Parliament(t 2) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
GDP per capita(t 2) 0:004 0:002 -0.001 0:000 0:002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Female Labor Force Part.(t 2) 0.020 -0.008 0.010 -0.005 -0.008 0.010
(0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006)
Left Cabinet(t 2) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000  0:000 0.000
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Party Quota(t 2) -0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Union Density(t 2)  0:013  0:007  0:004 -0.001  0:007  0:004
(0.000) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Wage Bargaining Level(t 2) -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 0.001 -0.009 -0.001
(0.016) (0.011) (0.052) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Fertility Rate(t 2) 0.086 -0.055 0:256 0:091 -0.039 0:248
(0.117) (0.079) (0.048) (0.032) (0.078) (0.047)
EU Membership(t 2)  0:209 -0.031  0:124  0:098 -0.035  0:124
(0.093) (0.051) (0.052) (0.036) (0.050) (0.052)
Social Expenditures(t 2) 0:042 0:029 0.003 0:007 0:028 0.003
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Post-1997 0:426 0:411
(0.093) (0.093)
Constant 0.365 1:365  0:759 -0.207 1:307  0:744
(0.591) (0.447) (0.272) (0.158) (0.441) (0.271)
N 603 639 593 596 639 593
R-squared 0.81 0.66 0.78 0.72 0.67 0.79
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Analysis carried out using the panelAR package for R version 3.2.1. Prais-Winsten regressions, with
panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
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equivalent of $497 more on child care per child per year, and $307 less on family allowances. In a
Mediterranean welfare state like Portugal the size of effects is smaller, at $26 more per child per year
on child care and $131 less on family allowances. However it is worth keeping in mind that Portugal
has a lower baseline of overall spending and a smaller share of that devoted to family policies. For
example, in 2006 Portugal devoted 0.3% of GDP to child care to France’s 1.1%.
Table 6.2: Real Spending Changes in Quota Countries, After – Before Quota Law
Italy Belgium France Spain Portugal
4 Child Care
% GDP -0.02 +0:20 +0:37 +0:10 +0:02
$ per child -$19 +$303 +$497 +$167 +$26
4 Allowances
% GDP -0.03 -0.24 -0.23 +0:04 -0.10
$ per child -$29 -$364 -$307 +$68 -$131
Notes: Spending decreases in italics. Change in share of GDP was calculated by subtracting the share of
GDP spent on each policy in the first year before the quota law from the share spent in the most recent
year for which data is available after a quota law was passed (2011). This was converted to real spending
changes per child using GDP, current PPPs (USD) data from OECD National Accounts, and World Bank
population data.
Quotas shift the composition, but not on the overall size, of work-family policy spending.
This suggests that insofar as the budget is fixed, relative spending priorities favor investing in
child care over family allowances after a quota law. It can be very unpopular and difficult to take
away benefits once they are established (e.g., Pierson 2000). So why would women politicians want
to decrease funding for family allowances? One explanation is that it’s more about prioritizing
child care than reducing allowances. When faced with limited funding or spending cuts, female
politicians might push for child care expansion even if it means cuts to family allowances, which
compose the majority of the work-family policy budget for most countries. For example, in 2013
France announced cuts to its generous system of family allowances along with a goal of 100,000 new
public child care places for children under three by 2017. The socialist Minister for Social Affairs
Marisol Touraine spearheaded the policy changes, which were often discussed together as a tradeoff.
She said in an interview, “A strong family policy today is one that creates child care places. It can
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not be limited only to benefits.”11 I come back to this point in the case study.
Model 4 shows a small negative association between quota laws and spending on leave
policies, but it is not statistically significant. One potential concern with spending data on maternity
and parental leave is that it is difficult to discern what type of leave policy governments are funding
using aggregate spending data. It could be longer periods of low-paid leave, which are arguably bad
for women’s employment, or shorter periods of high-paid leave, which are considered to be positive.
As a check on this problem, I used the same baseline model to estimate the effect of a quota law
on the total number of weeks and the wage replacement levels of maternity and parental leave,
as measured by Gauthier and Bortnik’s Comparative Maternity, Parental and Child Care Leave
and Benefits Database (models not included to save space) (Gauthier & Bortnik 2011). High wage
replacement levels in particular are easy to interpret as beneficial for maternal employment. As in
Model 4, no significant effects were found.
Why do quotas lead to more child care spending but not leave policy spending? One
interpretation might be that, again, it’s about relative priorities given limited budgets. Child care
is a bigger problem for many countries. While most countries have established paid leave policies
(of various lengths), there are still large cross-country differences in the provision of public child
care, especially for children under three (Commission 2013). If the budget, or women’s political
power, is limited they might choose to support child care over other policies.
Several control variables emerge as statistically significant. Higher GDP per capita and
the overall level of social expenditures are both associated with more spending on all work-family
policies except for child care. The higher the birth rate, the greater the spending on child care
and parental leave. Higher levels of unionization are associated with less overall spending on family
policies. Finally, contrary to expectations membership in the EU hinders overall work-family policy
spending, and spending on child care and parental leave.12
11“Touraine : ‘Une politique familiale ne peut se limiter qu’à des allocations’,” Le JDD, 28 October 2014, translated
by Google Translate.
12I also ran models including a control variable for Christian Democrat party power (share of cabinet seats
Christian Democrat, lagged by 2 years), because previous research suggests that religious parties are particularly
likely to influence work-family policies (e.g., Wennemo 1994; Morgan 2006). My main findings do not change.
154
One concern might be that the lagged percentage of women in parliament is not significant,
a result that also appeared in the analysis of party positions in Chapter 5. As previously discussed
this could be a legacy of the fact that quotas are often passed in countries with low levels of women’s
representation. However, women’s representation is also a mechanism in the causal story linking
quotas to outcomes. I further investigate the indirect effect of women’s representation on policy
outcomes in Appendix 6B. The Appendix presents evidence suggesting that, in line with theory, the
effect of a quota law is at least partially mediated by increased numbers of women in office.
Hypothesis 3 suggests that the size of the preference gap between men and women con-
ditions the effect of a quota law, and that we should expect larger changes to policy outcomes in
settings where the preference gap is relatively high. To test this I include the average Preference
Gap as an interaction term with Quota Law. The Preference Gap variable is the same index of
average country-level gender gaps in preferences for maternal employment shown in Figure 2.2 of
Chapter 2. The interaction term tells us whether a quota law is accommodated or hindered in the
context of different attitudes towards maternal employment. Models 5 and 6 (Table 6.1) shows
that the attitudinal context does matter in this sense. The change in spending in response to a
quota law is higher in countries with higher gender gaps. For example, in the regression on family
allowances (Model 5), the coefficient on quota law decreases from -0.07 in a country with a small
(3%) average gender gap in preferences to -0.24 in a country where the gap is much larger (10%).
Similarly in the regression on child care spending (Model 6) the coefficient on quota rises from 0.03
in a country with a 3% average gender gap in preferences (e.g., Portugal) to 0.13 in a country with
a 10% preference gap (e.g., Belgium).13
Figure 6.2 shows predicted spending on family allowances (on the left) and child care (right)
as a function of quota law implementation and average preference gaps between men and women.
At low levels of preference gaps, quota laws make only a small difference to spending outcomes. In
both cases the predicted level of spending is not statistically different from zero when the preference
gap is also zero. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, as the gap in preferences increases the variance in
13Tests of an interaction between quota law and preference gap in the regressions on overall spending (Model 1)
and leave policies (Model 4) were not significant.
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Family Allowances Child Care
Figure 6.2: Predicted Change in Spending Outcomes as a Function of Quota Law and Preference Gap
Notes: Predicted values are based on regression results shown in Models 5 and 6 of Table 6.1. The units on the
x-axis represent the average size of the gender gap in preferences towards maternal employment (all positive val-
ues showing that women are more in favor), and the units on the y-axis represent percentage point change in spending.
spending outcomes across countries also rises.
Finally, do the specific rules of quota laws – enforcement mechanisms, thresholds, and
placement mandates – affect the relationship between quotas and policy change? While Chapter 4
finds that all three legal provisions are associated with the election of greater numbers of women, re-
sults from Chapter 5 suggest little support for a link between quota rules and party position change.
The only provision linked to significantly larger effects on policy positions was strict enforcement
mechanisms. This casts doubt on a priori reasons to expect some types of quotas to have larger
impacts on spending, and so I explore the differences empirically in Appendix 6C. The Appendix
suggests no consistent evidence that stronger quota rules make a difference to national level policy
outcomes. However, I note that the relatively small sample size of national-level data available –
particularly when we split quota laws into different types – could impede statistical significance,
especially if effects are not very large or occur over time. Future research using more observations
over longer periods of time after a quota law has been in place could shed more light on this question.
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Robustness Checks
One concern with fixed effects models is that serial correlation in the dependent variable makes them
more likely to produce ‘false-positive’ results (Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan 2004b). Therefore, in
addition to using an AR(1) process to control for autocorrelation in all models presented, I estimate
a set of placebo regressions where the independent variable is a fake quota law, implemented some
years prior to the date of the actual quota law. Since these laws are fictitious, ‘no effect’ ought to be
observed. If the fake law is statistically significant, the main results from the actual quota laws are
likely to be spurious. If the placebo tests are not signficant, they provide additional support for the
theory that it is the quota law, and not underlying differences among countries or some proximate
event, that is responsible for changes in spending levels.
I use ten years prior to the actual quota implementation as the fake law implementation
date. For example, a quota law was implemented in France from 2002 to 2011, so the placebo quota
indicator will equal 1 from 1992 to 2001, and 0 otherwise. I run the placebo regressions for significant
results, spending on family allowances and child care. Table 6.3 displays the results, which show
small and statistically insignificant relationships between the fake quota law and policy outcomes
in both models. These ‘no effect’ results are what we expect. I also ran placebo regressions where
the date of the quota law was moved back by five and three years, respectively, and obtained the
same null results (not shown to save space). The results suggest no evidence that estimated effects
are an artifact of the fixed effects design, or that effects are driven by something idiosyncratic to
this particular set of countries. Instead, effects are only observed after the quota law has been
implemented. The lack of a systematic association between the fake quota law and policy outcomes
is consistent with the causal interpretation of the main results.
According to my argument, quota laws should only affect spending on issues over which
women and men disagree. To test this theory I run another set of placebo regressions on spending
in areas not characterized by a significant gender gap in preferences. The issues with the smallest
gender gaps in preferences are education spending and the government’s responsibility to provide
a living standard for the elderly, financial help to university students, and health care for the sick
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Table 6.3: Placebo Test of Significant Results
(1) (2)
Family Child Care
Allowances
Fake Quota Law(t 1) -0.013 0.021
(0.029) (0.026)
% Women in Parliament(t 2) 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
GDP per capita(t 2) 0:002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
Female Labor Force Part.(t 2) -0.007 0.009
(0.009) (0.006)
Left Cabinet(t 2) -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Party Quota(t 2) 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Union Density(t 2)  0:008 -0.003
(0.003) (0.001)
Wage Bargaining Level(t 2) -0.009 -0.001
(0.010) (0.006)
Fertility Rate(t 2) -0.053 0.254
(0.079) (0.047)
EU Membership(t 2) -0.033 -0.118
(0.051) (0.052)
Social Expenditures(t 2) 0:027 0.003
(0.006) (0.004)
Post-1997 0.444
(0.092)
Constant 1.362  0:748
(0.455) (0.272)
N 639 593
R-squared 0.64 0.77
Country fixed effects Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Notes: Analysis carried out using the panelAR package for R version 3.2.1. Prais-Winsten regressions, with
panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
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(see Figure 2.2, Chapter 2). The majority of both men and women support spending / intervention
on these issues, and differences are typically not statistically significant. However, the last of these
(health care for the sick) is difficult to interpret given the large gender gap that exists on whether the
government should spend more money on health care. Because of this, I focus on public expenditure
on Old Age Benefits and Education here.14
Models 1 and 2 of Table 6.4 report the results from models regressing public spending on old
age benefits and education on quota laws. EU Membership is not included in Model 2 (Education)
because there is not enough variation in the time period covered (1998 to 2010). Model 1 (Old
Age Benefits) includes data from 1980 to 2011, like the main models shown in Table 6.1. Providing
additional support for my argument, estimates show no significant association between quotas and
spending in these areas. When male and female political preferences are virtually indistinguishable,
as in old age benefits or spending on education, quota laws do not matter to spending outcomes.
14Both variables measure public expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Old Age Benefits includes standard and early
retirement pensions, and in-kind benefits including residential care and home-help services, while Education includes
public expenditure on all levels except for pre-primary education. Data come from the OECD via the Comparative
Welfare States Dataset 2014 (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2014).
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Table 6.4: Placebo Tests for Other Issue Areas
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Old Age Education Overall Health Care
Benefits Social Policies
Quota Law(t 1) -0.081 -0.051 -0.231 -0.097
(0.154) (0.076) (0.274) (0.105)
% Women in Parliament(t 2)  0:025 0.011 -0.018  0:015
(0.010) (0.009) (0.021) (0.007)
GDP per capita(t 2) -0.003 0:005 -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Female Labor Force Part.(t 2)  0:093 0:116 -0.051 -0.027
(0.033) (0.047) (0.069) (0.021)
Left Cabinet(t 2) 0:001 0.000 0:002 0:001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Party Quota(t 2) 0.001 -0.002 -0..001  0:002
0.002 (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Union Density(t 2) 0.005 -0.019 -0.001  0:025
(0.009) (0.015) (0.019) (0.006)
Wage Bargaining Level(t 2) -0.016 -0.053 -0.003 -0.038
(0.035) (0.032) (0.068) (0.028)
Fertility Rate(t 2)  0:577 -0.024 -0.159 0.324
(0.296) (0.393) (0.685) ()0.213
EU Membership(t 2) 0.097 -0.159 -0.161
(0.176) (0.439) (0.139)
Social Expenditures(t 2) 0:135 0:080 0:045
(0.026) (0.026) (0.018)
Constant 6.736 -2.348 13.838 4.898
(1.753) (2.010) (3.257) (1.044)
N 603 224 651 601
R-squared 0.79 0.95 0.82 0.76
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Analysis carried out using the panelAR package for R version 3.2.1. Prais-Winsten regressions, with
panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
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The theory also suggests that quota laws should be especially important for shifting or-
thogonal policies, those not aligned with the main left-right dimension in politics. To test this
theory I run another set of regressions on spending in areas that are characterized by a gender gap
in preferences, but also fall within the main the main left-right policy dimension. The dependent
variables are public spending on Overall Social Policies and Health Care.15 These represent the
policy areas with the next-largest gender gap in preferences, after maternal employment (see Figure
2.2, Chapter 2). Left-wing parties typically attach more importance to spending in these areas, and
right-wing parties less (see Table 2.1, Chapter 2). Overall Social Policies also corresponds well to
the party-level variable Welfare State Expansion from Chapter 5, which is associated with significant
increases after a quota law.
Models 3 and 4 of Table 6.4 report the results from models regressing public spending
on social policies and health care on quota laws. The estimates show no significant link between
quotas and spending in these areas, providing additional evidence to support the credibility of the
theoretical framework proposed in this book. Yet, this result is somewhat surprising given the fact
that quotas are associated with an increase in party attention to welfare state expansion (Chapter
5). There are a couple of ways to interpret these results. First, it could be that quotas are effective
at shifting only orthogonal issues, on which parties have not yet staked a claim. Perhaps the
party-level results from Chapter 5 are driven by change on coverage of work-family issues. It is not
possible to know for sure because the data do not allow us to distinguish between types of policies
within the category of welfare state expansion. However the case study of Belgium and Austria
does suggest that work-family policies in particular became a priority after a quota law, at least
for far right parties. Another option is that quotas, and added numbers of women in parliament,
could shift policies even on mainstream party issues like overall spending and health care, but it
takes more time for shifts in party positions to translate into spending outcomes when parties are
already committed to positions.
15Both variables measure public expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Overall Social Policies measures total public
social expenditure, while Health Care includes public expenditure on health care, both cash and in-kind benefits. Data
come from the OECD via the Comparative Welfare States Dataset 2014 (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2014).
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Taken together, the models strongly support the importance of a quota law as one way
of facilitating congruence between women’s policy preferences and outcomes. The implementation
of a quota law is a statistically significant determinant of greater spending on child care, and less
spending on family allowances. The fact that effects are different for different types of family policies
is strong evidence that results are not driven by some broader process that increases both spending
and adopting quotas simultaneously. The regression analysis also shows that the strength of a
quota law is influenced by the specific cultural context. Greater rates of policy change are found in
countries where the gap between women and men’s preferences on maternal employment is larger.
6.4 Causal Mechanisms: A Case Study of Portugal and Italy
The regression analysis suggests that quota laws are associated with changes in work-family policies
in the direction of women’s interests, but it cannot tell us why. This section investigates the mech-
anisms linking quotas to policy change, giving empirical findings greater plausibility and deepening
our understanding of quotas’ political influence. As discussed earlier in the chapter, two potential
mechanisms could explain how quota laws lead to policy change. First, added numbers of women
have more leverage within the party to negotiate and shift policies towards their collective pref-
erences, especially if they reach positions of leadership such as the cabinet. Second, regardless of
the number of women, the priorities of party leadership shift towards women’s preferences due to
growing public support for quotas and associated gender-related issues.
To investigate the relative importance of these mechanisms, I focus on the countries of
Portugal and Italy. This is one of two ‘most similar’ matched pair case studies conducted for the
sake of this book project. Chapter 5 utilizes the other matched pair, Belgium and Austria, to
investigate the impact of quotas on party-level position taking (see Chapter 3 for details about case
selection). In future work I plan to expand these case studies, using evidence from both matched
pairs to assess arguments about the impact of quota laws on party positions and policy outcomes.
For now I note that the case of Portugal is of particular interest because it implemented a quota law
very recently (2009). This allows me good access to politicians, party members, and activists who
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have been active in politics over the recent time period. Portugal and Italy are also characterized
by relatively small gender gaps in policy preferences on maternal employment, making it a ‘most
difficult’ test for my argument (Gerring 2007).
To understand how work-family policies changed before and after a quota law was im-
plemented in Portugal but not Italy, I use interviews with over thirty past and current members
of parliament and government, party members, and political activists conducted from November
2013 to April 2014. I deliberately chose interview subjects that could offer the best evidence about
policymaking, such as party leaders, cabinet members, and politicians and activists with a track
record on work-family policies. I also analyze parliamentary debates, official party and government
documents, and newspaper coverage from before and after the quota law was in place.16
The public in Portugal and Italy have similarly conservative views on maternal employ-
ment, and a relatively small gender gap in preferences on the issue. According to the 2008 European
Values Study, 26.3% of Italian women disagreed that a preschool child with a working mother suffers,
compared to 23.7% of men (a gap of 2.6%). In Portugal 31.9% of women disagree compared to 28.7%
of men (gap of 3.2%). These gender gaps tend to increase at higher education and socio-economic
levels; e.g., the gap rises to 7% in Portugal for those with at least some university education (see
Figure 2.4, Chapter 2). Both countries were facing severe effects of the global economic crisis from
2008 onwards, including mandatory spending cuts in social policies. Yet, the two countries crafted
very different solutions to work-family policy change. Overall, in line with the main findings from
regression models, Portugal invested more in child care and cut spending on family allowances while
Italy did the opposite. Table 6.5 summarizes key policy changes to family allowances and child care
since a quota law was passed in Portugal (2009), with spending cuts in italics.
Portugal embarked upon a major program to build 400 new public child care facilities
for children aged 0 to 3 and increased investment in the non-profit institutions (called IPSS) that
run most day-care facilities. In 2009 state social support for IPSS rose to 1.2 billion euros, an
increase of nearly 20% compared to 2008. Despite austerity measures requiring a reduction in
16Portuguese documents were translated using Google Translate. Italian documents were translated by the author.
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Table 6.5: Summary of Family Policy Changes 2009 – 2015, Italy and Portugal
Family Allowances Child Care
Italy Increase family allowances, extend to Cut funding to regions for child care
self-employed (2009 onwards) (2009 onwards)
Lump sum grant for low-income families (2009) Child care voucher (2013 onwards),
Lump sum birth grant for baby products (2009) capped at 20m per year
Lump sum birth grant of 960 euro (2015 - 2017)
Portugal Increase family allowances by 25% for lowest Program to build 400 new centers (2009 - 2011)
income families, 20% for single Increase funding for third sector providers
parents (2009) (2009 onwards)
Eliminate 25% increase for lowest income Universal right to preschool age 5+ (2009)
families (2010 onwards) Universal right to preschool age 4+ (2015)
Cut allowances for top two income groups
(2010 onwards)
public expenditures from 2010, this investment continued to increase year on year. Finally, the
parliament passed legislation guaranteeing a place for all children as young as 4 in preschool. In
Italy child care is handled by the regions, with the central government providing funding. Since
2008 governments severely cut regional transfers for social policies. The National Fund for Social
Policies, the fund for regional social policies including child care, was cut from 656 million euros
in 2008 to 179 million euros in 2011 – a decrease of 73 percent. The cuts have continued in recent
years, with funding falling as low as 11 million euros in 2012 before rebounding slightly to 258
million euros in 2014. One exception to the Italian trend toward less spending on child care is the
child care voucher introduced by Monti’s government in 2013. However, its impact is likely to be
small because funds are capped at 20 million euros per year.17 Overall, since the crisis Portugal has
increased spending on child care while Italy has made deep cuts.
Turning to family allowances, Portugal initially increased spending by 25% for the lowest
income families and 20% for single parents. However in 2010, the 25% ‘bonus’ for low-income families
was eliminated, as were all family allowances for the top two income categories – roughly 30% of
beneficiaries. These cuts were estimated to save 250 million euros per year.18 No major reforms have
been made in this area since 2010, despite the right – who opposed the cuts – coming to power. Italy,
17Legge 92/2012: Disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una prospettiva di crescita.
18“Cortes no abono de família atingem 1,4 milhões de beneficiários,” Economico, 01/10/2010.
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conversely, increased family allowances and extended them to self-employed individuals, provided
a one-time lump sum bonus of up to 1000 euro for low-income families (2009), and provided a
lump sum birth grant to help with the cost of diapers and formula (2009). Throughout the many
leadership changes in Italian government since 2008, funding for family allowances has remained
intact. In April of 2014, Prime Minister Renzi confirmed that ‘we will not touch family allowances’.19
In addition, Renzi announced a new birth grant of 960 euro per year for three years for low-income
families who have a child between 2015 and 2017. What explains these two countries’ very different
approaches to work-family policies in the context of major budgetary constraints?
The first proposed mechanism linking quotas to policy change is women in parliament. My
argument suggests additional numbers of women could impact policy in three main ways: a ‘critical
mass’, women’s sections, or – what I suggest is the most probable – reaching positions of leadership.
The quota law did result in an increase in the share of women in Portugal’s Assembleia da República
– from 21% before the law to 27% after. Many of the politicians I spoke to believed that having
significantly more women in office has influenced policies. For example PS MEP Ana Gomes says,
“Since there is a critical mass, it’s made a difference. Some [issues] more than others, but, definitely
it has made a difference. And it has brought many more women into helping determine policy, and
therefore bringing their perspective, and being more visible as well.”20
On the right, PSD MP Monica Ferro confirms, “Now you actually have women in par-
liament, and you have women pushing for certain number of public policies that I wouldn’t call a
gender agenda, but women have been pushing certain areas that I think you wouldn’t have the same
momentum if you didn’t have them.”21 However, there is little evidence that increased numbers of
women (a critical mass) influenced work-family policy decisions through activity in the parliament.
The changes that were made to spending were largely done via ‘decree laws’, which are issued by
the government and do not go through parliament (Leston-Bandeira 2001).22
19“Renzi accelera sul taglio dell’Irpef ‘E non toccheremo assegni familiari’.” La Stampa, 14/4/2014.
20Ana Gomes, personal interview, 6 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
21Monica Ferro, personal interview, 5 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
22The two exceptions are the 2009 law guaranteeing universal access to preschool from the age of 5, a government
bill which was approved by the majority in parliament (the PS, along with other left parties), and the 2015 law
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Perhaps increased numbers of women strengthen the power of organized women’s sections
within parties. The PS is the only party in Portugal to have such a group, and they have not focused
on work-family policies in recent times. In the years leading up to 2009 their main issues were: 1)
the quota law, 2) a referendum on liberalizing abortion, and 3) a gender evaluation for all legisla-
tion (‘gender mainstreaming’). Since the law has been in place, the group has continued to focus
on increasing women’s political participation, including extending the quota law to management
positions in the civil service and the boards of state enterprises.23 They have also argued strongly
for the spirit of the quota law to apply to the government as well. Right after the first election with
a quota law in place, women within the PS women’s section publicly urged the Prime Minister to
choose a more femininine government. The President of the PS women’s section Manuela Augusto
was quoted in a prominent national newspaper saying, “An increase in the number of ministers
is the logical step after the parity law."24 Feminist activist and PS women’s section member Ana
Coucello explains the motivation behind the lobbying: “ I thought it was stupid to keep on knocking
at the doors of ministers who were men and asking things like it was favors. It wasn’t favors, it was
rights.”25
It seems that their campaign worked; the share of women in the cabinet more than doubled,
from 12% to 29%, despite the fact that the same party and Prime Minister remained in power before
and after the election. While the women’s section did not lobby for work-family policies, they were
influential in pushing for more women in positions of power who can make those decisions. This
suggests that the mechanism of more women in parliament might not be easily separated into
distinct categories. Did more women in the cabinet make a difference? For work-family policies it is
particularly important to have a woman at the healm of the labor and social affairs portfolio – and
amending this to guarantee a place to children as young as 4. The 2015 law was proposed by a group of center-
right (PSD and CDS-PP) deputies and was approved unanimously. A large share of the bill’s sponsors (36%) were
women, but the spokesperson for the bill in the parliamentary debate was the male PSD parliamentary leader Luis
Montenegro.
23Sónia Fertuzinhos, personal interview, 22 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal; “Mulheres socialistas querem pari-
dade no poder local,” Publico, 3 June 2005; “Mulheres socialistas querem mais igualdade,” Correio de Manhã, 2
December 2009.
24“Mulheres do PS querem um governo mais feminino,” Diario de Noticias, 19 October 2009.
25Ana Coucello, personal interview, 3 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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this was the case after the quota law. Helena André was appointed Minister of Labor and Social
Solidarity in 2009. In 2011, with the change of government from left to right, the share of women
in the cabinet fell to 17%, and this key ministry shifted back to a man.
How influential were André and other female ministers appointed after the quota law?
One way to determine how influential ministers are likely to be is to consider their background
(Alexiadou 2015). As an independent with technical expertise in her field (a former union leader
and academic), André would likely have the will and capacity to promote policies that address issues
of particular concern to her. One of these was reconciling work and family life, a topic she addressed
from the trade union perspective since 1999.26
Another way of gaining leverage on this question is to look at whether policy enacted in
this period goes above and beyond what is formally stated in the PS government program. Both
the 2005 electoral manifesto and the 2009 government program call for additional investment in
child care facilities and third-sector providers of child care. The party did not shift its position in
these areas. Instead, the timing of policy implementation suggests that child care became a priority
especially after the quota law was implemented in 2009, despite the fact that the country was facing
major budget cuts. Minister André’s explanation of why the party continued to invest in child care
despite the constraints imposed by the financial crisis was that it allowed women to better reconcile
work and family responsibilities. In a June 2010 speech she says:
All this investment has enabled us to fill a deficiency, structural in our country, of
places available in social facilities. . . This bet, as a measure to support families, not
only enhances your quality of life, it promotes the reconciliation of personal, family and
professional life, and it has allowed the integration of a large number of women in the
labor market.27
Minister André was likely a key ally in prioritizing child care, but not the whole story. The
second theorized mechanism linking quotas to policy change is an increase in the overall salience of
26“A Igualdade de Oportunidades: Um Desafio para o Século XXI Perspectiva da Confederação Europeia de
Sindicatos,” Sociedade e Trabalho, 6, p.57-66.
27Intervention in the international seminar “Challenge indifference: gender, equality and social inclusion,” Lisbon,
25 June 2010.
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gender issues. The idea is that the debate about the quota law, and the rising public awareness of
women’s political issues, spurs party leaders to prioritize issues that women prefer. Indeed, Prime
Minister Sócrates made child care a particular priority, stressing the importance of expanding the
network of child care centers in public speeches and personally inaugurating multiple nurseries and
kindergardens. He went so far as to call investment in child care the ‘great but silent reform’ of his
administration.28 According to former minister Augusto Santos Silva the context of the quota law
was relevant for these decisions. He recalls that after the quota law party priorities shifted:
The improvement of things associated not with the stereotype but with the real familial
life and conciliation between private life and work, like kindergardens and improvement
of elementary and preschools, all this social policy was indeed very influenced by this
new affiliation of the [PS] party to gender-related issues.29
The feeling that gender-related issues increased in priority is shared by politicians across
parties. Two-thirds of the politicians and activists I interviewed believed that the quota law had
made a difference to policies, but not just because there were more women in office. As PS MEP
Ana Gomes explains, the law created new gender awareness, not just for women but for men as
well: “And let me tell you that our law is quite weak because the penalty that the parties pay
is quite weak, but it was more the pressure, the political pressure, the sense that they would be
singled out by the media and by other politicians if they would not minimally respect it.” The PSD
(conservative) Minister Teresa Morais claims that this pressure has influenced the political agenda,
“we have a bigger sense now of human rights, gender equality, and domestic violence, and I think
that this new sensibility is a result of the law at least partly.”30
It is notable that work-family policy changes persist after the government changed from
left to right in 2011; the quota wasn’t meaningful for left parties only. Right parties have not
increased family allowances, despite having been against cuts at the time. In fact political actors on
the right have started to explain decisions on work-family policies with specific reference to maternal
employment. For example in a debate in parliament on March 1, 2012, PSD MP Nilza Sena says:
28“Sócrates elogia ‘reforma silenciosa’ nas creches,” Economico, 31 August 2010.
29Augusto Santos Silva, personal interview, 12 November 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
30Teresa Morais, personal interview, 2 December 2013, Lisbon, Portugal.
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It is not only through family allowances that we can support families! It is urgent
to rethink the family and rethink it in the light of what are the new families, the
dual career couple model. . . This Government has already begun to do so with the
increase of 20,000 places in nurseries, taking advantage of facilities that were until then
underutilized.
Note that spending priorities are discussed as a tradeoff between family allowances and child care, as
in the earlier example of France. Again, the goal does not seem to be decreasing family allowances.
Instead, the priority is ‘modernizing’ the system by investing in child care, even if it means less
spending on family allowances. This shift in the direction of positions on the right is worth further
investigation in order to tease out the key variables and incentives driving change. It could be
attributable to the views of added numbers of women in the party, a normative shift in the mindsets
of party leaders, or a policy feedback effect whereby the PS’ investment in child care created new
resources and incentives for women to lobby for change.
What was the role of these potential mechanisms in the shadow case of Italy? First,
despite having no quota law, there was a large increase in the numbers of women in office during
this period with the election of a center-left alliance in 2013. The share of women in parliament
rose from 21% to 31%. Prime Minister Letta also appointed more women than ever before (32%)
to his 2013 cabinet, and this increased to 50% in Renzi’s 2014 center-left cabinet. However, there is
little evidence that these demographic changes have translated into women successfully organizing
for change within parties. This may be because much of the increase in women in parliament came
from the Five Star Movement, a new anti-establishment party with little party discipline and thus
little power to exert influence over policy making. The representation of women in right parties
remains low.
Within the main left wing party, women in office do believe that maternal employment
and child care are important – yet there has been little movement on these issues. For example, PD
Senator Valeria Fedeli says, “It is clear that women show a greater interest in concrete, daily-life
concerns. This is mainly due to the unequal, stereotype-based burden-sharing in Italian households,
in which women are the primary carers, which makes it all the more urgent to address the problem
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of services to families.”31 She goes on to lament that today the women’s section in her party is not
very strong. This perceived lack of power is shared by the former Minister Elsa Fornero, who said,
“It is true that women, those women in parliament, have different, let’s say objectives. They are
more often involved in social policies. . . but my impression was that they were sort of second role,
not first role. So the critical decisions were not taken by women but by men.”32 That said, many
women were hopeful that Renzi’s gender-balanced cabinet could yet bring real policy change in the
direction of women’s interests.
The issue salience explanation also receives little support. Unlike in Portugal, there has
been no great emphasis on the need to support women’s employment. One exception was the 2014
cross-departmental working group formed by the Minister of Labor to address the issue of work-
family conciliation. One of its three main areas of focus was child care facilities for children aged
0 to 3. However the working group did not survive the change in government in 2014. Deputy
Minister of Labor Cecilia Guerra, who served on the working group, is cautiously optimistic about
future change in this area. “The Renzi government has promised that not long from now there will
be a proposal. We’ll see. . . we are not done yet with this question. We must do more here,” she
says.33
Explanations for policy changes in Portugal emphasize women’s employment and recon-
ciliation between work and family. In Italy, parties stress the need to increase families’ economic
resources and combat declining birth rates instead. For example, the one-time bonus for low-income
families was designed to “support the purchasing power of families” (Pichetto Fratin (Pdl), Report
of the Senate hearing no. 132, January 26, 2009). The Ministry of Labor published a white paper
in 2009 that clearly places fertility at the heart of family policies, rather than women’s employment.
It blames Italy’s low birth rate for low productivity, but does not see women’s employment or child
care as a solution to the problem:
31Valeria Fedeli, email correspondence, 14 May 2014.
32Elsa Fornero, personal interview, 27 March 2014, Rome, Italy.
33Cecilia Guerra, personal interview, 9 April 2014, Rome, Italy.
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The gap between the desire for motherhood and its realization is often attributed to the
lack of child care or low rates of female employment. This may be true only partially.
If you look at the percentage of births in the regions with the largest number of high-
quality child care centers, there is no significant difference in the number of births. Even
women’s employment does not seem a decisive element.34
The case of Italy is worth revisiting in the coming years, because, as mentioned in the Introduction,
a quota provision was included in the 2015 electoral reform. From 2016 all parties are required to
include 50% women on their party lists. This could provide a useful context for testing whether
salience of women’s issues in politics increases after the law. Particularly if the share of women in
government remains high, allowing us to hold this constant, this case could shed further light on
the relative import of issue salience compared to increased numbers of women.
In summary, the evidence suggests that the main mechanisms linking quotas to work-family
policy change in Portugal were women’s added leverage within the party, particularly within the
women’s section of the PS, and an overall increase in the salience of women’s interests. Contrary
to initial hypotheses, the women’s section was able to utilize the quota law successfully to secure
significant change – a large increase in the number of women in the cabinet. The quota law also
gave parties new incentives to address gender-related issues, a mandate that parties in Italy lacked.
At the same time, there does not seem to be as sharp of a distinction between the increase of women
elected and the behavior of party leaders as the theory presented in Figure 6.1 suggests. Female
ministers, and notably Minister of Labor Helena André, likely played a role in prioritizing child
care, but it is difficult to discern how much of the policy change was driven by women in leadership
positions. Instead, it seems likely that quotas shift dynamics within the party in two ways: 1)
providing women with leverage to push the party and hold leaders accountable for its positions, and
2) making party leaders more responsive to gender equality claims.
Finally, it is worth noting the relatively short period of time since a quota law was im-
plemented in Portugal (six years). Other mechanisms might prove important over the long term.
As women gain experience in office and build relationships they might be able to push for policy
change in the parliament successfully. And as the numbers of women in parliament grow, the pool
34“La vita buona nella societa attivà,” Ministero del Lavoro, della Salute e della Politiche Sociali 2009, p. 24-25.
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of female candidates for cabinet positions will also naturally increase over time. Lastly, more and
more women are likely to utilize child care services in Portugal following the increased investment
in public care, and these women could form a strong lobby in support of further advancements,
driving additional policy change (feedback effects).
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has explored the effect of quota laws on work-family policies in advanced democracies.
It finds that quota laws lead to more spending on child care and less on family allowances, changes
that are in line with women’s greater preferences for maternal employment. The size of these effects
is larger in countries with larger gaps in preferences (e.g., France), but still significant even for
countries with relatively small gaps (e.g., Portugal). These policy changes are important in their
own right, but also have implications for broader social welfare outcomes. There is much room for
future research looking at related micro-level outcomes, where we may see trade-offs emerging. For
example, are lower-income women better off, given quotas reduce spending on family allowances
and child care provision is likely to still be limited? What about children? Maternal employment
has been shown to be one of the main safeguards against child poverty (Lichter & Eggebeen 1994),
but this assumes a high quality of care results from public investment.
Quota laws are often viewed with derision, as artificial and even undemocratic mechanisms
of altering the composition of policymaking bodies. The results presented here suggest that quotas
cannot be dismissed so easily. Even in the ‘most difficult’ institutional context of parliamentary
democracies, quota laws lead to change in the direction of women’s aggregate preferences – and thus
increase democratic responsiveness. However, the story is not as simple as a direct link between
women’s descriptive and substantive representation, at least not in the short term. Instead, case
studies suggest that quota laws are effective due to both increased leverage of women in the party
and a new public awareness of gender issues that leads parties to prioritize women’s concerns. The
findings add evidence suggesting that gender-related public policies could have their own effects on
public attitudes, political elites, and the subsequent policymaking process (Pierson 1993; Campbell
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2003). As Besley (2005b) has argued, political selection and the institutions that shape it deserve
greater attention in the field of political economy. While the focus here has been gender, quotas
also exist for other dimensions of identity such as ethnicity. There is much room for further studies
along these lines.
The findings also point to fruitful new directions for models of welfare state development.
The theory presented here suggests that mechanisms aimed at more equal representation like quotas
are especially likely to shift outcomes on issues which are: 1) characterized by a gap in preferences
bewteen disadvantaged and dominant groups and 2) orthogonal to the main left-right party dimen-
sion. This framework can be used to identify and test other potential outcomes of interest – not
only for women but for other identity groups as well. One promising issue area is violence against
women, which is both relatively new to the political agenda and characterized by a gender gap in
preferences, with women preferring to see tougher laws.35 Another example could be reparations for
slavery in the U.S., which is not clearly partisan and characterized by significant gaps along racial
lines, with Black Americans vastly more supportive.36
A recent public debate about reparations is illustrative. In an opinion piece expressing his
disappointment with the failure of the left to address racial issues like reparations, writer Ta-Nehisi
Coates describes this as the ‘class first’ approach. Coates expresses frustration that Democratic
hopeful Bernie Sanders opposes reparations as ‘too divisive’, claiming that candidates must look
outside the mainsteam (class-based) party orthodoxy in order to make progress on racial equality.37
The dynamics Coates describes fit well with the book’s theory of political market failure: a significant
group interest that is not being addressed by mainstream parties, partially because it would split
constituencies (black and white, here within the Democratic party). Future research might look for
examples of quotas, affirmative action, or other mechanisms to increase the representation of ethnic
minority groups in order to explore impacts beyond gender.
35Eurobarometer 73.2: Humanitarian Aid, Domestic Violence Against Women, and Mental Well-Being, February-
March 2010.
36YouGov: Overwhelming Opposition to Reparations for Slavery and Jim Crow, May 23 - 27, 2014.
37Coates, Ta-Nehisi. “Why Precisely Is Bernie Sanders Against Reparations?” The Atlantic, 19 January 2016.
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7 | Conclusions
This book started with stories about gender quota law debates in countries around the world:
France, Poland, Ireland, Italy, and Venezuela. These accounts illustrate that arguments linking
identity to policymaking are mainstream. But this is just the tip of the iceberg. In the past year
alone, gender quota laws have been proposed in the parliaments or electoral commissions of Scotland,
Luxembourg, Georgia, and Malawi. A research report on gender inequality in the U.K. also called
for a gender quota law, spurring some prominent women MPs to agree with the proposal, although
it has not been debated in parliament.1 Although they are less popular than gender quotas, quotas
for ethnic minority groups exist in at least 28 countries (Bird 2014).
Looking beyond gender and ethnicity, there have been very few openly out LGBT rep-
resentatives in national parliaments. Reynolds (2013) counts only 151 in the past 35 years, in a
sample of 96 countries. Yet, evidence shows that LGBT representatives are correlated with advances
in gay rights in their countries, states, and towns (Haider-Markel 2010; Reynolds 2013). The first
report on the representation of transgender candidates and elected officials came out in 2015 (Casey
& Re 2015). It finds that there are only twenty transgender individuals currently in office, and
none of these at the national level. The report calls for greater presence of transgender people in
public office in order to “give the community an authentic voice in political decision-making” (p.
3). The increasing recognition of the political under-representation of identity groups underscores
the importance of answering the central questions that I have pursued in this book: when and how
politician identity influences the policymaking process.
1“LSE study calls for gender quotas to place women in positions of power,” The Guardian, 12 October 2015.
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7.1 Summarizing the Argument
The main argument of this book is that quotas resolve an inefficiency in the electoral market,
whereby out-groups such as women are disadvantaged. Women face high barriers to entry in politics,
due to both comparative lack of resources and bias in candidate selection procedures. This matters
because politicians tend to be biased towards their own interests. The under-representation of
women is especially detrimental to substantive representation when women’s policy demands are
orthogonal to the main left-right (class-based) policy dimension. This is because existing parties
have little incentive to represent new policy concerns if they split core constituencies or detract from
known (‘owned’) policy positions. In this scenario, disadvantaged groups face a ‘political market
failure’: traditional parties will avoid addressing the cross-cutting issue, and forming a new party is
not a feasible option. Using survey data, I show that the largest gender gap in advanced democracies
exists over the issue of maternal employment, and that the gap cuts across partisan identities.
The imposition of quotas corrects this market failure by increasing the likelihood that
the preferences of disadvantaged groups will be represented. After a quota law, we should expect
to see policy change in the direction of women’s preferences, especially for orthogonal issues like
work-family policies. I propose two main mechanisms linking quotas to policy change in advanced
democracies. They both heavily weight the importance of intra-party decision-making, given the
strong role of parties in most of these countries. The first is that after a quota law, added numbers
of women have more leverage to push the party towards their collective preferences. The second is
that quotas lead to the increased salience of gender-related issues, and this cues party leaders to
better represent women’s preferences – either to gain electoral advantage or because leaders shift
their views about the normative value of balanced representation.
After showing that quota laws are one of the most important determinants of women’s
descriptive representation, I examine their effects on policy outcomes. I look at two critical stages
of the policymaking process, political party positions and public spending outcomes. Confirming
hypotheses, I find that quotas laws increase party attention to women’s preferences in the manifesto.
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Gender quota laws increase coverage of welfare state expansion – an issue women prefer more
spending on compared to men – but are not linked to change in policy positions not characterized
by a gender gap, such as environmental protection. The results hold up to several robustness
checks, including ignoring time series information to address concerns about serially correlated
errors and removing parties responsible for proposing quota laws to address endogeneity concerns.
Interestingly, the size of effects is slightly larger among right parties, many of which did not support
the law. This suggests that quotas could have the potential to more drastically alter the ideology
of right parties compared to the left, which often devote significant attention to women’s issues
already. Former Prime Minister of Australia Julia Gillard recently said that the conservative side of
politics will always lag behind without a quota or target.2 She was referring to numbers of women
in the party, but perhaps the sentiment applies to the representation of women’s policy interests as
well.
I then demonstrate that quotas also shift government actions in the direction of women’s
interests. Using public spending data I am able to explore the impacts of quotas on spending on
specific social policies, which is not possible for party positions given current manifesto data coding.
Specifically, this lets me test whether quotas matter especially for orthogonal issues like work-family
policies. I find that implementing a quota law increases spending on child care, which encourages
maternal employment, and decreases spending on family allowances, which tend to discourage ma-
ternal employment. The strength of a quota law is influenced by the specific cultural context, with
larger policy shifts seen in countries where the gap between women and men’s preferences on ma-
ternal employment is also larger. The findings hold up to several robustness checks, including a set
of placebo regressions which test the research design by examining whether “no effect” is observed
when the date of quota implementation is moved back by a number of years. In another set of
placebo tests I find no evidence of change to spending in areas where men and women tend to have
similar policy preferences (old age benefits and education) or where issues fall within the bounds of
the mainstream, left-right policy dimension (overall social spending and health care).
2“Julia Gillard Debunks Gender Roles in Politics,” The Australian, 12 November 2015.
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Evidence from qualitative case studies sheds light on the mechanisms linking quota laws to
policy change. Not surprisingly for parliamentary democracies, the role of women in the parliament
– for example, proposing legislation – is minimal. Instead, findings suggest that women in leadership
positions can shift policies towards their preferences at early stages of the process (party position
taking). Yet when it comes to prioritizing these issues in office, changes are driven by male party
elites. Quotas raise gender equality to the national stage, cueing party leaders to respond or risk
losing voter support. Still, my research does not support a sharp distinction between the number
of women and behavior of party leaders. Instead, quotas shift party-internal dynamics, including
providing women with leverage to monitor and hold the party accountable for its positions, especially
if they are organized in women’s sections.
7.2 Contributions
The book’s findings are important for three main reasons. First, gender quotas are increasingly
popular. Until now, we knew very little about their policy effects. In line with quota advocates,
such as those quoted at the beginning of this book, this study confirms that quota laws can be
an effective tool to increase the substantive representation of women’s interests. Quotas lead to a
more inclusive democracy in this sense, and they are arguably more politically relevant than other
‘sticky’ factors that might empower women like culture or electoral system change. More broadly,
the results add to mounting evidence suggesting that politician identity matters, even in the context
of parliamentary democracies.
This book provides new insights into when identity is most likely to matter, and how women
and other disadvantaged groups can influence policies. Descriptive representation is particularly
important for those issues that are off the main left-right dimension in politics, because parties
have little incentive to address cross-cutting demands that may split their constituencies. Up until
now, most of the literature on identity and policies has come from majoritarian settings. This book
expands the scope to parliamentary democracies, a context where individual politicians are typically
assumed to have very little policymaking power. Drawing on the literature on intra-party politics,
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I show that there are several ways that increased numbers of women can work within existing
power structures to shift party priorities and government actions. But this is not the whole story.
Gendered institutions like quotas can also have important effects on political outcomes in their own
right by raising the salience of gender-related issues and cueing party leaders to priorize them.
Second, the adoption of quota laws has practical policy implications, and the effects are
not limited to women. Work-family policies are important for everyone. Overall spending on family
issues is relatively low in advanced democracies. However it is on the rise, unlike many other social
policies which are seeing stagnating or declining spending (Morgan 2013). As attitudes towards
gender roles in society are changing with younger generations, and more women enter the workforce
in developing countries, these policies will only become more critical. Maternal employment is also
linked to other outcomes we care about like children’s well-being. There is much room for future
work exploring the extent to which public spending increases associated with a quota law translate
into improved welfare outcomes for women and children. An important element of any such research
agenda must involve understanding how these policy shifts impact lower income and ethnic minority
groups. Quotas tend to lead to the election of white, highly educated women (Hughes 2011), and
it is important to recognize that there could be important ‘within group’ preferences that majority
group women are not representing.
Finally, the theoretical framework proposed is broad enough to apply to the representation
of other disadvantaged groups. It can help explain why certain policy demands of other groups
such as LGBT people, immigrants, and labor market ‘outsiders’ are likely to be under-represented,
and determine whether mechanisms to increase their representation in office might help. Some
examples of disadvantaged group demands that fall under the category of orthogonal to the left-
right dimension are: women’s support for tougher laws on violence against women, labor market
outsiders’ preferences for active and passive labor market policies, Black Americans’ support for
reparations, and, potentially, LGBT preferences for enhanced gay rights. These issues are likely
to see increased policy attention with increasing descriptive representation of the relevant identity
group. However, policy demands that fall squarely within the mainstream policy space are less
likely to shift with added numbers of these groups in office. For example, immigrants prefer less
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restrictionist immigration policies, but partisanship is also a strong predictor of preferences on this
issue (Scheve & Slaughter 2001). Immigrants might find allies with left parties, who are more likely
to have similar preferences, but they also face strong opposition from the right that is increasingly
spilling over to the left as well (Alonso & da Fonseca 2012). Because parties have already staked
out positions in this area, increasing immigrant representation is less likely to shift policies. There
is much room for further thought experiments and studies along these lines.
7.3 Questions for Future Research
This book explains some important puzzles, but it also raises further research questions yet to be
answered in the field of identity and politics. I discuss three of them briefly here: the effects of
quotas on other types of representation, the role of women in leadership as a mechanism, and effects
in other social and political contexts.
Substantive representation is only one way of measuring the effects of quotas and politician
identity in politics. The key outcome variables I use – party positions and government spending –
focus on the content and priority of different policy issues. Another way of looking at substantive
representation is to consider how women affect the style of political decision-making. It has been
claimed that women are more consensual in their approach to politics (Kathlene 1994; Rosenthal
1998; Childs 2004b) and more broadly the work environment (Eagly & Johnson 1990; Niederle &
Vesterlund 2008; McKinsey 2008). For example, women in the U.S. Senate were widely credited
with finding a bipartisan compromise to end the 2013 government shutdown.3 Studies have also
suggested that increasing the numbers of women in a group makes not just women, but everyone
in the group more inclusive and cooperative (Mendelberg, Karpowitz & Goedert 2013), and that
greater diversity can have positive effects on the stability and performance of the group (Cederman,
Wimmer & Min 2010; Wucherpfennig et al. 2012; Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader 2003; Ararat, Aksu
& Tansel Cetin 2010). Other studies suggest the opposite in terms of financial performance, for
gender quotas for corporate boards in particular. Research from Scandinavia finds that quotas
3“Senate Women Lead in Effort to Find Accord,” The New York Times, 14 October 2013.
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led to a decline in firm performance, at least in the short term (Matsa & Miller 2010; Ahern &
Dittmar 2012). More research is needed in order to determine how quotas, and the abrupt entry of
women, affects the style of political decision-making, and – probably relatedly – the stability and
performance of parliaments.
Another line of research investigates the role of quotas in furthering women’s symbolic
representation. The presence of women in parliaments could increase public awareness and attitudes
related to gender equality, raise women’s political engagement and partipation, and encourage young
women to aspire to political careers (a ‘role model’ effect). It is hard to tease out the causal direction
between attitudes and women in office, so the semi-exogenous implementation of a quota offers some
useful leverage. The best evidence we have on the symbolic impacts of a gender quota comes from
India, where Beaman et al. (2008) show that quotas reduce discrimination against female leaders
among men. The qualitative evidence presented in this book suggests that elites perceive public
opinion shifts after a quota law, but such a shift is not measured directly. Survey evidence comparing
attitudes towards women in politics, and women’s political engagement and participation, before
and after a quota law would help answer these questions.
We also know very little about whether quotas increase voter turnout, partially because
most countries do not report turnout by gender.4 Evidence from the local level in Italy suggests
that quotas can increase both turnout (especially for women) (De Paola, Scoppa & De Benedetto
2014) and the number of women running in future elections, once the quota is taken away (De Paola,
Scoppa & Lombardo 2010). Research from India also finds that districts which previously had a
quota in place elect more women (Bhavnani 2009). However in this Indian case it seems much of
the effect is driven by women who had actually benefited from the quota, whereas in Italy effects
are not driven by female incumbency. Further studies using national level and comparative data,
if it is possible to collect, would help determine whether quotas can encourage women’s political
engagement and ambition.
A second promising area for future research is the role of women in leadership positions as
4See IPU’s Voter turnout 1945-1999: A global survey, Appendix – Voter turnout by gender, available from:
http://www.idea.int/vt/survey/
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mechanism for policy change. In many of my fieldwork interviews, politicians told me that quotas
for women in parliament weren’t enough. In order to make a real difference in policymaking, more
women are needed in government roles where the crucial decisions are made. The case studies in
this book suggest that women reaching positions of leadership within the party (Belgium), and in
the cabinet (Portugal) played a role in shifting or implementing policy positions. But the relative
influence of women in positions of power like the cabinet compared to party leaders is unclear. We
also know very little about how robust the link between quotas and women in leadership positions is,
including whether this relationship holds across countries or increases over time. The ‘glass ceiling’
for women has been well-documented. Are quotas for parliamentary seats enough to make progress
on this? Future studies might assess whether quotas lead to more women in party leadership and
cabinet positions, particularly portfolio positions related to gendered issue areas. The second stage
will be to explore whether, and how, more women in leadership roles are associated with social
policy outcomes.
Finally, this book focuses on advanced democracies primarily because the underlying theory
is based on the existence of gender differences in policy preferences, which are well-established in
advanced democracies. My work illustrates that the largest gender gaps in advanced democracies
exist on the issue of maternal employment, where women are more supportive than men by nearly
10 percentage points. But we do not know how gender gaps in advanced democracies compare to
the rest of the world, where quotas are also common. There is a surprising lack of data on gender –
and other social group – differences in preferences across countries and over time. Questions about
individual policy preferences are included in many cross-national surveys, but analysis of gender
gaps on specific policy issues is rare.5 What issues do men and women disagree on in other parts
of the world? How has this changed over time? Future research in this area could help us map the
potential implications of quotas and other mechanisms that shape political selection worldwide.
It will also be important to consider how different political institutions could moderate the
effects of quotas in other parts of the world. This book looks at quotas within parliamentary or semi-
5One exception is Gottlieb et al. (N.d.), who analyze gender gaps in Africa. They find gender differences in
preferences are small, but significant for poverty and water related issues in particular.
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presidential systems with strong parties. Looking outside advanced, parliamentary democracies can
help us answer questions about whether quotas, and politician identity, lead to greater policy effects
under certain institutional conditions. Perhaps quota laws, and increased numbers of women, will be
even more successful at changing outcomes in majoritarian systems, where individual representatives
from the governing party and opposition have more power to propose bills and affect the agenda
directly.
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Appendix
Appendix 4A: Description of data on political party gender quotas
Table A.1 presents a list of all political parties in 22 advanced democracies that have used a gender
quota provision for elections to the national parliament. A party is coded as having a voluntary party
quota if the party adopted a measure aiming for a certain percentage of women in the candidates for
national level political office. Often these provisions are included in party statutes or other official
party documents, although this is not always the case, and having a formal, written rule was not
a requirement for a party to be coded as having a gender quota provision in this data. The year
the quota was adopted is noted, as well as the percentage required, and the formal rule specifying
a quota provision where relevant. Note that for the sake of this book the party quota variable is
operationalized as the share of political parties with voluntary gender quota provisions, weighted
by the parties’ share of seats in parliament. Information about the quota size is thus not included
in the measure.
Data were initially collected from secondary literature, typically single case studies of the
relevant country. For those parties which were documented as currently having a quota provision
in place, I then consulted party statutes and other relevant party documents (such as the party
constitution or electoral rules) to confirm that the quota is still in place and that the size of the
quota is correct. Where there were discrepancies among different data sources, I contacted the
political party directly whenever possible. Sources are listed by country following Table A.1.
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Table A.1: Political Parties with Gender Quota Provisions
Country Party Year
Adopted
Quota
Size
Formal Rule
Australia Australian Labor Party (ALP) 1994 35%
2002 40% Rule 10, Constitution (2014)
Austria Greens 1986 50% Article 7.3, Party Statutes (2011)
Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) 1986 25%
1993 40% Article 16.2, Party Statutes (2012)
Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) 1995 30%
Belgium Flemish Liberals (VLD) 1985 – 1993 20%1
French Christian Democrats (PSC /
CdH)
1986 33% Article 14, Party Statutes (2002)
Flemish Greens (Agalev / Groen) 1991 50% Article 20, Party Statutes (2011)
Flemish Social Democrats (SP / Sp.a) 1992 25%
2000 50% Article 55.1, Party Statutes (2002)
Flemish Christian Democrats (CVP /
CD&V)
1993 50%2 General Assembly Instructions3
French Greens (Ecolo) 2000 50% Article 40, Party Statutes (2013)
French Social Democrats (PS) 2000 50% Article 1.4.1, Party Statutes (2012)
Canada Liberal Party 1993 25%
2008 33%4
New Democratic Party (NDP) 1993 50% Federal nomination rules (2013)
Denmark Socialist People’s Party (SF) 1988 –
19905
40%
Finland none
Germany The Greens 1983 50% Article 11.5, Party Statutes (2012)
Social Democratic Party (SPD) 1988 25%
1990 33%
1994 40% Article 8.2, Party Statutes (2011)
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)
/ The Left Party
1990 50% Article 10.5, Party Statutes (2013)
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 1996 33% Article C.5, Party Statutes (2012)
Great Britain Labour Party 1997, 2005,
2010
NA6
Greece none
Iceland Women’s List 1983 –
19987
100%
The Social Democratic Alliance 1999 40% Article 5.5, Party Selection Rules
(2013)
Left-Green Movement 1999 50%
Progressive Party 2005 40%
Ireland none
Italy Democratic Party (DS / PD) 1991 40%
Continued on next page
1The Flemish Liberals’ quota was cancelled when the party changed name and statutes (Meier 2004).
2The Flemish Christian Democrats decided on a gradual plan to reach 50% by using the following formula: x percent +
(50 percent – x percent)/2, where x is the percentage of women on the lists at the previous election (Meier 2004).
3For each election, the General Assembly of the Flemish Christian Democrats approves a set of instructions for the commit-
tees who will form the candidate lists. The most recent instructions include a requirement for equal representation of women
and men.
4The Liberal Party’s targets for women are not included in formal rules. They have been set under the leadership of Jean
Chretien (starting with 1993 election), Paul Martin (elections of 2004 and 2006), Stephane Dion (federal election of 2008, and
note that Dion increased the target to 1/3) and Micheal Ignatieff (election of 2011).
5The Danish Socialist People’s party abandoned candidate quotas for the federal parliament in 1990.
6Women were to be selected for 50% of winnable seats (40% in 2010), in a policy known as ‘all women shortlists’.
7The Women’s List was a feminist and all-female party in Iceland that existed until 1998, when it disbanded and merged
with other political parties.
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Country Party Year
Adopted
Quota
Size
Formal Rule
2008 50% Article 9.7, Party Statutes (2013)
Communist Party (PCI) 1987 –
19918
40%
Communist Refoundation Party
(PRC)
1991 40% Article 67.1, Party Statutes (2011)
Japan none
Luxembourg Christian People’s Party (CSV) 2002 33% Article 82, Party Statutes (2001)
The Greens 1983 50% Article 32.4, Party Statutes (2013)
The Left 2009 50%
The Netherlands Labour (PvdA) 1987 25%
1992 33%
T998 50% Article 9.3, Party Statutes (2013)
GreenLeft 1994 50%
New Zealand none
Norway Socialist Left Party (SV) 1975 40% Article 3.2, Party Statutes (2013)
Labour Party (A/Ap) 1983 40%
2005 50% Article 8.10, Party Statutes (2013)
Center Party (Sp) 1985 40% Article 5.A, Party Statutes (2013)
Christian People’s Party (KrF) 1993 40% Article 11, Party Statutes (2009)
Liberal Party (V) 2000 40%
Portugal Socialist Party (PS) 1999 25% Article 16.12, Party Statutes (2012)
Left Bloc (BE) 1999 33% Article 19.5, Party Statutes (2012)
Spain Party of Catalan Socialists (PSC) 1982 12%
1987 15%
1990 25%
1996 30%
2000 40% Article 28, Party Statutes (2011)
Communist Party (PCE) 1987 25% Article 4.1, Party Statutes (2013)
Socialist Party (PSOE) 1988 25%
1994 30%
1997 40% Article 11.1.k, Party Statutes (2012)
United Left (IU) 1990 35%
1997 40% Article VII, Party Statutes (2012)
Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) 2000 NA
2007 40% Appendix, Party Statutes (2012)
Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV) 1991 30%
2002 40% Article 75, Party Statutes (2013)
Galician Nationalist Block (BNG) 1998 40% Article 12.1, Party Statutes (2013)
Canarian Coalition (CC) 2000 40% Article 18, Party Statutes (2008)
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) 2004 40% Article 3, Party Statutes (2011)
Sweden The Green Party 1987 40%
1997 50% Article 17.1, Party Statutes (2012)
The Left Party (V) 1987 NA9
1990 40%
1993 50% Article 21, Party Statutes (2014)
The Social Democratic Party (SAP) 1987 40%
1990 50% Election Rule 3, Party Statutes (2013)
Switzerland Social Democratic Party (SP) 1986 33%
1992 40%
2000 50% Article 4, Party Statutes (2012)
United States none
8In 1991 the Communist Party of Italy evolved into the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), with more radical party
members forming the Communist Refoundation Party.
9From 1987 to 1999 the policy of Sweden’s Left Party was that the percentage of women in the lists should be the same as
the percentage of women in the constituency.
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List of Sources for Party Quotas Data
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Curtin, Jennifer, and Kelly Sexton. 2004. “Selecting and electing women to the House of
Representatives: Progress at last?." Australasian Political Studies Association Conference,
Political Science Department, University of Adelaide. Vol. 29.
Austria
Bischof, Gunter, and Anton Pelinka and Erika Thurner. 1998. Women in Austria:
Contemporary Austrian Studies, Vol. 6. Transaction Publishers.
Good, David F., Margarete Gradner, and Mary J. Maynes, eds. 1996. Austrian women in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries: cross-disciplinary perspectives. Vol. 1. Berghahn books.
Köpl, R. 2005. “Gendering political representation: debates and controversies in Austria,” in
Lovenduski, J. et al (eds) State Feminism and Political Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 20-40.
Belgium
Buijis, Nathalie, Cabinet of the President of the Senate, Sabine de Bethune. Email
correspondence (re. quotas within the Flemish Christian Democrat party). January 30, 2014.
Huyghe, Tinneke, Coordinator, Women & Society (Flemish Christian Democrats). Email
correspondence. February 25, 2014.
Meier, Petra. “The Mutual Contagion Effect of Legal and Party Quotas A Belgian
Perspective." Party Politics 10.5 (2004): 583-600.
Canada
Godwin, Matthew. “Awaiting the watershed: women in Canada’s Parliament." Canadian
parliamentary review 33.2 (2010): 32-37.
Matland, Richard E., and Donley T. Studlar. 1996. “The contagion of women candidates in
single-member district and proportional representation electoral systems: Canada and
Norway." The Journal of Politics 58.03: 707-733.
Pynenburg, Mary, President of the National Women’s Liberal Commission. Email
correspondence. February 3, 2014.
Reid, Jordan. NDP National Organizer responsible for candidates and nominations. Email
correspondence. February 5, 2014.
Denmark
Freidenvall, Lenita, Drude Dahlerup, and Hege Skjeie. 2006. "An incremental model." Women,
Quotas and Politics 10: 55.
Henig, Simon. 2002. Women and political power: Europe since 1945. Routledge.
Finland
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Great Britain
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Science, Stockholm University, 2004.
Greece
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Verge, Tánia, Professor, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Email correspondence. January 28, 2014.
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Freidenvall, Lenita, Drude Dahlerup, and Hege Skjeie. 2006. "An incremental model." Women,
Quotas and Politics 10: 55.
187
Kristjánsson, Svanur. 2002. Iceland: from party rule to pluralist political society.
QuotaProject.org: Global Database of Quotas for Women. International IDEA,
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm University. Accessed January 2014.
Ireland
Buckley, Fiona, Yvonne Galligan, and Claire McGing. “ ‘Someday Girls, Someday’: Legislating
for Gender Quotas in the Republic of Ireland." Available at SSRN 2236481 (2013).
Italy
Caul, M. 2001. “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A
Cross–National Analysis.” Journal of Politics 63: 1214-1229.
Guadagnini, Marila. "Gendering the debate on political representation in Italy: a difficult
challenge." State Feminism and Political Representation (2005): 130-152.
Japan
QuotaProject.org: Global Database of Quotas for Women. International IDEA,
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm University. Accessed January 2014.
Luxembourg
Dahlerup, Drude, ed. Women, quotas and politics. Routledge, 2013.
Krook, M. L. ; Lovenduski, J. Squires, J. 2006. “Western Europe, North America, Australia
and New Zealand: Gender quotas in the context of citizenship models” Women, Quotas and
Politics. Taylor Francis US: 194.
Muller, Marion. Parliamentary Attache, Dei Greng. Email correspondence. 11 – 12 February
2014.
Pfister, Rene and Christoph Schult. “Gender Quota Debate: ’We Have to Rethink Our Entire
Social Model.” ’ Spiegel Interview: March 27, 2012.
QuotaProject.org: Global Database of Quotas for Women. International IDEA,
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm University. Accessed January 2014.
The Netherlands
Gamri, Attiya. MP, PvdA party. Email correspondence. 6 February 2014.
Henig, Simon. 2002. Women and political power: Europe since 1945. Routledge.
QuotaProject.org: Global Database of Quotas for Women. International IDEA,
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm University. Accessed January 2014.
New Zealand
Dahlerup, Drude, ed. Women, quotas and politics. Routledge, 2013.
QuotaProject.org: Global Database of Quotas for Women. International IDEA,
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm University. Accessed January 2014.
188
Norway
Almenning, Kjartan. Head of Organization, Liberal Party. Email correspondence. 24 – 25
February 2014.
Dahlerup, D. Freidenvall, L. 2005. “Quotas as a ‘fast track’ to equal representation for women:
Why Scandinavia is no longer the model.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 7: 26-48.
Engelstad, Fredrik, and Mari Teigen, eds. 2012. Firms, Boards and Gender Quotas:
Comparative Perspectives. Vol. 29. Emerald Group Publishing.
Freidenvall, Lenita, Drude Dahlerup, and Hege Skjeie. 2006. "An incremental model." Women,
Quotas and Politics 10: 55.
Henig, Simon. 2002. Women and political power: Europe since 1945. Routledge.
QuotaProject.org: Global Database of Quotas for Women. International IDEA,
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm University. Accessed January 2014.
Portugal
Baum, Michael, and Ana Espirito-Santo. “Portugal’s quota-parity law: an analysis of its
adoption." West European Politics 35.2 (2012): 319-342.
Fazenda, Luis, Left Bloc MP. Email correspondence. January 29, 2014.
Monteiro, Rosa. “The Quota Policy in Portugal: The Role of Political Parties and State
Feminism. RCCS Annual Review." (2012).
Spain
Verge, Tánia. 2012. “Institutionalising gender equality in Spain: from party quotas to electoral
gender quotas." West European Politics 35.2: 395-414.
Verge, Tánia, Professor, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Email Correspondence. Jan 27 – 29, 2014.
Sweden
Freidenvall, L. Institutionen, S. 2003. “Women’s Political Representation and Gender Quotas:
The Swedish Case.” Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, Stockholm.
Switzerland
QuotaProject.org: Global Database of Quotas for Women. International IDEA,
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm University. Accessed January 2014.
Berger, Barbara, General Secretary of SP Frauen. Email Correspondence. Jan 30, 2014.
United States
QuotaProject.org: Global Database of Quotas for Women. International IDEA,
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Stockholm University. Accessed January 2014.
189
Appendix 4B: Summary statistics for Chapter 4
Table A.2: Summary Statistics, 21 Countries
Variable M SD Min Max N Data source
Percentage of women in parliament 18.9 12.17 0 47.3 190 CWS 2014
Quota law 0.04 0.20 0 1 190 Own data
Party quota 18.38 24.70 0 90.16 190 Own data (Appendix 4A)
Female share of labor force 42.09 4.44 27.93 48.08 190 OECD
GDP per capita (year 2000 dollars) 29,478 10,345 8,892 65,088 190 World Bank
Left party power 0.44 0.18 0.03 1 190 CMP
Programmatic parties 0.70 0.51 0 2 190 Iversen & Rosenbluth 2008
Women’s movements 1.78 1.08 0 3 190 Htun & Weldon 2012
EU membership 0.47 0.50 0 1 190 EU 2015
Notes: CWS 2014 is the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, February 2014 version (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2014); OECD
is the OECD ALFS summary tables (female annual labor force divided by total annual labor force), http://stats.oecd.org/;
World Bank is the World Bank Development Indicators (Group 1978); CMP is the Comparative Manifesto Project (Vokens
et al. 2012); EU 2015 is the list of EU member states available from the European Union, http://europa.eu (2015).
Left party power is the percentage of seats held by left parties, where left parties are those categorized
as ecology, communist, or social democratic parties.
Programmatic Parties is an additive variable combining electoral district size and pooling of votes.
Women’s movements is coded on a scale of 0 – 3, where 0 indicates no feminist women’s movement
and 3 a strong, autonomous feminist women’s movement. It is an additive variable combining Htun
and Weldon’s (2012) ‘strength’ (0 – 2) and ‘autonomy’ (0 – 1) measures.
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Appendix 4C: Technical details of analysis using synthetic control
methods, Chapter 4
I construct synthetic control countries for Italy, Belgium, France, Portugal, and Spain using the
Synth package for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011). The synthetic control countries are
constructed as a weighted average of potential control countries, with weights chosen so that the
resulting synthetic control country best replicates the values of predictors of female representation
in the treated country before the quota law was passed. To produce the synthetic control countries
I use predictor variables that are found to be highly significant in the previous regression analysis,
namely: GDP, women’s labor force participation, programmatic parties, and party quotas. These
variables are augmented by including the average percentage of women in parliament over several
pre-treatment time periods. Other countries that pass a quota law during the same time period are
dropped from the potential control donor pool. I also drop countries that are missing data during
the relevant time period, as the method requires a balanced panel.
Note that because countries have elections at different times, time units are constructed
using elections rather than years. For each treated country I identify the election immediately before
a quota law was implemented (i.e., the quota law was passed by the government resulting from that
election) and code it (t=5), and then order the elections before and after t=1, 2, etc. I follow the
same procedure for all potential control countries, where the last election before a quota law was
implemented in the treated country is coded t=5 and previous and subsequent elections are ordered
accordingly. I repeat this procedure for each ‘treated’ (quota) country.
Table A.3 compares the pretreatment characteristics of the actual ‘treated’ (quota) coun-
tries with their synthetic versions, as well as the average of all potential controls in the donor pool
for each country. We see that particularly for the pre-treatment average percentage of women in
parliament variables, the synthetic control country provides a more suitable control than the av-
erage of all potential control countries, for every case shown. Prior to adopting a quota law, the
percentage of women in parliament was lower in the countries that passed a quota law than in
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the average of control countries, in every case. Compared to the average of all potential control
countries, the synthetic control countries are able to better reproduce the values for the share of
women in parliament prior to the passage of a quota law.
The synthetic control countries do not necessarily provide a closer fit to the real country
for the other predictor variables included in matching (GDP per capita, programmatic parties, etc.).
In fact, this turns out not to matter in terms of predicting the share of women in parliament. The
synthetic control method is implemented by choosing a value V among all positive definite and
diagonal matrices to minimize the mean squared prediction error of the percentage of women in
parliament in the ‘treated’ country during the pre-quota period (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller
2011). The resulting value of the diagonal element for all other variables except for the previous
percentage of women in parliament variables turns out to be zero, or very close to zero, in most cases.
This means that given the other variables included (lagged measures of the outcome variable) these
other determinants have little substantial power predicting the percentage of women in parliament
before a quota law is implemented. I experimented with a wide set of possible predictor variables,
including instances where I included fewer lagged measures of women’s representation and in turn
got better matches for other predictor variables, but this did not change the results substantively.1
Table A.4 shows the weights of each control country composing each synthetic country.
We see that France contributes 18%, Japan contributes 61%, and Sweden contributes 21% to the
synthetic Italy; a zero weight is assigned to all the other control regions. Synthetic Belgium is
composed of 71% Japan, 14% Denmark, 5% Australia, and small percentages of other countries.
Synthetic France is made up of 89% Japan and 11% Finland. Synthetic Portugal is composed of
33% Australia, 27% Luxembourg, 24% United States, 16% Great Britain, and 1% New Zealand.
Finally synthetic Spain is made up of 57% Great Britain, 27% Sweden, and 17% Austria.
1Including fewer pre-treatment measures of women’s representation (i.e. using one variable to measure the
average percentage of women in parliament over the whole pre-treatment time period, rather than several variables
that measure it over several pre-treatment time periods) did not achieve as good of a fit on pre-treatment measures
of the outcome variable for some countries, although several of the other predictor variables, e.g. female labor force
participation or programmatic parties, achieved better matches between synthetic and control countries. However the
results in terms of post-treatment trends did not change significantly. Because the goal is to to construct a synthetic
control unit as similar as possible to each of the treated units on pre-treatment values of the outcome variable for
the elections preceding the quota law’s passage, I chose to include multiple lagged measures of the outcome variable.
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Table A.4: Country weights used in constructing synthetic control countries
Italy Belgium France Portugal Spain
Country Weight Weight Weight Weight Weight
Australia 0 0.05 0 0.33 NA
Austria 0 0 0 0 0.17
Canada 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0 0.14 0 0 NA
Finland 0 0 0.11 0 NA
France 0.18 NA NA NA NA
Japan 0.61 0.71 0.89 NA NA
Luxembourg NA 0 0 0.27 0
Netherlands 0 0 0 NA NA
New Zealand 0 0.01 0 0.01 NA
Norway 0 0 0 0 0
Portugal 0 0.02 0 NA NA
Spain 0 0.01 NA NA NA
Sweden 0.21 00.03 0 0 0.27
Switzerland NA 0 NA NA NA
Great Britain NA 0.01 0 0.16 0.57
United States 0 0 0 0.24 0
Notes: ‘NA’ indicates countries not included in the potential control country donor poll for that analysis. Countries were not
included either because data were not available for the full time period of comparison, or the country passed a gender quota
law during the time period of comparison. For example, because Belgium was the first to pass a quota law it is excluded from
the donor pool of potential control countries for France and Portugal. Synthetic control countries were identified using Synth
for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011).
In order to assess the robustness of the results (presented in the main text), I follow Abadie,
Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) and others in running placebo studies (Abadie & Gardeazabal
2003; Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2010; Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan 2004b). The placebo
studies answer the question of how often I would obtain results of this magnitude if I had chosen a
country at random for the analysis instead of the ‘treated’ (quota) country. I apply the synthetic
control method to countries that did not pass a quota law during the sample period, for each quota
country and associated period studied.2 If the placebo studies create increases in magnitude similar
to the ones estimated in the countries that passed a quota law, then the analysis would not provide
significant evidence of a positive effect of a quota law on the percentage of women in parliament. If
the placebo studies show that the increase estimated is relatively large compared to the change in
countries that did not pass a quota law, then conversely the analysis shows significant evidence of
a positive effect of quota laws on the percentage of women in parliament.
Figure A.1 shows the results of the placebo tests for each country. (Recall that the case
2The placebo tests are done by iteratively applying the synthetic control method to every other country in the
control donor pool, for each ‘treated’ (quota) country. For more, see Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010).
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of Spain was dropped after the synthetic control method was unable to achieve a good fit of pre-
treatment trends.) The gray lines represent the change associated with each of the control country
placebo tests, i.e. the difference in the percentage of women in parliament between each country
in the donor pool and its synthetic version. The dark black line shows the increase in women
in parliament estimated for the ‘treated’ (quota) country. As the figures show, the estimated
increase for the quota countries is unusually large relative to the distribution of change in women
in parliament for the other countries in the donor pool in most cases, but especially for Belgium.
The positive effect for Belgium is the highest of all countries in its sample, and because the figure
includes 17 countries, the probability of estimating an increase of this magnitude under a random
permutation of the intervention is 6% (1/17) – a test level close to the 5% often used in conventional
tests of statistical significance.
Turning to France, the positive effect is large relative to most other countries, but not the
largest. Of the 14 countries included, 1 other shows at least as large of a positive effect as France,
making the probability of estimating an increase of this magnitude randomly 14%. Considering
Portugal, as in Belgium the positive effect observed is higher than all control countries except for
one, and because the analysis includes 11 countries the probability of estimating an increase of this
magnitude randomly is 18%. Finally considering Italy, the positive effect observed is higher than 8
out of 14 countries, making the probability of estimating an increase of this magnitude randomly
42%.
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Figure A.1: Differences in percentage of women in parliament in ‘treated’ (quota) countries and differences
in placebo test countries
Notes: All analyses were carried out using Synth for R (Abadie, Diamond & Hainmueller 2011).
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Appendix 5A: Summary Statistics for Chapter 5
Table A.5: Summary Statistics, 22 Countries
Variable M SD Min Max N Data source
Welfare state expansion 7.62 6.09 0 58.33 1225 MARPOR 2013
Environmental protection 5.29 5.81 0 53.49 1225 MARPOR 2013
Quota Law 0.06 0.23 0 1 1225 Own data
Party Quota(t 1) 0.12 0.33 0 1 1225 Own data
PR Electoral System 0.90 0.29 0 1 1225 CWS 2014
Presidentialism 0.16 0.37 0 1 1225 CWS 2014 Labor Force Part.(t 1y) 41.36 5.03 27.45 48.56 1225 CWS 2014
%  in Parl.(t 1y) 17.17 12.17 0 47.30 1225 CWS 2014
Unionization(t 1) 44.19 21.05 7.61 87.13 1225 CWS 2014
Inequality(t 1) 27.63 4.04 19.70 37.80 1225 SWIID
Income per capita(t 1) 28400 10384 9271 59950 1225 UN WDI
Unemployment(t 1) 6.66 4.35 0 22.96 1225 CWS 2014
% Population 65+(t 1) 13.72 2.62 6.48 20.48 1225 CWS 2014
Total quasi-sentences 766 1169 12 9999 1225 MARPOR 2013
Party vote change(t 1) -0.17 4.31 -27.02 22.73 1225 MARPOR 2013
Effective no. of parties(t 1) 3.96 1.56 1.69 9.07 1225 CWS 2014
Notes: MARPOR 2013 is the Comparative Manifesto Project (Manifesto Project MRG/MARPOR/MARPOR) Version 2013b.
CWS 2014 is the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, February 2014 version. SWIID is the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database, version 4.0 (2013). UN WDI is the U.N. World Development Indicators (2014). Original data on party
quotas were compiled using secondary literature, party documents, and correspondence with political party representatives (For
further details, see Appendix 4A).
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Appendix 5B: Comparison of Manifesto Social Policies
Table A.6 gives an overview of party attention to various social policy issues over time. I coded each
manifesto for inclusion of content related to the ‘welfare state expansion’ sub-categories of health
care, pensions / retirement, social housing, child care, parental leave, elderly care, and disability.
This allows me to gain a better understanding of the range of policy issues the party addresses,
before and after a quota law was implemented in Belgium (1999) but not Austria. A Xindicates
that the policy issue was discussed in the manifesto.
Table A.6: Party Attention to Welfare State Expansion Issues
Health Care Pensions Social Child Care Parental Elderly care Disability
housing leave
Belgium
Vlaams Blok / Belang (VB)
1987 X X X
1991 X X X X X
1995 X X X X
1999 X X X X X X X
2003 X X X X X X
2007 X X X X X X X
Austria
Freedom Party (FPÖ)
1986 X X X
1990 X X X X
1994 X X
1999 X
2002 X X X X X
2006 X X X
Notes: The table shows coverage of specific policy issues related to welfare state expansion in party manifestos for election
years before and after a quota law was implemented in Belgium (1999). A Xindicates that the policy issue was discussed in
the party manifesto.
Table A.6 shows that the most popular issue is pensions, which each party discusses in the
party manifesto in every election year analyzed. Belgium’s VB also covers health care and disability
in each of its manifestos. Elderly care and social housing are covered less frequently before the
quota law was in place (in 2 and 1 out of 3 elections, respectively), and then addressed in every
year afterwards. Child care and parental leave are only discussed as policy options after the law
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was implemented; before, VB family policy focuses on family allowances and tax cuts.
Turning to Austria’s FPÖ we see less coverage in general of social policy issues. The
only issue that gets consistent attention in the party manifesto is pensions. Disability and elderly
care are addressed infrequently, with no noticeable increase over time, in contrast to health care
which is covered only in the 2002 and 2006 elections. Public child care is only discussed in the
2006 manifesto, and parental leave is mentioned in three manifestos with no discernable trend over
time. Finally social housing is only addressed in 2 elections before a quota law was implemented
in Belgium (1990 and 1994). Overall, Belgium’s VB covers a broader range of social policies in its
manifestos than Austria’s FPÖ, and the party has increased attention to child care, parental leave,
elderly care, and social housing since a quota law has been in place.
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Appendix 6A: Sources and Summary Statistics for Data Used in
Analysis, Chapter 6
Table A.7: Summary Statistics, 22 Countries
Variable M SD Min Max N Data source
Overall Family Policy Spending 1.96 1.07 0.15 4.85 651 OECD SOCX
Family Allowances 0.92 0.56 0.82 2.82 690 OECD SOCX
Child Care 0.49 0.51 0 2.01 638 OECD SOCX
Parental Leave 0.24 0.25 0 1.42 643 OECD SOCX
Old Age Benefits 6.76 2.23 2.56 12.98 651 CWS 2014
Education 5.23 1.02 3.34 7.75 224 CWS 2014
Quota Law(t 1) 0.02 0.16 0 1 704 Own data
% Women in Parliament(t 2) 13.76 11.39 0 47.3 704 CWS 2014
GDP per capita(t 2) 213 101 36 816 704 CWS 2014
Female Labor Force Part.(t 2) 39.74 5.92 17.86 48.70 704 CWS 2014
Left Cabinet(t 2) 34.14 39.31 0 100 704 CWS 2014
Party Quota(t 2) 12.08 22.69 0 99 704 Own data
Union Density(t 2) 40.69 18.41 7.57 87.44 702 CWS 2014
Wage Bargaining Level(t 2) 3.12 1.34 1 5 704 CWS 2014
Fertility Rate(t 2) 1.97 0.57 1.15 4.12 704 CFP 2011
EU Membership(t 2) 0.51 0.50 0 1 704 EU 2015
Social Expenditures(t 2) 20.96 5.15 9.90 35.68 645 OECD SOCX
Preference Gap 9.19 4.62 -0.56 14.96 704 Own data
Notes:
OECD SOCX is the OECD Social Expenditures Database, accessed in December 2014.
CWS 2014 is the Comparative Welfare States Data Set, February 2014 version (Brady, Huber & Stephens 2014).
CFP 2011 is the Comparative Family Policy Database, 2011 (3.0) version (Gauthier & Bortnik 2011).
EU 2015 is the list of EU member states available from the European Union on europa.eu (2015).
Original data on party quotas were compiled using secondary literature, party documents, and correspondence with political
party representatives (For further details, see Appendix 4A).
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Appendix 6B: Mediation Analysis:
Women’s Representation as a Mechanism
The baseline specifications in Chapter 6 (Table 6.1) present the overall effect of a quota law, control-
ling for potential confounders including the share of women in parliament. Women in parliament
is included as a control because it is a good proxy for general taste or attitudes towards women
in politics, a potentially important confounder. The results show that quota laws lead to change
in spending priorities even controlling for trends in the share of women in parliament. However,
as previously discussed there is good reason to believe that the share of women in parliament is
also part of the causal chain linking quotas to policy outcomes. To investigate the indirect effect
of increased women’s representation due to a quota law, I follow Kenny and colleagues’ four steps
for showing mediation effects (Baron & Kenny 1986; Judd & Kenny 1981, 2010). These can be
summarized as: 1) Show that the causal variable is correlated with the outcome; 2) Show that
the causal variable is correlated with the mediator; 3) Show that the mediator affects the outcome
variable; and 4) For complete mediation, show that the effect of the causal variable on the outcome
while controlling for the mediator is zero.
Recall that in the baseline specifications Quota Law is lagged by one year and all other
covariates, including women’s representation, are lagged by two years, in order to alleviate concerns
about post-treatment bias. In the following analysis of women’s representation as a mechanism I
use a measure of women in parliament that is contemporaneous with quota law implementation, i.e.
lagged by only one year. Table A.8 presents the results, which are based on Model 3 of Table 6.1
(where the dependent variable is child care spending). All models include the full set of controls
shown in Table 6.1 specifications (not shown to save space).
Model 1 shows that Quota Law has an overall effect on child care spending. Without
women’s representation in the model, the size of the coefficient on Quota Law is 0.08, and is
significant at conventional levels (p=0.04). Second, Model 2 shows that the causal variable of
interest is correlated with the mediator: Quota Law is associated with 4.4 percentage point increase
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Table A.8: Mediation Analysis of Women’s Representation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Child Care % Women Child Care Child Care Child Care Child Care
in Parliament
Quota Law(t 1) 0:08 4:4 0.05 -0.01
(0.04) (0.84) (0.04) (0.04)
% Women in Parliament(t 1) 0:01 0:01 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Quota Law(t 1) Preference Gap 0:02
(0.01)
% Women in Parliament(t 1) Preference Gap 0:00
(0.00)
Constant  1:24  28:32  1:07  1:08  1:19  1:07
(0.32) (5.76) (0.31) (0.31) (0.32) (0.32)
N 893 624 593 593 593 593
R-squared 0.75 0.86 0.73 0.74 0.76 0.73
Rho 0.74 0.63 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.75
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Prais-Winsten regressions, with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. All models include the full set of
controls shown in Table 6.1 specifications (not shown to save space).
Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
in women in parliament. Third, Model 3 shows that the mediator is associated with the outcome.
Women’s representation is associated with a statistically significant increase in child care spending.
For every 10% increase in women’s representation, there is a 0.10 percentage point increase in child
care spending. Finally, to establish total mediation step 4 assesses the relationship between the
causal variable and outcome when the mediator is included in the model. Model 4 shows that
the effect of a quota law is significantly reduced when women’s representation is included in the
model. Including women’s representation, the coefficient on Quota Law decreases to 0.05 and is not
significant (p=0.18). This suggests that the effect of a quota law is at least partially mediated by
increased numbers of women in office.
As in the baseline results, Table A.8 shows that the effect of Quota Law is conditional on
the size of the gender preference gap. The interaction between Quota Law and Preference Gap is
now significant at the 0.05 level (Model 5). Model 6 shows that the same is true of the interaction
between Preference Gap and the mediator % Women in Parliament. This is consistent with the
logic of the argument about the size of the gender gap in preferences, i.e., greater numbers of
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women in parliament should lead to policy change only on issues on which women and men have
different preferences. The key take-aways here are that quotas work at least partially through the
mechanism of women’s representation, and the positive result for child care spending is even stronger
when models take this into account.
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Appendix 6C: Quota Rules and Spending Outcomes
Table A.9 addresses questions about whether the specific rules of the quota provision matter for
spending outcomes. These models use the same previously described fixed effects specifications
shown in Models 2 and 3 of Table 6.1. All models include the full set of controls shown in Table 6.1
specifications (not shown to save space).
Table A.9: Provisions of Quota Law and Spending Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family Child Care Family Child Care Family Child Care
Allowances allowances Allowances
Quota, strict sanctions  0:15 0.04
(0.05) (0.03)
Quota, weak sanctions -0.07 0.05
(0.04) (0.04)
Quota, 50% threshold  0:17 0.11
(0.09) (0.08)
Quota, < 50% threshold  0:08 0.03
(0.03) (0.02)
Quota, placement mandates  0:12 0.03
(0.05) (0.03)
Quota, no placement mandates  0:11 0:10
(0.06) (0.05)
Constant 1:29  0:75 1:31  0:71 1:39  0:78
(0.44) (0.27) (0.44) (0.27) (0.43) (0.27)
N 639 593 639 593 639 593
R-squared 0.66 0.78 0.67 0.77 0.68 0.79
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Analysis carried out using the panelAR package for R version 3.2.1. Prais-Winsten regressions, with
panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
Signif. codes: *** 0.01 ** 0.05 * 0.10
Models 1 and 2 of Table A.9 separate the quota variable into laws that require parties to
comply with the law for the list to be accepted (Quota, strict sanctions, representing Spain and
Belgium after a quota law was passed) and those that do not (Quota, weak sanctions). The results
suggest that quotas with strict enforcement rules have larger effects on family allowances spending
than quotas without, but a Wald test finds that the difference between these coefficients is not
statistically significant. Looking at child care (Model 2), the results suggest no difference between
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the outcomes for quotas with and without strict enforcement mechanisms.
Models 3 and 4 separate the quota variable into laws that require women to make up a
high threshold, 50% of the list (Quota, 50% threshold, representing France after it passed a quota
law and Belgium from 2007), versus those that do not (Quota, < 50% threshold). Again for the
dependent variable of family allowances (Model 3) we see a larger effect for the stricter provision
(50% threshold), but the difference between coefficients on different thresholds is not significant.
For child care (Model 4), the results suggest a larger effect for quotas with a threshold under 50%,
although again a Wald test of coefficients finds no statistically significant difference.
Models 5 and 6 test the impact of placement mandates (when the law includes specific
rules about the rank-ordering of candidates, represented by Quota, placement mandates). The
coefficients on placement rules are very similar for family allowances, suggesting that this provision
does not condition spending in this area. In the area of child care spending larger effects are seen
for quotas without placement mandates. However a Wald test of the difference between quotas
with and without placement mandates finds that the difference between these two coefficients is not
statistically significant.
In summary, the results here suggest no strong or consistent evidence that stronger quota
laws lead to larger changes in spending on work-family policies. This finding is not very surprising
given that results from Chapter 5 find little evidence of a relationship between quota provisions
and party position change, with the exception of enforcement mechanisms. However, it is worth
noting the smaller sample size of national-level data used here, compared to party-level data used
in Chapter 5. It could be that the small sample size – particularly once we start dividing quota
rules into different types – precludes statistical significance, especially if effects are not very large or
occur over time. More observations over longer periods of time after a quota law has been in place
would be helpful in making progress on this question in the future.
205
References
Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond & Jens Hainmueller. 2010. “Synthetic control methods for com-
parative case studies: Estimating the effect of California’s tobacco control program.” Journal of
the American Statistical Association 105(490).
Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond & Jens Hainmueller. 2011. “Synth: An R Package for Synthetic
Control Methods in Comparative Case Studies.” Journal of Statistical Software 42(13).
Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond & Jens Hainmueller. 2014. “Comparative Politics and the Syn-
thetic Control Method.” American Journal of Political Science pp. n/a–n/a.
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12116
Abadie, Alberto & Javier Gardeazabal. 2003. “The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the
Basque Country.” American economic review pp. 113–132.
Abou Zeid, Gihan. 2006. “WomenâĂŹs Access to the Decision-Making Process across the Arab
Nation.” Women, quotas, and politics pp. 168–193.
Adams, James. 2001. Party competition and responsible party government: A theory of spatial
competition based upon insights from behavioral voting research. University of Michigan Press.
Adams, James, Andrea B Haupt & Heather Stoll. 2009. “What moves parties? The role of pub-
lic opinion and global economic conditions in Western Europe.” Comparative Political Studies
42(5):611–639.
Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow & Garrett Glasgow. 2004. “Understanding change
and stability in party ideologies: Do parties respond to public opinion or to past election results?”
British Journal of Political Science 34(04):589–610.
Adams, James, Michael Clark, Lawrence Ezrow & Garrett Glasgow. 2006. “Are niche parties funda-
mentally different from mainstream parties? The causes and the electoral consequences of Western
European parties’ policy shifts, 1976–1998.” American Journal of Political Science 50(3):513–529.
Adams, James, Samuel Merrill III & Bernard Grofman. 2005. A Unified Theory of Party Compe-
tition: A Cross-National Analysis Integrating Spatial and Behavioral Factors. New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Adams, James & Zeynep Somer-Topcu. 2009. “Policy Adjustment by Parties in Response to Rival
PartiesâĂŹ Policy Shifts: Spatial Theory and the Dynamics of Party Competition in Twenty-Five
Post-War Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 39(4):825–846.
206
Adema, Willem, Pauline Fron & Maxime Ladaique. 2011. “Is the European Welfare State Really
More Expensive?”.
Ahern, Kenneth R & Amy K Dittmar. 2012. “The changing of the boards: The impact on firm
valuation of mandated female board representation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127(1):137–
197.
Aldrich, John H. 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in
America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Alesina, A. & D. Rodrik. 1991. Distributive politics and economic growth. Technical report National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Alesina, A. & E.L. Glaeser. 2004. Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: A world of difference.
Oxford University Press Oxford.
Alexiadou, Despina. 2015. “Ideologues, Partisans, and Loyalists Cabinet Ministers and Social Wel-
fare Reform in Parliamentary Democracies.” Comparative Political Studies 48(8):1051–1086.
Allan, James P & Lyle Scruggs. 2004. “Political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced
industrial societies.” American Journal of Political Science 48(3):496–512.
Alonso, Sonia & Sara Claro da Fonseca. 2012. “Immigration, left and right.” Party Politics 18(6):865–
884.
Anesi, V. & P.D. Donder. 2009. “Party Formation and Minority Ideological Positions*.” The Eco-
nomic Journal 119(540):1303–1323.
Angrist, Joshua D & Jörn-Steffen Pischke. 2008. Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s
companion. Princeton University Press.
Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M Snyder Jr & Charles Stewart III. 2001. “Candidate positioning in
US House elections.” American Journal of Political Science pp. 136–159.
Anzia, Sarah F & Christopher R Berry. 2011. “The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do
Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?” American Journal of Political Science 55(3):478–
493.
Ararat, Melsa, Mine H Aksu & Ayse Tansel Cetin. 2010. “The impact of board diversity on boards’
monitoring intensity and firm performance: evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange.” Available
at SSRN 1572283 .
Attanasio, Orazio, Hamish Low & Virginia Sanchez-Marcos. 2008. “Explaining changes in female
labor supply in a life-cycle model.” The American Economic Review pp. 1517–1552.
Austen-Smith, D. 2000. “Redistributing income under proportional representation.” Journal of
Political Economy 108(6):1235–1269.
Austen-Smith, D. & M. Wallerstein. 2006. “Redistribution and affirmative action.” Journal of Public
Economics 90(10):1789–1823.
Bachrach, Peter & Morton S Baratz. 1962. “Two faces of power.” American political science review
56(04):947–952.
207
Baker, Michael & Kevin Milligan. 2008. “How Does Job-Protected Maternity Leave Affect Mother-
sâĂŹ Employment?” Journal of Labor Economics 26(4):655–691.
Baldez, L. 2004. “Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative Candidates in Mexico.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 29(2):231–258.
Baldez, Lisa & John M Carey. 2001. “Budget procedure and fiscal restraint in posttransition Chile.”
Presidents, parliaments, and policy pp. 105–148.
Banducci, Susan A & Jeffrey A Karp. 2000. “Gender, leadership and choice in multiparty systems.”
Political Research Quarterly 53(4):815–848.
Banducci, Susan A, Todd Donovan & Jeffrey A Karp. 2004. “Minority representation, empowerment,
and participation.” Journal of Politics 66(2):534–556.
Barnes, Samuel H. 1977. Representation in Italy: institutionalized tradition and electoral choice.
University of Chicago Press Chicago.
Baron, Reuben M & David A Kenny. 1986. “The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social
psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations.” Journal of person-
ality and social psychology 51(6):1173.
Bartolini, Stefano & Peter Mair. 2007. Identity, competition and electoral availability: the stabilisa-
tion of European electorates 1885-1985. ECPR Press.
Bauer, Gretchen & Hannah Evelyn Britton. 2006. Women in African parliaments. Lynne Rienner
Publishers Boulder, CO.
Baum, Michael & Ana Espírito-Santo. 2012. “Portugal’s quota-parity law: an analysis of its adop-
tion.” West European Politics 35(2):319–342.
Beaman, L.A., R. Chattopadhyay, E. Duflo, R. Pande & P. Topalova. 2008. Powerful women: Does
exposure reduce bias? Technical report National Bureau of Economic Research.
Beck, Nathaniel & Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. “What to Do (And Not to Do) With Time-Series
Cross-Section Data.” American Political Science Review 89:634–647.
Benabou, Roland. 1996. Inequality and growth. In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1996, Volume
11. MIT Press pp. 11–92.
Benoit, Kenneth, Michael Laver et al. 2006. Party policy in modern democracies. Routledge.
Beramendi, Pablo, Silja Häusermann, Herbert Kitschelt & Hanspeter Kriesi. 2015. The politics of
advanced capitalism. Cambridge University Press.
Bergemann, Annette & Regina T Riphahn. 2011. “The introduction of a short-term earnings-related
parental leave benefit system and differential effects on employment intentions.” Schmollers
Jahrbuch: Journal of Applied Social Science Studies/Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts-und Sozialwis-
senschaften 131(2):315–325.
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004a. “How much should we trust
differences-in-differences estimates?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1):249–275.
208
Bertrand, Marianne, Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan. 2004b. “How much should we trust
differences-in-differences estimates?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1):249–275.
Besley, T., R. Pande & V. Rao. 2005a. “Participatory democracy in action: Survey evidence from
South India.” Journal of the European Economic Association 3(2-3):648–657.
Besley, T., R. Pande & V. Rao. 2005b. “Political selection and the quality of government: Evidence
from South India.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5201 .
Besley, Timothy J, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson & Johanna Rickne. 2013. “Gender quotas and the
crisis of the mediocre man: Theory and evidence from Sweden.”.
Besley, Timothy & Stephen Coate. 1997. “An Economic Model of Democracy.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 112:1:85–114.
Bhavnani, R.R. 2009. “Do electoral quotas work after they are withdrawn? Evidence from a natural
experiment in India.” American Political Science Review 103(1):23–35.
Bille, Lars. 2001. “Democratizing a democratic procedure: Myth or reality? Candidate selection in
Western European parties, 1960-1990.” Party Politics 7(3):363–380.
Bird, Karen. 2003. “Who are the women? Where are the women? And what difference can they
make? Effects of gender parity in French municipal elections.” French Politics 1(1):5–38.
Bird, Karen. 2005. “The political representation of visible minorities in electoral democracies: a
comparison of France, Denmark, and Canada.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11(4):425–465.
Bird, Karen. 2014. “Ethnic quotas and ethnic representation worldwide.” International Political
Science Review 35(1):12–26.
Black, Jerome H & Lynda Erickson. 2003. “Women candidates and voter bias: do women politicians
need to be better?” Electoral Studies 22(1):81–100.
Blondel, Jean & Ferdinand Müller-Rommel. 1993. Governing together: the extent and limits of joint
decision-making in Western European cabinets. St. Martin’s Press.
Bolzendahl, Catherine. 2009. “making the implicit explicit: gender influences on Social Spending
in twelve industrialized Democracies, 1980–99.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender,
State & Society 16(1):40–81.
Bolzendahl, Catherine & Clem Brooks. 2007. “Women’s political representation and welfare state
spending in 12 capitalist democracies.” Social Forces 85(4):1509–1534.
Bonoli, Giuliano & Frank Reber. 2010. “The political economy of childcare in OECD countries:
Explaining cross-national variation in spending and coverage rates.” European Journal of Political
Research 49(1):97–118.
Bornschier, Simon. 2010. Cleavage politics and the populist right: the new cultural conflict in Western
Europe. Temple University Press Philadelphia.
Brady, David, Evelyne Huber & John D. Stephens. 2014. “Comparative Welfare States Data Set.”
University of North Carolina and WZB Berlin Social Science Center .
209
Brians, Craig Leonard. 2005. “Women for women? Gender and party bias in voting for female
candidates.” American Politics Research 33(3):357–375.
Broockman, David E. 2013. “Black Politicians Are More Intrinsically Motivated to Advance Black-
sâĂŹ Interests: A Field Experiment Manipulating Political Incentives.” American Journal of
Political Science 57(3):521–536.
Budge, Ian. 1994. “A new spatial theory of party competition: Uncertainty, ideology and policy
equilibria viewed comparatively and temporally.” British Journal of Political Science 24(4):443–
467.
Budge, Ian. 2001. Mapping policy preferences: estimates for parties, electors, and governments,
1945-1998. Vol. 1 Oxford University Press.
Budge, Ian, David Robertson & Derek Hearl. 1987. Ideology, strategy and party change: spatial
analyses of post-war election programmes in 19 democracies. Cambridge University Press.
Burden, Barry C. 2007. Personal roots of representation. Princeton University Press.
Burgoon, Brian. 2012. “Partisan embedding of liberalism how trade, investment, and immigration
affect party support for the welfare state.” Comparative Political Studies 45(5):606–635.
Burnet, Jennie E. 2011. “Women have found respect: Gender quotas, symbolic representation, and
female empowerment in Rwanda.” Politics & Gender 7(03):303–334.
Burrell, Barbara. 1994. “A womanâĂŹs place is in the house.” Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press .
Calossi, Enrico & Eugenico Pizzimenti. 2013. “The Degree of Centralization in Candidate Selection
Procedures: The Italian Case.” Working Paper .
Campa, Pamela. 2011. “Gender quotas, female politicians and public expenditures: quasi-
experimental evidence.” Unpublished paper. Department of Economics, Stockholm University,
Stockholm .
Campbell, Andrea Louise. 2003. How policies make citizens: Senior political activism and the
American welfare state. Princeton University Press.
Campbell, Andrea Louise. 2012a. “Policy makes mass politics.” Annual Review of Political Science
15:333–351.
Campbell, Rosie. 2012b. “What do we really know about women voters? Gender, elections and
public opinion.” The Political Quarterly 83(4):703–710.
Campbell, Rosie, Sarah Childs & Joni Lovenduski. 2010. “Do women need women representatives?”
British Journal of Political Science 40(01):171–194.
Canon, D.T. 1999. Race, redistricting, and representation: The unintended consequences of black
majority districts. University of Chicago Press.
Carey, J.M. & M.S. Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of
electoral formulas.” Electoral studies 14(4):417–439.
210
Carey, John M. 2007. “Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative
voting.” American Journal of Political Science 51(1):92–107.
Carnes, Nicholas. 2012. “Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Congress
Matter?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 37(1):5–34.
Carroll, Susan J. 2006. “Moms who swing, or why the promise of the gender gap remains unfulfilled.”
Politics & Gender 2(03):362–374.
Casey, Logan S. & Andrew Re. 2015. Standing Out: Transgender and Gender Variant Candidates
and Elected Officials Around the World. LGBTQ Representation and Rights Initiative, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Castles, Francis G. 1994. “On religion and public policy: Does Catholicism make a difference?”
European Journal of Political Research 25(1):19–40.
Catalano, A. 2009. “Women Acting for Women? An Analysis of Gender and Debate Participation
in the British House of Commons 2005–2007.” Politics & Gender 5(01):45–68.
Caul, M. 2001. “Political Parties and the Adoption of Candidate Gender Quotas: A Cross–National
Analysis.” Journal of Politics 63(4):1214–1229.
Caul, Miki. 1999. “Women’s Representation in Parliament The Role of Political Parties.” Party
politics 5(1):79–98.
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer & Brian Min. 2010. “Why do ethnic groups rebel? New
data and analysis.” World Politics 62(01):87–119.
Celis, Karen. 2007. “Substantive representation of women: the representation of women’s interests
and the impact of descriptive representation in the Belgian parliament (1900–1979).” Journal of
Women, Politics & Policy 28(2):85–114.
Chaney, Paul. 2012. “Critical actors vs. critical mass: The substantive representation of women in
the Scottish Parliament.” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 14(3):441–457.
Chattopadhyay, R. & E. Duflo. 2003. “Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a India-Wide
Randomized Policy Experiment.” NBER Working Paper 8615.
Chattopadhyay, R. & E. Duflo. 2004. “Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy
experiment in India.” Econometrica 72(5):1409–1443.
Childs, S. 2004a. New Labour’s women MPs: women representing women. Psychology Press.
Childs, S. & M.L. Krook. 2006. “Should feminists give up on critical mass? A contingent yes.”
Politics & Gender 2(04):522–530.
Childs, S. & M.L. Krook. 2009. “Analysing women’s substantive representation: From critical mass
to critical actors.” Government and Opposition 44(2):125–145.
Childs, Sarah. 2004b. “A feminised style of politics? Women MPs in the House of Commons.” The
British Journal of Politics & International Relations 6(1):3–19.
Citizenship, Commission ’e. 2007. “Equal G ’e.”.
211
Clots-Figueras, Irma. 2011. “Women in politics: Evidence from the Indian States.” Journal of Public
Economics 95(7):664–690.
Commission, European. 2013. “Barcelona objectives. The development of childcare facilities for
young children in Europe with a view to sustainable and inclusive growth.” Report from the Com-
mission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions .
Crowder-Meyer, Melody. 2013. “Gendered Recruitment without Trying: How Local Party Recruiters
Affect Women’s Representation.” Politics & Gender 9(04):390–413.
Crowley, Jocelyn Elise. 2004. “When tokens matter.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29(1):109–136.
Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen & Philipp Rehm. 2006. “Risks at work: The demand and supply
sides of government redistribution.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 22(3):365–389.
Dahlerup, D. 2006. Women, quotas and politics. Vol. 10 Routledge.
Dahlerup, Drude. 2008. “Gender Quotas–Controversial But Trendy: On Expanding the Research
Agenda.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 10(3):322–328.
Dahlerup, Drude & Lenita Freidenvall. 2005. “Quotas as a ‘fast track’ to equal representation for
women: Why Scandinavia is no longer the model.” International Feminist Journal of Politics
7(1):26–48.
Dalton, Russell J. 1985. “Political Parties and Political Representation Party Supporters and Party
Elites in Nine Nations.” Comparative Political Studies 18(3):267–299.
Dalton, Russell J. 2009. “Economics, environmentalism and party alignments: A note on partisan
change in advanced industrial democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 48(2):161–
175.
Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. 2006. “Implementation of Political Party Gender Quotas Evidence
from the German Länder 1990–2000.” Party Politics 12(2):211–232.
De Paola, M., V. Scoppa & R. Lombardo. 2010. “Can gender quotas break down negative stereo-
types? Evidence from changes in electoral rules.” Journal of Public Economics 94(5-6):344–353.
De Paola, Maria, Vincenzo Scoppa & Marco Alberto De Benedetto. 2014. “The impact of gender
quotas on electoral participation: Evidence from Italian municipalities.” European Journal of
Political Economy 35:141–157.
Del Boca, Daniela. 2002. “The effect of child care and part time opportunities on participation and
fertility decisions in Italy.” Journal of Population Economics 15(3):549–573.
Del Boca, Daniela, Rolf Aaberge, Ugo Colombino, John Ermisch, Marco Francesconi, Silvia Pasqua
& Steinar Strom. 2005. “Labour market participation of women and fertility: the effect of social
policies.” Boeri, Del Boca and Pissarides (eds.): Labor Market Participation and Fertility of
Women: the Effect of Social Policies pp. 121–264.
Devlin, Claire & Robert Elgie. 2008. “The effect of increased women’s representation in parliament:
The case of Rwanda.” Parliamentary Affairs 61(2):237–254.
212
Dewan, Torun & Rafael Hortala-Vallve. 2011. “The three As of government formation: Appointment,
allocation, and assignment.” American Journal of Political Science 55(3):610–627.
Dodson, D.L. 2006. The impact of women in Congress. Oxford University Press, USA.
Dolan, Kathleen. 1998. “Voting for Women in the" Year of the Woman".” American Journal of
Political Science pp. 272–293.
Dolezal, Martin, Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, Wolfgang C Müller & Anna Katharina Winkler. 2012.
“The Life Cycle of Party Manifestos: The Austrian Case.” West European Politics 35(4):869–895.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Dustmann, Christian & Uta Schönberg. 2012. “Expansions in maternity leave coverage and children’s
long-term outcomes.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4(3):190–224.
Duverger, Maurice. 1955. The political role of women. Unesco.
Eagly, Alice H & Blair T Johnson. 1990. “Gender and leadership style: A meta-analysis.” Psycho-
logical bulletin 108(2):233.
Edlund, L. & R. Pande. 2002. “Why have women become left-wing? The political gender gap and
the decline in marriage.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(3):917–961.
Edwards, M.S. & F.C. Thames. 2007. “District magnitude, personal votes, and government expen-
ditures.” Electoral Studies 26(2):338–345.
Enelow, James M & Melvin J Hinich. 1984. The spatial theory of voting: An introduction. CUP
Archive.
Erhardt, Niclas L, James D Werbel & Charles B Shrader. 2003. “Board of director diversity and
firm financial performance.” Corporate governance: An international review 11(2):102–111.
Erzeel, Sylvia & Petra Meier. 2011. “Wat veranderen quota’s? Rekrutering en selectie van kandi-
daten door Belgische partijen na de invoering van de quotawetten.” Tijdschrift voor genderstudies
14(2).
Esaiasson, P. & K. Heidar. 2000. Beyond Westminster and Congress: The Nordic Experience. Ohio
State Univ Pr.
Esping-Andersen, G. 1990a. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Vol. 6 Polity press Cambridge.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990b. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Vol. 6 Polity press Cam-
bridge.
Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1999. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford University
Press.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 2002. Why we need a new welfare state. Oxford University Press.
Estevez-Abe, Margarita, Torben Iversen & David Soskice. 2001. “Social protection and the forma-
tion of skills: a reinterpretation of the welfare state.” Varieties of capitalism. The institutional
foundations of comparative advantage, Oxford p. 145.
213
Ezrow, Lawrence. 2007. “The variance matters: How party systems represent the preferences of
voters.” Journal of Politics 69(1):182–192.
Falleti, Tulia G & Julia F Lynch. 2009. “Context and causal mechanisms in political analysis.”
Comparative Political Studies .
Ferrara, Federico & J Timo Weishaupt. 2004. “Get your Act Together Party Performance in Euro-
pean Parliament Elections.” European Union Politics 5(3):283–306.
Ferreira, F. & J. Gyourko. 2011. Does Gender Matter for Political Leadership? The Case of US
Mayors. Technical report National Bureau of Economic Research.
Finseraas, Henning. 2009. “Income inequality and demand for redistribution: a multilevel analysis
of European public opinion.” Scandinavian Political Studies 32(1):94–119.
Fox, Richard L & Jennifer L Lawless. 2004. “Entering the arena? Gender and the decision to run
for office.” American Journal of Political Science 48(2):264–280.
Fox, Richard L & Jennifer L Lawless. 2010. “If only they’d ask: Gender, recruitment, and political
ambition.” The Journal of Politics 72(02):310–326.
Fréchette, G.R., F. Maniquet & M. Morelli. 2008. “Incumbents’ interests and gender quotas.”
American Journal of Political Science 52(4):891–909.
Fulton, Sarah A, Cherie D Maestas, L Sandy Maisel & Walter J Stone. 2006. “The Sense of a
Woman: Gender, Ambition, and the Decision to run for Congress.” Political Research Quarterly
59(2):235–248.
Funk, P. & C. Gathmann. 2008. “Gender gaps in policy making: Evidence from direct democracy
in Switzerland.”.
Gauthier, Anna H & A Bortnik. 2011. “Comparative family policy database, version 3.” Netherlands
Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute and Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Am-
sterdam and Cologne .
Gaventa, John. 1982. Power and powerlessness: Quiescence and rebellion in an Appalachian valley.
University of Illinois Press.
Gelb, Joyce. 1989. Feminism and politics: A comparative perspective. Univ of California Press.
Gelman, Andrew & Jennifer Hill. 2006. Data analysis using regression and multilevel/hierarchical
models. Cambridge University Press.
Genovese, Federica, Pia Wassmann & Gerald Schneider. 2014. “The Eurotower Strikes Back: Crises,
Adjustments and Europe’s Austerity Protests.” Comparative Political Studies .
George, Alexander L & Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case studies and theory development in the social
sciences. Mit Press.
Gerring, John. 2006. Case study research: principles and practices. Cambridge University Press.
Gerring, John. 2007. “Is there a (viable) crucial-case method?” Comparative Political Studies
40(3):231–253.
214
Gilens, Martin. 2012. Aﬄuence and influence: Economic inequality and political power in America.
Princeton University Press.
Gingrich, Jane & Christopher Ansell. 2015. “The Dynamics of Social Investmnet: Human Capital,
Activation, and Care.” The Politics of Advanced Capitalism pp. 282–304.
Givens, Terri E. 2004. “The radical right gender gap.” Comparative Political Studies 37(1):30–54.
Glynn, Adam N & Nahomi Ichino. 2014. “Increasing Inferential Leverage in the Comparative Method
Placebo Tests in Small-n Research.” Sociological Methods & Research p. 0049124114528879.
Gornick, Janet C, Marcia K Meyers & Katherin E Ross. 1997. “Supporting the employment of moth-
ers: Policy variation across fourteen welfare states.” Journal of European social policy 7(1):45–70.
Gottfried, Heidi & Jacqueline O’Reilly. 2002. “Reregulating breadwinner models in socially conser-
vative welfare systems: comparing Germany and Japan.” Social Politics: International Studies in
Gender, State & Society 9(1):29–59.
Gottlieb, Jessica, Guy Grossman & Amanda Lea Robinson. N.d. “Do men and women have different
policy preferences, and if so, why?” . Forthcoming.
Greene, Zachary & Matthias Haber. 2014. “Leadership competition and disagreement at party
national congresses.” British Journal of Political Science pp. 1–22.
Group, World Bank. International Economics Dept. Development Data. 1978. World development
indicators. World Bank.
Guadagnini, Marila. 2005. “Gendering the debate on political representation in Italy: a difficult
challenge.” State Feminism and Political Representation pp. 130–152.
Guryan, Jonathan. 2001. Desegregation and black dropout rates. Technical report National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Hacker, Jacob S & Paul Pierson. 2011. Winner-take-all politics: How Washington made the rich
richer–and turned its back on the middle class. Simon and Schuster.
Haider-Markel, Donald P. 2010. Out and running: Gay and lesbian candidates, elections, and policy
representation. Georgetown University Press.
Harmel, Robert & Lars Svåsand. 1997. “The Influence of New Parties on Old Parties’ Platforms The
Cases of the Progress Parties and Conservative Parties of Denmark and Norway.” Party Politics
3(3):315–340.
Harmel, Robert, Uk Heo, Alexander Tan & Kenneth Janda. 1995. “Performance, leadership, factions
and party change: An empirical analysis.” West European Politics 18(1):1–33.
Haupt, Andrea B. 2010. “Parties’ Responses to Economic Globalization What is Left for the Left
and Right for the Right?” Party Politics 16(1):5–27.
Häusermann, Silja. 2006. “Changing coalitions in social policy reforms: the politics of new social
needs and demands.” Journal of European Social Policy 16(1):5–21.
Häusermann, Silja. 2010. The politics of welfare state reform in continental Europe: modernization
in hard times. Cambridge University Press.
215
Haussman, Melissa & Birgit Sauer. 2007. Gendering the state in the age of globalization: women’s
movements and state feminism in postindustrial democracies. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Hawkesworth, Mary. 2003. “Congressional enactments of race–gender: Toward a theory of raced–
gendered institutions.” American Political Science Review 97(04):529–550.
Henig, Simon. 2002. Women and political power: Europe since 1945. Routledge.
Hicks, Alexander M. 1999. Social democracy & welfare capitalism: a century of income security
politics. Cornell University Press.
Hinojosa, Magda. 2012. Selecting women, electing women: Political representation and candidate
selection in Latin America. Temple University Press.
Ho, Daniel E, Kosuke Imai, Gary King & Elizabeth Stuart. 2011. “MatchIt: Nonparametric Pre-
processing for Parametric Causal Inference.” Journal of Statistical Software 42:1–28.
Htun, Mala & Mark P Jones. 2002. “Engendering the right to participate in decision-making:
electoral quotas and women’s leadership in Latin America.” Gender and the politics of rights and
democracy in Latin America pp. 32–56.
Htun, Mala & S Laurel Weldon. 2012. “The Civic Origins of Progressive Policy Change: Combating
Violence against Women in Global Perspective, 1975–2005.” American Political Science Review
106(3):548–569.
Huber, E. & J.D. Stephens. 2000. “Partisan governance, women’s employment, and the social
democratic service state.” American Sociological Review pp. 323–342.
Huber, Evelyne & John D Stephens. 2001. Development and crisis of the welfare state: parties and
policies in global markets. University of Chicago press.
Hughes, Melanie M. 2009. “Armed conflict, international linkages, and women’s parliamentary
representation in developing nations.” Social Problems 56(1):174–204.
Hughes, M.M. 2011. “Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Womenï£¡s Political Representation
Worldwide.” American Political Science Review 105(3):604–620.
Humphreys, Macartan & John Garry. 2000. “Thinking about salience.” Draft originally posted at
http://www. people. fas. harvard. edu/˜ mnhumphr/papers1/salience. pdf .
Imai, Kosuke, Gary King & Olivia Lau. 2009. “Zelig: Everyone’s statistical software.” R package
version 3(5).
Indridason, Indridi H & Christopher Kam. 2005. “The timing of cabinet reshuﬄes in five Westminster
parliamentary systems.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 30(3):327–363.
Inglehart, Ronald F. 2008. “Changing values among western publics from 1970 to 2006.” West
European Politics 31(1-2):130–146.
Inglehart, Ronald & Pippa Norris. 2000. “The developmental theory of the gender gap: Women’s and
men’s voting behavior in global perspective.” International Political Science Review 21(4):441–
463.
Inglehart, Ronald & Pippa Norris. 2003. “The true clash of civilizations.” Foreign policy pp. 63–70.
216
Iversen, T. & D. Soskice. 2001. “An asset theory of social policy preferences.” American Political
Science Review 95(4):875–894.
Iversen, T. & D. Soskice. 2006. “Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some
democracies redistribute more than others.” American Political Science Review 100(2):165.
Iversen, T. & F. Rosenbluth. 2008. “Work and power: The connection between female labor force
participation and female political representation.” Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 11:479–495.
Iversen, Torben & David Soskice. 2007. “Two Paths to Democracy.”.
Iversen, Torben & Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 2010. Women, work, and politics: The political
economy of gender inequality. Yale University Press.
Iversen, Torben & Frances Rosenbluth. 2006. “The Political Economy of Gender: Explaining Cross-
National Variation in the Gender Division of Labor and the Gender Voting Gap.” American
Journal of Political Science 50(1):1–19.
Jalalzai, Farida. 2013. Shattered, Cracked, Or Firmly Intact?: Women and the Executive Glass
Ceiling Worldwide. Oxford University Press.
Jaumotte, Florence. 2003. “Female labour force participation: past trends and main determinants
in OECD countries.”.
Jones, Mark P. 1998. “Gender Quotas, Electoral Laws, and the Election of Women Lessons from
the Argentine Provinces.” Comparative Political Studies 31(1):3–21.
Jones, Mark P. 2004. “Quota legislation and the election of women: Learning from the Costa Rican
experience.” Journal of Politics 66(4):1203–1223.
Judd, Charles M & David A Kenny. 1981. “Process analysis estimating mediation in treatment
evaluations.” Evaluation review 5(5):602–619.
Judd, Charles M & David A Kenny. 2010. “Data analysis in social psychology: Recent and recurring
issues.” Handbook of social psychology .
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. 1977. Men and Women of the Corporation. Vol. 5049 Basic books.
Kathlene, L. 1994. “Power and influence in state legislative policymaking: The interaction of gender
and position in committee hearing debates.” American Political Science Review pp. 560–576.
Kedar, Orit. 2005. “When moderate voters prefer extreme parties: Policy balancingin parliamentary
elections.” American Political Science Review 99(02):185–199.
Kenworthy, Lane & Melissa Malami. 1999. “Gender inequality in political representation: A world-
wide comparative analysis.” Social Forces 78(1):235–268.
King, G. & L. Zeng. 2006. “The dangers of extreme counterfactuals.” Political Analysis 14(2):131–
159.
Kitschelt, H. 2000a. “Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities.” Comparative
Political Studies 33(6-7):845–879.
217
Kitschelt, Herbert. 1994. The transformation of European social democracy. Cambridge University
Press.
Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000b. “Citizens, politicians, and party cartellization: Political representa-
tion and state failure in post-industrial democracies.” European Journal of Political Research
37(2):149–179.
Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1988. “Left-libertarian parties: Explaining innovation in competitive party
systems.” World Politics 40(02):194–234.
Kittilson, M.C. 2006. Challenging Parties, Changing Parliament: Women and Elected Office in
Contemporary Western Europe. Ohio State University Press.
Kittilson, Miki Caul. 2008. “Representing women: The adoption of family leave in comparative
perspective.” The Journal of Politics 70(02):323–334.
Kittilson, Miki Caul. 2010. “Comparing gender, institutions and political behavior: Toward an
integrated theoretical framework.” Perspectives on Politics 8(01):217–222.
Kittilson, Miki Caul. 2011. “Women, parties and platforms in post-industrial democracies.” Party
Politics 17(1):66–92.
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara & Ian Budge. N.d. “Michael McDonald,
eds (2006) Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in
Eastern Europe, European Union and OECD 1990-2003.”.
Klingemann, H.D., R.I. Hofferbert, I. Budge, H. Keman, T. Bergman, F. Pétry & K. Strom. 1994.
“Parties, policies, and democracy.”.
Koch, Michael T & Sarah A Fulton. 2011. “In the defense of women: Gender, office holding, and
national security policy in established democracies.” The Journal of Politics 73(01):1–16.
Köpl, Regina. 2005. “Gendering political representation: debates and controversies in Austria.”
State Feminism and Political Representation pp. 20–40.
Korpi, W. 1978. The working class in welfare capitalism: Work, unions and politics in Sweden.
Routledge & Kegan Paul London.
Korpi, Walter. 1983. The democratic class struggle. Routledge.
Korpi, Walter & Joakim Palme. 2003. “New politics and class politics in the context of austerity and
globalization: Welfare state regress in 18 countries, 1975–95.” American Political Science Review
97(03):425–446.
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1998. “The transformation of cleavage politics The 1997 Stein Rokkan lecture.”
European journal of political research 33(2):165–185.
Kroliczek, Karolina. 2012. The Feminist Way Forward: Gender Quota Policy in Poland. PhD thesis
Department of Politics, University of York.
Krook, M.L. 2006. “Reforming representation: the diffusion of candidate gender quotas worldwide.”
Politics & Gender 2(3):303–327.
218
Krook, M.L. 2008. “Campaigns for candidate gender quotas: a new global women’s movement?”
Women’s Movements: Flourishing or in Abeyance .
Krook, M.L. 2009. Quotas for women in politics: Gender and candidate selection reform worldwide.
Oxford University Press, USA.
Krook, Mona Lena. 2013. “Electoral Gender Quotas A Conceptual Analysis.” Comparative Political
Studies p. 0010414013495359.
Krook, Mona Lena. 2015. “Empowerment versus backlash: gender quotas and critical mass theory.”
Politics, Groups, and Identities 3(1):184–188.
Kunovich, Sheri & Pamela Paxton. 2005. “Pathways to Power: The Role of Political Parties in
Women’s National Political Representation1.” American Journal of Sociology 111(2):505–552.
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny. 1999. “The quality
of government.” Journal of Law, Economics, and organization 15(1):222–279.
Lambert, Priscilla A. 2008. “The comparative political economy of parental leave and child care:
Evidence from twenty OECD countries.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State
& Society 15(3):315–344.
Laver, Michael & Kenneth A Shepsle. 1996. Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and
legislatures in parliamentary democracies. Cambridge University Press.
Laver, Michael et al. 2003. Estimating the policy position of political actors. Routledge.
Lawless, Jennifer L. 2015. “Female Candidates and Legislators.” Annual Review of Political Science
18:349–366.
Lawless, Jennifer L & Kathryn Pearson. 2008. “The primary reason for women’s underrepresenta-
tion? Reevaluating the conventional wisdom.” The Journal of Politics 70(01):67–82.
Lawless, Jennifer L & Richard Logan Fox. 2005. It takes a candidate: Why women don’t run for
office. Cambridge University Press.
Leonardi, Robert & Douglas A Wertman. 1989. Italian Christian Democracy: the politics of domi-
nance. Macmillan.
Leston-Bandeira, Cristina. 2001. “The Portuguese parliament during the first two decades of democ-
racy.” West European Politics 24(1):137–156.
Lewis, Jane. 1992. “Gender and the development of welfare regimes.” Journal of European social
policy 2(3):159–173.
Lichter, Daniel T & David J Eggebeen. 1994. “The effect of parental employment on child poverty.”
Journal of Marriage and the Family pp. 633–645.
Lindbeck, Assar & Dennis J Snower. 2001. “Insiders versus outsiders.” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives pp. 165–188.
Lindert, Peter H. 1996. “What limits social spending?” Explorations in Economic History 33(1):1–
34.
219
Lindvall, Johannes & David Rueda. 2014. “The insider–outsider dilemma.” British Journal of Po-
litical Science 44(02):460–475.
Lipset, S.M. & S. Rokkan. 1967. “Party systems and voter alignments.” New York 1.
Lizzeri, Alessandro & Nicola Persico. 2004. “Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy
and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain’s" Age of Reform".” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics pp. 707–765.
Lloren, Anouk, Jan Rosset & Reto Wüest. 2015. “Descriptive and Substantive Representation of
Poor Citizens in Switzerland.” Swiss Political Science Review .
Lott, Jr, J.R. & L.W. Kenny. 1999. “Did women’s suffrage change the size and scope of government?”
Journal of Political Economy 107(6):1163–1198.
Lovenduski, Joni. 2001. “Women and politics: minority representation or critical mass?” Parlia-
mentary Affairs 54(4):743–758.
Lovenduski, Joni & Pippa Norris. 1993. Gender and party politics. Sage Publications Ltd.
Lyall, Jason. 2014. “Why armies break: Explaining mass desertion in conventional war.” Available
at SSRN .
Madrigal, Róger, Francisco Alpízar & Achim Schlüter. 2011. “Determinants of performance of
community-based drinking water organizations.” World Development 39(9):1663–1675.
Manow, Philip. 2009. “Electoral rules, class coalitions and welfare state regimes, or how to explain
Esping-Andersen with Stein Rokkan.” Socio-Economic Review 7(1):101–121.
Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. “Rethinking representation.” American political science review 97(04):515–
528.
Mansbridge, Jane. 2009. “A âĂĲSelection ModelâĂİ of Political Representation*.” Journal of Po-
litical Philosophy 17(4):369–398.
Martin, Lanny W. 2004. “The government agenda in parliamentary democracies.” American Journal
of Political Science 48(3):445–461.
Matland, Richard E. 1998. “Women’s representation in national legislatures: Developed and devel-
oping countries.” Legislative Studies Quarterly pp. 109–125.
Matland, Richard E. 2005. “The Norwegian experience of gender quotas.” In Collaboration with
p. 64.
Matland, Richard E. 2006. “Electoral quotas: Frequency and effectiveness.” Dahlerup, Drude (Hg.):
Women, Quotas and Politics, London pp. 275–292.
Matland, Richard E & David C King. 2002. Women as candidates in congressional elections. In
Women transforming congress. University of Oklahoma Press Norman pp. 119–45.
Matland, Richard E & Donley T Studlar. 1996. “The contagion of women candidates in single-
member district and proportional representation electoral systems: Canada and Norway.” The
Journal of Politics 58(03):707–733.
220
Matsa, D.A. & A.R. Miller. 2010. “A female style in corporate leadership? Evidence from quotas.”
Unpublished working paper .
Mayhew, David R. 1974. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Mazur, Amy G. 2002. Theorizing feminist policy. Oxford University Press.
McAllister, Ian & Donley T Studlar. 2002. “Electoral systems and women’s representation: a long-
term perspective.” Representation 39(1):3–14.
McDonald, Michael D & Ian Budge. 2005. Elections, parties, democracy: conferring the median
mandate. Oxford University Press.
McKinsey, Company &. 2008. Women Matter: Female Leadership, a Competitive Edge for the
Future. McKinsey & Company.
Meguid, Bonnie M. 2005. “Competition between unequals: The role of mainstream party strategy
in niche party success.” American Political Science Review 99(03):347–359.
Meier, Petra. 2004. “The Mutual Contagion Effect of Legal and Party Quotas A Belgian Perspective.”
Party Politics 10(5):583–600.
Meier, Petra. 2012. “From laggard to leader: explaining the Belgian gender quotas and parity
clause.” West European Politics 35(2):362–379.
Mendelberg, Tali, Christopher F Karpowitz & Nicholas Goedert. 2013. “Does Descriptive Repre-
sentation Facilitate Women’s Distinctive Voice? How Gender Composition and Decision Rules
Affect Deliberation.” American Journal of Political Science .
Mettler, Suzanne. 2002. “Bringing the state back in to civic engagement: Policy feedback effects of
the GI Bill for World War II veterans.” American Political Science Review 96(02):351–365.
Michelle Heath, R., L.A. Schwindt-Bayer & M.M. Taylor-Robinson. 2005. “Women on the sidelines:
women’s representation on committees in Latin American legislatures.” American Journal of
Political Science 49(2):420–436.
Milanovic, Branko. 2000. “The median-voter hypothesis, income inequality, and income redistribu-
tion: an empirical test with the required data.” European Journal of Political Economy 16(3):367–
410.
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., R. Perotti & M. Rostagno. 2002. “Electoral systems and public spending.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(2):609–657.
Moene, Karl Ove & Michael Wallerstein. 2001. “Inequality, social insurance, and redistribution.”
American Political Science Review pp. 859–874.
Morgan, Kimberly J. 2006. Working mothers and the welfare state: Religion and the politics of
work-family policies in Western Europe and the United States. Stanford University Press.
Morgan, Kimberly J. 2013. “Path Shifting of the Welfare State: Electoral Competition and the
Expansion of Work-Family Policies in Western Europe.” World Politics 65(01):73–115.
Mughan, Anthony & Pamela Paxton. 2006. “Anti-immigrant sentiment, policy preferences and
populist party voting in Australia.” British Journal of Political Science 36(02):341–358.
221
Murray, R. 2010a. Parties, Gender Quotas and Candidate Selection in France. Palgrave Macmillan
Basingstoke and New York.
Murray, Rainbow. 2010b. “Second among unequals? A study of whether France’s âĂĲquota wom-
enâĂİ are up to the job.” Politics & Gender 6(01):93–118.
Murray, Rainbow. 2012a. “No Longer the Laggard: How France leapfrogged the UK in women’s
representation.” Renewal 20(4).
Murray, Rainbow. 2012b. “Parity in France: a ‘dual track’ solution to women’s under-
representation.” West European Politics 35(2):343–361.
Murray, Rainbow. 2014. “Quotas for men: reframing gender quotas as a means of improving repre-
sentation for all.” American Political Science Review 108(03):520–532.
Murray, Rainbow, Mona Lena Krook & Katherine AR Opello. 2012. “Why are gender quotas
adopted? Party pragmatism and parity in France.” Political Research Quarterly 65(3):529–543.
Naldini, Manuela. 2004. Family in the Mediterranean Welfare States. Routledge.
Niederle, Muriel & Lise Vesterlund. 2008. “Gender differences in competition.” Negotiation Journal
24(4):447–463.
Nielsen, Rich & John Sheffield. 2012. Case selection via matching. Technical report Working paper).
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Department of Government.
Nielsen, Richard A. 2014. “Case selection via matching.” Sociological Methods & Research
p. 0049124114547054.
Niven, David. 1998. “Party elites and women candidates: The shape of bias.” Women & Politics
19(2):57–80.
Norris, Pippa. 1985. “Women’s legislative participation in Western Europe.” West European Politics
8(4):90–101.
Norris, Pippa. 1996. “Mobilising the ‘women’s vote’: the gender-generation gap in voting behaviour.”
Parliamentary Affairs 49(2):333–342.
Norris, Pippa. 1997. Passages to power: Legislative recruitment in advanced democracies. Cambridge
University Press.
Norris, Pippa. 2005. Radical right: Voters and parties in the electoral market. Cambridge University
Press.
Norris, Pippa, Elizabeth Vallance & Joni Lovenduski. 1992. “Do candidates make a difference?
Gender, race, ideology and incumbency.” Parliamentary Affairs 45(4):496–517.
O’Brien, Diana Z. 2012a. When Women Matter: The Relationship Between Women’s Presence and
Policy Representation in Western European States PhD thesis Washington University.
O’Brien, D.Z. 2012b. “Quotas and Qualifications in Uganda.” The Impact of Gender Quotas .
O’Connor, Julia S. 1999. “Employment equality strategies in liberal welfare states.”.
222
O’Regan, Valerie R. 2000. Gender matters: female policymakers’ influence in industrialized nations.
Greenwood Publishing Group.
Orloff, Ann Shola. 1993. “Gender and the social rights of citizenship: The comparative analysis of
gender relations and welfare states.” American sociological review pp. 303–328.
Osborne, M.J. & A. Slivinski. 1996. “A model of political competition with citizen-candidates.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 111(1):65–96.
Palici di Suni, Elisabetta. 2012. “Gender Parity and Quotas in Italy: A Convoluted Reform Process.”
West European Politics 35(2):380–394.
Panday, Pranab Kumar. 2008. “Representation without participation: Quotas for women in
Bangladesh.” International Political Science Review 29(4):489–512.
Pande, R. 2003. “Can mandated political representation increase policy influence for disadvantaged
minorities? Theory and evidence from India.” The American Economic Review 93(4):1132–1151.
Parsons, Craig & Till Weber. 2011. “Cross-cutting issues and party strategy in the European Union.”
Comparative Political Studies p. 0010414010393474.
Patashnik, Eric. 2003. “After the public interest prevails: The political sustainability of policy
reform.” Governance 16(2):203–234.
Patashnik, Eric M. 2014. Reforms at risk: What happens after major policy changes are enacted.
Princeton University Press.
Paxton, Pamela & Melanie M Hughes. 2015. “The Increasing Effectiveness of National Gender
Quotas, 1990–2010.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 40(3):331–362.
Paxton, Pamela, Melanie M Hughes & Matthew A Painter. 2010. “Growth in women’s political
representation: A longitudinal exploration of democracy, electoral system and gender quotas.”
European Journal of Political Research 49(1):25–52.
Perrigo, Sarah. 1996. “Women and change in the Labour Party 1979-1995.” Parliamentary Affairs
49(1):116–129.
Persson, T. & G. Tabellini. 1991. Is inequality harmful for growth? Theory and evidence. Technical
report National Bureau of Economic Research.
Persson, T. & G. Tabellini. 2005. The economic effects of constitutions. mit Press.
Pfau-Effinger, Birgit. 2004. “Socio-historical paths of the male breadwinner model–an explanation
of cross-national differences1.” The British journal of sociology 55(3):377–399.
Pfeiffer, Christiane. 2005. Leave Policies and Research: Reviews and Country Notes: Austria. Leave
Network: Centrum voor Bevolkings- en Gezinsstudie (CBGS).
Phillips, A. 1995. The politics of presence. Oxford University Press, USA.
Pierson, Paul. 1993. “When effect becomes cause: Policy feedback and political change.” World
politics 45(04):595–628.
223
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics.” American
political science review 94(02):251–267.
Pintor, Rafael Lopez & Maria Gratschew. 2004. “Voter Turnout in Western Europe since 1945: A
Regional Report.” International IDEA .
Pitkin, Hanna F. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Poggione, Sarah. 2004. “Exploring gender differences in state legislators’ policy preferences.” Political
Research Quarterly 57(2):305–314.
Pontusson, Jonas. 2015. “Introduction to the Debate: Does descriptive misrepresentation by income
and class matter?” Swiss Political Science Review .
Rehavi, M.M. 2007. “Sex and politics: Do female legislators affect state spending.” Unpublished
manuscript, University of Michigan .
Reingold, Beth. 1992. “Concepts of representation among female and male state legislators.” Leg-
islative Studies Quarterly pp. 509–537.
Reynolds, Andrew. 1999. “Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World.” World Politics
51(4):547–72.
Reynolds, Andrew. 2013. “Representation and rights: The impact of LGBT legislators in compara-
tive perspective.” American Political Science Review 107(02):259–274.
Rigon, Massimiliano & Giulia Tanzi. 2012. “Does gender matter for public spending? Empirical
evidence from Italian municipalities.” Empirical Evidence from Italian Municipalities (April 27,
2012). Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No 862.
Roemer, J.E. 1998. “Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: an old argument in new garb.”
Journal of Public Economics 70(3):399–424.
Rogers, W. 1994. “Regression standard errors in clustered samples.” Stata technical bulletin 3(13).
Romer, Thomas & Howard Rosenthal. 1979. “The elusive median voter.” Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 12(2):143–170.
Rønsen, Marit & Marianne Sundström. 1996. “Maternal employment in Scandinavia: A comparison
of the after-birth employment activity of Norwegian and Swedish women.” Journal of population
economics 9(3):267–285.
Rosenthal, Cindy Simon. 1998. When women lead: Integrative leadership in state legislatures. Oxford
University Press on Demand.
Rubin, Donald B. 1973. “Matching to remove bias in observational studies.” Biometrics pp. 159–183.
Rueda, David. 2005. “Insider–outsider politics in industrialized democracies: the challenge to social
democratic parties.” American Political Science Review 99(01):61–74.
Rueda, David. 2006. “Social democracy and active labour-market policies: Insiders, outsiders and
the politics of employment promotion.” British Journal of Political Science 36(03):385–406.
224
Rueda, David & Jonas Pontusson. 2010. “Individual Preferences for Redistribution in Western
Europe: Self-Interest, Political Articulation, Altruism and Identity.” Unpublished manuscript,
University of Oxford, Oxford. At http://www. yale. edu/leitner/resources/papers/RuedaYale2010.
pdf .
Rule, Wilma. 1987. “Electoral systems, contextual factors and women’s opportunity for election to
parliament in twenty-three democracies.” The Western Political Quarterly pp. 477–498.
Rule, Wilma. 1994. “Parliaments of, by, and for the People: Except for Women?” CONTRIBU-
TIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 338:15–15.
Rule, Wilma & Joseph Francis Zimmerman. 1994. Electoral systems in comparative perspective:
Their impact on women and minorities. Number 338 Greenwood Publishing Group.
Sabatier, Paul A & Christopher Weible. 2014. Theories of the policy process. Westview Press.
Sacchet, Teresa. 2008. “Beyond numbers: The impact of gender quotas in Latin America.” Interna-
tional Feminist Journal of Politics 10(3):369–386.
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. “Gender stereotypes and vote choice.” American Journal of Political
Science pp. 20–34.
Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006. Where women run: Gender and party in the American states. University
of Michigan Press.
Santos, Maria Helena & Lígia Amâncio. 2012. “Género e política: análise sobre as resistências
nos discursos e nas práticas sociais face à Lei da Paridade.” Sociologia, Problemas e Práticas
(68):79–101.
Sartori, Giovanni. 1968. “Representational systems.” International Encyclopedia of the social sci-
ences 13:470–75.
Scheve, Kenneth, David Stasavage et al. 2006. “Religion and preferences for social insurance.”
Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1(3):255–286.
Scheve, Kenneth F & Matthew J Slaughter. 2001. “Labor market competition and individual pref-
erences over immigration policy.” Review of Economics and Statistics 83(1):133–145.
Schmidt, Gregory D & Kyle L Saunders. 2004. “Effective Quotas, Relative Party Magnitude, and
the Success of Female Candidates Peruvian Municipal Elections In Comparative Perspective.”
Comparative Political Studies 37(6):704–734.
Schumacher, Gijs, Catherine E De Vries & Barbara Vis. 2013. “Why do parties change position?
Party organization and environmental incentives.” The Journal of Politics 75(02):464–477.
Schwindt-Bayer, L.A. 2006. “Still supermadres? Gender and the policy priorities of Latin American
legislators.” American Journal of Political Science 50(3):570–585.
Schwindt-Bayer, L.A. 2009. “Making quotas work: the effect of gender quota laws on the election
of women.” Legislative studies quarterly 34(1):5–28.
Schwindt-Bayer, L.A. 2015. “Chile’s Gender Quota: Will It Work?”.
225
Seawright, Jason & John Gerring. 2008. “Case selection techniques in case study research a menu
of qualitative and quantitative options.” Political Research Quarterly 61(2):294–308.
Sénac-Slawinski, Réjane. 2008. “Justifying Parity in France after the Passage of the so-called Parity
Laws and the Electoral Application of them: The ‘Ideological Tinkering’ of Political Party Officials
(UMP and PS) and Women’s NGOs.” French Politics 6(3):234–256.
Shugart, Matthew Soberg. 1998. “The inverse relationship between party strength and executive
strength: a theory of politicians’ constitutional choices.” British Journal of Political Science
28(01):1–29.
Shwindt-Bayer, L.A. & R. Corbetta. 2004. “Gender Turnover and Roll-Call Voting in the US House
of Representatives.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29(2):215–229.
Skeije, H. 1993. Gender and Party Politics. Sage chapter Ending the Male Political Hegemony: The
Norwegian Experience.
Skjeie, Hege. 1991. “The rhetoric of difference: On women’s inclusion into political elites.” Politics
& society 19(2):233–263.
Skocpol, Theda. 1995. Protecting soldiers and mothers. Harvard University Press.
Somer-Topcu, Zeynep. 2009. “Timely decisions: the effects of past national elections on party policy
change.” The Journal of Politics 71(01):238–248.
Strøm, Kaare. 2000. “Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies.” European jour-
nal of political research 37(3):261–290.
Svaleryd, H. 2009. “Women’s representation and public spending.” European Journal of Political
Economy 25(2):186–198.
Svallfors, S. 1997. “Worlds of welfare and attitudes to redistribution: A comparison of eight western
nations.” European Sociological Review 13(3):283–304.
Swank, Duane. 2002. Global capital, political institutions, and policy change in developed welfare
states. Cambridge University Press.
Swers, M.L. 2002. The difference women make: The policy impact of women in Congress. University
of Chicago Press.
Tarrow, Sidney. 2010. “The strategy of paired comparison: Toward a theory of practice.” Compar-
ative political studies 43(2):230–259.
Thomas, S. 1994. How women legislate. Oxford University Press New York.
Thomson, Robert, Terry Royed, Elin Naurin, Joaquin Artés, Mark J Ferguson, Petia Kostadinova &
Catherine Moury. 2012. The program-to-policy linkage: A comparative study of election pledges
and government policies in ten countries. In APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper.
Tripp, Aili Mari & Alice Kang. 2008. “The Global Impact of Quotas On the Fast Track to Increased
Female Legislative Representation.” Comparative Political Studies 41(3):338–361.
Ueda, M. 2005. Does Minority Representation Matter for Policy Outcomes?: Evidence from the US
States. Technical report Working Paper.
226
Van Kersbergen, Kees. 2003. Social capitalism: A study of Christian democracy and the welfare
state. Routledge.
Van Kersbergen, Kees & Philip Manow. 2009. Religion, class coalitions, and welfare states. Cam-
bridge University Press.
Vega, A. & J.M. Firestone. 1995. “The effects of gender on congressional behavior and the substantive
representation of women.” Legislative Studies Quarterly pp. 213–222.
Verba, S., K.L. Schlozman & H.E. Brady. 1995. Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American
politics. Harvard Univ Pr.
Verge, Tania. 2012. “Institutionalising Gender Equality in Spain: From Party Quotas to Electoral
Gender Quotas.” West European Politics 35(2):395–414.
URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2011.648014
Vokens, A, O Lacewell, P Lehmann, S Regel, H Schultze & A Werner. 2012. “The Manifesto Data
Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR).” Manifesto Project Database .
Volkens, Andrea, Pola Lehmann, Nicolas Merz, Sven Regel, Annika Werner, Onawa Promise
Lacewell & Henrike Schultze. N.d. “The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project
(MRG/CMP/MARPOR).”.
Von Wahl, Angelika. 2006. “Gender equality in Germany: Comparing policy change across domains.”
West European Politics 29(3):461–488.
Walgrave, Stefaan, Frédéric Varone & Patrick Dumont. 2006. “Policy with or without parties? A
comparative analysis of policy priorities and policy change in Belgium, 1991 to 2000.” Journal of
European Public Policy 13(7):1021–1038.
Wängnerud, L. 2009. “Women in parliaments: Descriptive and substantive representation.” Annual
Review of Political Science 12:51–69.
Wängnerud, Lena. 2000. “Testing the politics of presence: Women’s representation in the Swedish
Riksdag.” Scandinavian political studies 23(1):67–91.
Washington, E.L. 2008. “Female Socialization: How Daughters Affect Their Legislator Fathers’
Voting on Women’s Issues.” The American economic review 98(1):311–332.
Wauters, Bram, Karolien Weekers & Bart Maddens. 2010. “Explaining the number of preferential
votes for women in an open-list PR system: an investigation of the 2003 federal elections in
Flanders (Belgium).” Acta Politica 45(4):468–490.
Weeks, Ana Catalano & Lisa Baldez. 2015. “Quotas and qualifications: the impact of gender quota
laws on the qualifications of legislators in the Italian parliament.” European Political Science
Review 7(01):119–144.
Welch, Susan. 1985. “Are women more liberal than men in the US Congress?” Legislative Studies
Quarterly pp. 125–134.
Weldon, S Laurel. 2002. “Beyond Bodies: Institutional Sources of Representation for Women in
Democratic Policymaking.” Journal of Politics 64(4):1153–1174.
227
Wennemo, Irene. 1994. Sharing the costs of children: Studies on the development of family support
in the OECD countries. Swedish Institute for Social Research [Institutet för social forskning].
Whitby, Kenny J. 2000. The color of representation: Congressional behavior and black interests.
University of Michigan Press.
Williams, Laron K, Katsunori Seki & Guy D Whitten. 2014. “You’ve Got Some Explaining To
Do: The Influence of Economic Conditions and Spatial Competition on Party Strategy.” Political
Science Research and Methods pp. 1–17.
Williams, Melissa S. 2012. “Beyond the Empirical-Normative Divide: The Democratic Theory of
Jane Mansbridge.” PS: Political Science & Politics 45(04):797–805.
Williams, R.L. 2000. “A note on robust variance estimation for cluster-correlated data.” Biometrics
56(2):645–646.
Winship, Christopher & Stephen L Morgan. 1999. “The estimation of causal effects from observa-
tional data.” Annual review of sociology pp. 659–706.
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2010. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT press.
Wucherpfennig, Julian, Nils W Metternich, Lars-Erik Cederman & Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. 2012.
“Ethnicity, the state, and the duration of civil war.” World Politics 64(01):79–115.
Xydias, Christina. 2009. Women Representing Women: Examining the Effects of Gender Quotas.
In Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
Young, Iris Marion. 1997. “Deferring group representation.” Nomos pp. 349–376.
Zetterberg, P. 2008. “The downside of gender quotas? Institutional constraints on women in Mexican
state legislatures.” Parliamentary Affairs 61(3):442–460.
228
